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No person in our country can be convicted of a crime unless there is absolute 
certainty about his guilt.  That is the theory, at least.  If the accused does not willingly 
plead guilty, all the essential elements of guilt must be proven to a jury, and they must be 
proven “beyond a reasonable doubt.”1  To be sure, the phrase “reasonable doubt” does 
not actually appear anywhere in the Constitution.  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
expressed the view that the reasonable doubt rule only “crystalliz[ed] . . . as late as 
1798.”2  Nevertheless, in 1970 the Court read the familiar standard of proof into our 
constitutional law.3  Since then, the Court has insisted unwaveringly on the fundamental 
importance of the requirement of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” even at the cost of 
throwing American sentencing law into “far reaching and  . . . disturbing” confusion.4   
The words “reasonable doubt” may not appear in the Constitution; but it is inconceivable 
that we could abandon our American commitment to the “reasonable doubt” standard of 
proof—so much so that Supreme Court does not shy away from creating chaos our 
criminal justice system in its name. 
Yet this fundamental commitment can be uncomfortably difficult to explain and 
justify.  The formula “reasonable doubt” is, after all, hardly easy to interpret.  How 
exactly are you supposed to know when your doubts about the guilt of the accused are 
                                                 
1 In Re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 374 (1970) (citing C. McCormick, Evidence § 321, pp. 681-682 (1954); 
see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed. 1940); 
2 Id., 373; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000). 
3 In re Winship, 357 U.S. 358 (1970);  sim. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000). 
4 Blakely v. Washington, 2204 U.S. Lexis, 4573 (O’Connor Dissent at IV a). 
“reasonable”?  Jurors are sometimes understandably baffled5:  Even some of the most 
sophisticated members of the legal profession find the question too difficult to answer.6  
In fact, there is a considerable corpus of case law in which judges flounder unhappily 
over the definition of “reasonable doubt.”  Courts in several states are forbidden even to 
try to explain the standard, according to one study,7 and a majority of the federal circuits 
treat it as so elusive that trial courts cannot be required to define it.8  The Supreme Court, 
for its part, has not been much help.  The Court took a crack at the problem in 1990, 
holding that the “reasonable doubt” instruction could not include another venerable 
historical phrase, “moral certainty.”9  Four years later, however, the Court backtracked, 
declaring that “moral certainty” could be used in some circumstances after all, and 
otherwise declining to elucidate the meaning of the standard.10  The Court has made it 
clear that an error in defining “reasonable doubt” is never harmless11;  the rule is too 
fundamentally important for that.  At the same time, the Court’s decisions leave it at best 
unclear whether courts are obliged to define the “reasonable doubt” standard for confused 
jurors or not.12   
                                                 
5 See e.g. the discussion of People v. Redd, 266 A.D.2d 12, 698 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep't 1999), cited and 
discussed in Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury 
Instructions, 66 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1081, 1087 (1999). 
6 For the views of an eminent federal judge, see Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 NYU L 
Rev. 979, 982-990 (1993);  and for a sharply worded account by a sitting Justice of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court, see Stephen J. Fortunato, No Uncertain Terms, Legal Affairs (January/February 2004), 16-
18.  For an account of the current state of affairs, see John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? 
Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1187, 1187 
(2002). 
7 See Jessica Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical Concept, 22 
Am. J. Crim. L. 677, 687-688 (1995).  According to Robert C. Power, Reasonable and Other Doubts: The 
Problem of Jury Instructions, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 45, 87 (1999), one state moved out that category since 
Cohen’s study. 
8 Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction, 682-686;  Power, Reasonable and Other Doubts, 86. 
9 Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). 
10 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). 
11 Sullivan v Louisiana (US) 124 L Ed 2d 182, 113 S Ct 2078 (1993). 
12 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 23-28 (1994)  (Justice Ginsburg, Concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
All this makes for an unsettling state of affairs.  The “reasonable doubt” standard 
is undeniably a fundamental part of our law.  Yet a majority of our judiciary seems to 
have come to the conclusion that the phrase “reasonable doubt” can be assigned no 
definitive meaning.  A cynic or post-modern philosopher might point to this situation, 
gleefully, as evidence for the deep incoherence of the most basic propositions of the law. 
It is not my purpose in this Article to offer any such cynical or post-modern 
account.  We can understand our law.  But in order to understand it, we sometimes have 
to dig deep into its history, and that is the case here.  As I want to show, the “reasonable 
doubt” formula seems mystifying today because we have lost sight of its original 
purpose.  The origins of  “reasonable doubt” lie in a forgotten world of pre-modern 
Christian theology, a world whose concerns were quite different from our own. 
At its origins, as this Article aims to show, the familiar “reasonable doubt” rule 
was not intended to perform the function we ask it to perform today:  It was not primarily 
intended to protect the accused.  Instead, it had a significantly different, and distinctly 
Christian, purpose:  The “reasonable doubt” formula was originally concerned with 
protecting the souls of the jurors against damnation.  Convicting an innocent defendant 
was regarded, in the older Christian tradition, as a potential mortal sin.  The purpose of 
the “reasonable doubt” instruction was to address this frightening possibility, reassuring 
jurors that they could convict the defendant without risking their own salvation, as long 
as their doubts about guilt were not “reasonable.”  It is only if we see the rule in this 
original context that we can grasp its significance:  The rule was simply never designed 
to protect the accused, nor even to serve as a standard of proof in the proper sense of the 
term. 
Historians have sometimes come tantalizingly close to grasping this basic truth 
about the origins of “reasonable doubt.”13  Indeed, in many ways it is a truth that is 
simply obvious.  We all know that jurors are supposed to decide “according to 
conscience”; and everyone with a basic knowledge of Christian doctrine understands that 
questions of “conscience” are questions that involve peril for the soul of the individual 
Christian.  It should not be entirely surprising to learn that the problems of jury trial are in 
part problems involving risks to the souls of Christian jurors:  Of course it is the case that 
Christian jurors who vote falsely to convict do so at the risk of their own salvation.  
Nevertheless, historians have never grasped the magnitude of the theological problems of 
“conscience” and salvation in the structure of jury trial, and they have not rightly 
understood the connection between those problems and the concept of “reasonable 
doubt.”  Indeed, some historians—notably John Langbein—have denied that Christian 
moral theology of conscience has anything to do with the “reasonable doubt” rule at all.14  
And while other scholars, such as James Franklin and Barbara Shapiro, have looked 
through the literature of moral theology in the hunt for the origins of “reasonable doubt,” 
they have not recognized how critically important the question of salvation was.15  The 
consequence is that we find ourselves far more confused about the state of our law today 
than we need to be. 
                                                 
13 Especially Barbara Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause:  Historical Perspectives on 
the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (Berkeley: U. of California, 1991), 1-41;  James Franklin, The 
Science of Conjecture: : Evidence and Probability before Pascal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001), 1-
101;  Margaret Sampson, Laxity and Liberty in seventeenth-century English political thought, in Edmund 
Leites, ed., Conscience and Casuisty in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, England, 1988), 85-87. 
14 Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: The View from the Ryder Sources, 96 Col. L. 
Rev. 1168, 1199 n. 152 (1996). 
15 The most important of these accounts remains Shapiro’s admirable effort to show that the origins of the 
rule lie in “satisfied conscience” standard of the seventeenth century.  Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
and Probable Cause, 1-41.  The shortcoming of this fine work lies in its failure to grasp that proof as such 
was not the issue:  Instead, the deep problems involved, not the satisfied conscience, but the safe 
conscience.  I offer fuller discussion below, Sections VII and VIII.  
In the effort to put an end this confusion, this Article traces the historical link 
between the “reasonable doubt” formula and the problem of juror salvation.  The story 
revolves around aspects of pre-modern Christian theology that are likely to seem strange 
to the modern reader.  In particular, it revolves around the moral theology of judging.  
Medieval and early modern Christians experienced great anxiety about the dangers that 
acts of judgment presented for the soul of the judge.  As all readers of Dante know, 
medieval office-holders faced the risk of damnation if they committed sin in the course of 
their official acts.  Those risks confronted judges just as they faced to all officeholders.  
Indeed, the problems of judges were considered exceptionally important, and commanded 
considerable attention.  As medieval church lawyers put it, any sinful misstep committed 
by a judge in the course of judging “built him a mansion in Hell,”16 and rules had to be 
developed to shield the judge from the consequences of his own official acts.  This was 
especially true any time a judge imposed “blood punishments”—i.e., execution and 
mutilation, the standard criminal punishments of pre-nineteenth-century law. 
Now, when it came to inflicting blood punishments, pre-modern Christian 
theology turned in particular on the problem of “doubt.”  “Doubt” about the facts 
presented a real danger to the soul of the individual judge:  “Doubt” was the voice of an 
uncertain conscience, and in principle it had to be obeyed.  Such was the rule laid down 
in particular by the standard “safer way” school of Christian moral theology:  “In cases of 
doubt,” as the “safer way” formula ran, “the safer way is not to act at all.”17  This 
doctrine was applied to judging as it was to all other acts involving the individual 
                                                 
16Thus my slightly poetic translation of  “edificat in Gehennam.”  The phrase is quoted and discussed in 
Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters im gelehrten Prozeβ der Frühzeit: Iudex secundum allegata 
non secundum conscientiam iudicat (Munich: Beck, 1967), 50 n.1. 
17 Discussed below, Section 
conscience:  As a typical French “dictionary of conscience” explained the standard 
Christian law in the eighteenth century, “In every case of doubt, where one’s salvation is 
in peril, one must always take the safer way. . . .   A judge who is in doubt must refuse to 
judge.”18  A judge who sentenced an accused person to a blood punishment while 
experiencing “doubt” about guilt committed a mortal sin, and thus put his own salvation 
at risk.  These were injunctions that were applied to judges in every part of western 
Christendom, from Spain to Germany, from Italy to England. 
The history of the “reasonable doubt” rule is the history of English struggles with 
these universal western Christian challenges.  Common law jurors were Christians, and 
they were Christians who engaged in acts of judgment.  During the Middle Ages English 
criminal jurors did not yet face the worst dangers involved in such acts:  Medieval 
criminal juries were not compelled to enter the general verdict of “guilty,” and therefore 
were not compelled to put their souls at risk.  But in the early modern period, the moral 
dangers of judging became acute for English criminal jurors.  As an eighteenth-century 
guide to the Englishman’s civic duties ominously reminded its readers:  “The Office and 
Power of these Juries is Judicial, they only are the Judges from whose Sentence the 
Indicted are to expect Life or Death.” 19  Yet within the Christian tradition this was an 
“Office and Power” fraught with danger.  To be a juror was potentially to “build yourself 
a mansion in Hell”—“to pawn [your] Soul,” as a famous seventeenth-century pamphlet 
put it.20  There is plenty of evidence that Christian jurors took this quite seriously, 
especially at the end of the eighteenth century.  As the moral philosopher William Paley 
                                                 
18 Collet, Abrégé du Dictionnaire des Cas de Conscience de M. Pontas, Paris : Libraires Associés, 1767, 1 : 
467-468. 
19 [Anon.], A Guide to the Knowledge of the Rights and Privileges of Englishmen (London:  Printed for J. 
Williams and W. Bingley, 1771), 95-96. 
20 Hawles, Englishman’s Right, 122. 
described the situation in 1785, jurors experienced “a general dread lest the charge of 
innocent blood should lie at their doors.”21  Jurors simply did not want to convict, Paley 
complained:  In their “weak timidity,” they held it “the part of a safe conscience not to 
condemn any man, whilst there exists the minutest possibility of his innocence.”22
It was in response to such juror “timidity” and “dread” that the “reasonable 
doubt” standard introduced itself into the common law in the 1770s and especially 1780s.   
Paley’s 1785 description of jurors who wished to preserve a “safe conscience” was 
exactly correct:  English Christian jurors of the 1780s, following the standard precepts of 
“safer way” theology, often wished to take the “surest side”23 or the “safer way,”24 
refusing to convict the accused where they experienced “any degree of doubt.” 25  The 
same was true on the American side of the Atlantic:  As John Adams reminded the jurors 
in the Boston Massacre trials in 1770, repeating language of moral theology that dated 
back to the Middle Ages:  “[w]here you are doubtful never act: that is, if you doubt of the 
prisoner’s guilt, never declare him guilty; that is always the rule, especially in cases of 
life.”26  It was in the face of such religiously motivated reluctance to convict that the 
“reasonable doubt” rule arose, taking its now-familiar form during the 1780s.  Christian 
moral theology had always left some room to ignore doubts that were not “reasonable.”  
English criminal justice embraced this, aiming to persuade jurors that they could convict 
without risk to the safety of their salvation, as long as their “doubts” were not 
“reasonable.”   
                                                 
21 Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (Indianapolis, 2002), 391-392 (1785).  For 
“innocent blood”:  Matt. 27:4 (Judas). 
22 Id. 
23 Trial of John Shepherd (Theft) (1789).  THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY REF: T17890603-43 
24 Trial of Henry Harvey (Deception, Perjury) (1785) THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY REF: 
T17850914-187 
25 Trial of John Shepherd (Theft) (1789).  THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY REF: T17890603-43 
26 3 L. Wroth and H. Zobel, Legal Papers of John Adams (1965), 243. 
Such is the origin of “reasonable doubt.”  As it suggests, the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard was not originally designed to make it more difficult for jurors to 
convict.  As thoughtful historians have sometimes recognized, it was designed to make 
conviction easier, by assuring jurors that their souls were safe if they voted to condemn 
the accused.27  In its original form, it had nothing to do with maintaining the rule of law 
in the sense that we use the phrase, and nothing like the relationship we imagine to the 
values of liberty.  It was the product of a world troubled by moral anxieties that no longer 
trouble us much at all.  All of this makes it unsurprising that our law should find itself in 
a state of confusion today.  We are asking the “reasonable doubt” standard to serve a 
function that it was not originally designed to serve, and it does its work predictably 
badly. 
Those are the simple outlines of the history this Article recounts.  In its full detail 
the story is inevitably more complex.  The theology and jurisprudence of “doubt” and 
blood punishments developed principally in continental Europe.  It began developing 
during the twelfth century, particularly during the great campaign against ordeals.  
Accordingly, I will spend some time discussing ordeals, and explaining continental 
developments.  Inevitably, I will also have to spend time describing Christian theology—
not only the theology of “doubt,” but also about questions concerning the judge’s use of 
his “private knowledge,” and the nature of Catholic confession and its Calvinist 
alternatives. 
I will also spend some time, at the beginning of the Article, developing a basic, 
but little explored, jurisprudential distinction:  the distinction between proof procedures 
                                                 
27 Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof have 
Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165, 1169 (2003);  Anthony Morano, A 
Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. Rev. 507 (1975). 
and what I will call moral comfort procedures.  As I hope to convince the reader, this is a 
fundamentally important distinction for understanding the original meaning of the 
“reasonable doubt” rule, and indeed for understanding pre-modern law more broadly.  
Proof procedures, as the name suggests, aim to achieve proof in cases of uncertainty.  
Moral comfort procedures, by contrast, aim to relieve the moral anxieties of persons who 
fear engaging in acts of judgment—persons such as early modern criminal jurors.  As the 
opening Section of this Article will argue, these two different kinds of procedures are 
easily confused.  Indeed, the errors of our “reasonable doubt” historiography almost all 
grow out of a failure to distinguish proof procedures from moral comfort procedures. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Section I lays out the distinction between proof 
procedures and moral comfort procedures.  Section II begins an exploration of Christian 
moral theology, discussing the medieval concept of blood guilt and its application to the 
judicial ordeal.  Sections III and IV describe the pre-modern theology of judging, 
including the ban on the judge’s use of his “private knowledge” (Section III), and the 
application of the theology of “doubt” to the problems of criminal procedure (Section 
IV).  Section V turns more specifically to the common law, explaining how general 
western theological precepts were applied to judges and jurors in England.   In Section 
VI, the treatment of the medieval criminal jury is described.  In particular, Section VI 
emphasizes the importance of the special immunities enjoyed by medieval criminal 
juries.  In Section VII, the Article describes the seminal events of the seventeenth 
century, as criminal jurors escaped the coercion that had been their lot during the Tudor 
period, and faced the moral dilemmas of conscience.  Section VIII explores the final 
emergence of the “reasonable doubt” standard in the moral theology and law of the 
eighteenth century, and Section IX concludes. 
 
 
I.  Two Kinds of Procedures:  Proof and Moral Comfort 
 
There already exists a large and very fine literature on the history of “reasonable 
doubt,” and it may seem improbable that there is anything left to say.  Nevertheless, 
confusion about the origin of the rule continues to reign.  To appreciate the depth of this 
confusion, one need only glance at the two most recent books to address the problem.  On 
the one hand, we have The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, a 2003 book by John 
Langbein, the most learned and penetrating of common law historians at work today.  To 
Langbein, it seems clear that the “reasonable doubt” developed in England in the mid-
1780s, and equally clear that it developed as part of a larger effort to create procedural 
protections for the accused, “in association with the ripening adversary system.”28  In 
particular, Langbein associates the rule with the “lawyerization” of the common law trial, 
a process by which defense counsel gradually introduced procedural protections for the 
accused over the course of the eighteenth century.29
On the other hand, we have The Science of Conjecture, a 2001 book by James 
Franklin, a historian of science and epistemology.  To Franklin, it is clear that the 
“reasonable doubt” standard dates, not the eighteenth, but to the sixteenth century; and 
equally clear that it was not produced by lawyers at all.  According to Franklin, the 
                                                 
28 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford, 2003), 33. 
29 Langbein, Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 261-266. 
phrase “reasonable doubt” was first coined by the Spanish moral theologian Francisco 
Suarez.30  As Franklin sees it, the history of the phrase does not by any means belong 
exclusively to the history of the law.  It belongs to a much larger history of the search for 
certainty, a search that preoccupied scientists, theologians and philosophers as much as it 
did lawyers.  Nor is Franklin the only historian to say this sort of thing.  Barbara Shapiro 
is an even better known advocate of the same position.  Shapiro finds the origins of 
“reasonable doubt” in the seventeenth century.  For her too, the legal rule is to be seen 
alongside the similar rules found among scientists,31 as well as among divines like Bishop 
Wilkins, who spoke of the search for “moral certainty”32:  For Shapiro as for Franklin, 
“reasonable doubt” was the product of a grand early modern intellectual effort to find 
certainty in the world.  There are other claims in the literature, too:  Anthony Morano has 
tried to show that the “reasonable doubt” rule grew up during the Boston Massacre trials 
of 1770, as part of a debate over “the traditional English concept that it is better to acquit 
the guilty than to convict the innocent.”33
Can these views be reconciled?  What, if anything, does the version of 
“reasonable doubt” that we find among sixteenth-century Spanish moral theologians have 
to do with the version of “reasonable doubt” that we find in the criminal trials of the Old 
Bailey in the 1780s, or the Boston Massacre trials in 1770?   This is the key question for 
                                                 
30 Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 2001), 63. 
31 Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships 
between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law and Literature (Princeton, 1983), 167-193 
32Barbara J. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-
1850, 38 Hastings L.J. 153 (1986).  This line of argument was first explored by Theodore Waldman, 
Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt, J. History of Ideas 20:3 (1959):  299-316, and has most 
recently been reviewed by Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the 
Burden of Proof have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165,  1171-1195 
(2003). 
33 Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. Rev. 507, 517 
(1975). 
understanding the history of “reasonable doubt.”  Answering it requires us to immerse 
ourselves in a forgotten world of pre-modern adjudication and theology. 
Indeed, our difficulties in understanding the “reasonable doubt” rule are the result 
of a failure of historical memory.  We have forgotten that legal procedures in the pre-
modern world were not like legal procedures today.  They did not always aim only at 
achieving certainty and proof in cases where the guilt of the offender was uncertain.  Nor 
did they aim only at providing procedural safeguards for the accused.  Instead, they were 
often designed to help relieve the judge’s own anxieties about the dangers surrounding 
the act of judging.  As James Fitzjames Stephen, the pioneering nineteenth-century 
historian of the criminal law, famously put it, pre-modern judges often dreaded “the 
responsibility—which to many men would appear intolerably heavy and painful—of 
deciding . . . upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner.” 34  They dreaded this 
responsibility so much that they avoided entering verdicts if at all possible, or else sought 
to diminish their personal responsibility in other ways.  They were not seeking proof so 
much as they were seeking moral comfort. 
To understand this, we must begin by recognizing how authentically disquieting 
the act of judgment could seem in the pre-modern world.  Pre-modern judges did indeed 
face “heavy and painful” dangers.  Not all of these dangers were spiritual.  Sometimes 
they were legal:  In medieval Italy, for example, judges were subject to civil and criminal 
liability for incorrect judgments.35 English jurors faced similar legal threats until 1670.36  
On a grosser level, the physical well-being of a judge was sometimes threatened in the 
                                                 
34 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Routledge, repr. 1996) 
(orig. 1883), 1: 573. 
35 Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 265 and 265 n. 553 for bibliography. 
36 Below, Section VII. 
past, just as it is still sometimes threatened today:  The pre-modern judge who 
condemned a person might easily become the target of vengeance by that person’s family 
or associates.  The world of today, in which most judges can simply leave the courtroom 
behind with comparatively little fear for their lives or livelihoods, is a very modern 
world.   
But lives and livelihoods were not all that was at stake.  For understanding the rise 
of the “reasonable doubt” standard, it is especially important to recognize that a judge 
might, as Stephen implied, dread the moral and spiritual responsibilities of judgment.  
This was particularly true where capital punishment was concerned.  Lending one’s hand 
to the killing of another person is widely regarded as a frightening business in human 
societies.  As anthropologists and historians of religion have shown, anyone in the pre-
modern world involved in the killing of another person subjected himself to the risk of 
bad luck, bad karma, bad fate37; and when it comes to capital cases, judges (and jurors) 
are, after all, persons who can be thought of as cooperating in the collective killing of 
another human being.   
This may sound bizarre to the modern reader.  We are accustomed to the idea that 
the judge’s professional identity puts him in a different kind of moral position from that 
of a person “cooperating in a collective killing”;  modern judges succeed in maintaining a 
psychic distance from the raw results of the judgments they enter, seeking only proof and 
certainty.  So for that matter do most (though certainly not all) modern jurors.  But the 
capacity to maintain that kind of psychic distance developed only very slowly.  Judges 
were not by any means always clearly exempted from the risk of spiritual responsibility 
                                                 
37 For reflections by three eminent scholars, see Walter Burkert, René Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith, 
Violent Origins, ed. Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly (Stanford, 1987). 
for the killings over which they presided, whether in the western or the non-western 
worlds, and they sometimes displayed considerable anxiety. 
Indeed, it is helpful to begin with a non-western example, which will offer a 
useful foil for the Christian tradition that eventually produced the “reasonable doubt” 
rule.  This example is drawn from the world of the Theravada Buddhist tradition as 
described by Andrew Huxley.  It involves judging and “kamma,” the Pali word for 
karma, and it features the infant who would grow up to be the Buddha: 
In the Tenniya Jataka the future Buddha at one month old, sitting with the king, 
his father, in court, witnesses his father sentencing criminals to death.  Instantly 
he remembers that in a past life he too condemned men to death, and that as a 
result he endured the pains of hell for 80,000 years.  To escape inheriting the 
throne, the Future Buddha pretends to be autistic.  In the face of this canonical 
warning that inflicting punishment can damage your kamma, the devout Buddhist 
prince should refuse to become king.38
This passage offers us a paradigmatic example of the moral anxieties attached to judging 
in the pre-modern world.  Judging is dangerous—not just to the accused, but also to the 
judge.  It is dangerous to the judge regardless of the merits of the case:  Note that there is 
no suggestion here that the King was condemning innocent persons to death; the dangers 
to his kamma were dangers presented by any act of condemnation.  As Huxley observes, 
this was an attitude that pushed Theravada Buddhists toward a radical antinomianism, 
which at the limit preached a collapse of all social institutions.39
                                                 
38 Andrew Huxley, Sanction in the Theravada Buddhist Kingdoms, in Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin 
pour l’Histoire Comparative des Institutions 58: La Peine (Brussels, 1991), 4 : 345. 
39 Id. 
Western Christian thinkers were never quite so radically antinomian:  Western 
fears have mostly involved condemning the innocent, not the guilty.  Nevertheless, 
Christianity had its own antinomian streak, and its own anxieties about the afterlife, and 
there are closely related passages and practices in western law as well, passages and 
practices that betray a real anxiety about the spritual risks associated with judging.  
Beware the act of judging, theologians declared all through the Middle Ages:  You risk 
making yourself into a murderer.40  Or as the most famous text on jury trial of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Sir John Hawles’ The Englishman’s Right, put it, 
echoing the medieval theological tradition:  let the conscientious juryman “tremble,” lest 
he be “guilty of [the defendant’s] Murther.”41  If most of us have forgotten these 
anxieties, they were still very much alive for late eighteenth-century jurors, as they 
remain alive for some jurors in capital cases today. 
So how can you judge in a capital case without becoming a “murtherer” yourself?  
The response given by the Tenniya Jataka offers essentially no hope:  Judging, according 
to this Theravada tale, is quite simply synonymous with killing.  But the western 
Christian tradition has typically taken a more forgiving approach, creating institutions 
that allow judges to condemn offenders to death without suffering crippling personal 
anxiety.  Indeed, throughout western legal history we find many procedures designed to 
ease or eliminate the burden of moral responsibility for judges, soldiers, executioners, or 
persons who join in a group killing from necessity.  These are what I will call moral 
comfort procedures, procedures designed to guarantee that judges in capital cases, and 
                                                 
40 Below, Section II. 
41 Id., 22 
people like them, can take away a necessary dose of moral comfort, even while 
participating in a death. 
The idea that legal procedures might sometimes serve such a moral comfort 
purpose is not completely unfamiliar.  It is an idea we find in particular among critics of 
the American death penalty, who have often tried to show that American law is structured 
in a way that allows participants in the death penalty system to deny their moral 
responsibility.  These critics often analogize the American system to a firing squad.  
Firing squad procedure is well known:  One member of the squad is chosen to receive a 
blank, but no member of the squad is permitted to know precisely which of them is the 
chosen one.  The purpose of this procedure is easy to discern:  It is intended to relieve the 
individual squad members of a burdensome sense of moral responsibility, by allowing 
each one to doubt that it was he who fired the fatal shot.  It offers, as we might say, a kind 
of moral safe harbor for the conscience of each individual fusilier.  Critics of American  
capital punishment, most probingly Laura Underkuffler,42 have often seized on this 
example in their efforts to capture the immorality of American law.43  As they see it, the 
American criminal justice system works like a kind of gigantic firing squad—a system in 
which every actor manages to find a way to disclaim his disquieting personal 
responsibility for the death of the offender. 
Doubts can be raised about this as a description of America.  It is not clear that 
modern American officials involved in inflicting the death penalty really feel a need for 
                                                 
42 Underkuffler, Propter Honoris Respectum: Agentic and Conscientic Decisions in Law: Death and Other 
Cases, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1730-1732 (1999). 
43 For this common topos in the death penalty literature, see e.g. Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, 
and Martin T. Wells, Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 44 Buffalo L. Rev. 339, 339 (1996);  Laura 
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moral comfort.  In particular, is not at all certain that American death penalty jurors really 
feel meaningful moral qualms.44  But if modern American jurors do not clearly feel such 
qualms, pre-modern jurors most definitely did, as we shall see; and so did pre-modern 
judges and others involved in collective killings.  Pre-modern legal systems really were 
structured, for some purposes, like gigantic firing squads, with numerous procedures 
designed to provide the agents of killing with ways of denying or diminishing their sense 
of moral responsibility. 
Many of those procedures were directed at executioners or other ordinary killers 
from necessity such as soldiers.45  Firing squad procedure does indeed offer one example.  
Another example is the traditional rule on cannibalism among shipwrecked sailors—the 
rule that was rejected in the famous case of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens.  According 
to this traditional rule, starving seamen could kill and eat one of their number, but only 
provided that they drew lots to determine which of them would be the victim.46  As all 
first-year law students know, the Dudley and Stephens court could not see any sense in 
this procedure, which it described drily as “somewhat strange.”47  Yet this procedure 
makes perfect sense, given the anxieties about killing that are so widespread in human 
societies.  Drawing lots makes it possible to assert that God, or Fate, or Chance has made 
the decision to kill, thus lifting the moral responsibility from the participants in the 
                                                 
44 The results of Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells, Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 44 Buffalo L. 
Rev. 339, 367 (1996), are complex and effectively ambiguous:  They find that the “average juror,” while 
aware of his moral responsibility, “does not think it likely that any death sentence he imposes will actually 
ever be carried out.” 
45 For Saint Augustine on soldiers, see below Section II. 
46 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 1 Wall. Jr. 1 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842), cited and discussed in Regina 
v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
47 Id. 
killing.48  Indeed, when it comes to cannibalism, we can all grasp the reassuring spiritual 
logic of this sort of procedure:  Any of us driven to cannibalism would be glad for the 
chance to claim that the decision had been made by chance or God, not by ourselves.   
Pre-modern judges, too, were provided with chances to disclaim their moral 
responsibility for their acts.  In particular, there were two types of common moral 
comfort procedures for judges.  First, there are responsibility-shifting procedures—rules 
that aimed to comfort the judge by forcing some other agent to assume all or part of the 
responsibility for making the final judgment.  Stephen interpreted jury trial in exactly this 
way:   
It is hardly necessary to say that to judges in general the maintenance of trial by 
jury is of more importance than to any other members of the community.  It saves 
judges from the responsibility—which to many men would appear intolerably 
heavy and painful—of deciding simply on their own opinion upon the guilt or 
innocence of the prisoner. 49
The structure of jury trial, as Stephen interpreted it, was such that each of its two actors, 
judge and jury, could shift some of the more responsibility for judgment over to the other, 
thus diminishing the sense of responsibility for both.  The same observation was made, in 
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was said à propos of Rabelais’ famous Judge Bridoye, who decided cases by a throw of the dice.  See 
Rabelais, Le Tiers Livre des Faicts et Dicts Héroïques du Bon Pantagruel (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 
1970), 191-211 (chaps. xxxix-xliv).  The judge, says Pantagruel: 
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Justice maintenu, comme disent les talmudistes en sort n’estre mal aulcun contenu, seulement par 
sort estre, en anxiété et doubte des humains, manifestée la volunté divine. 
Id., 210. 
49 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Routledge, repr. 1996) 
(orig. 1883), 1: 573. 
considerably more dramatic language, by our seventeenth-century pamphleteer Hawles, 
who described the dynamic of jury trial this way: 
[T]he Guilt of the Blood or ruin of an Innocent man [is] Bandyed to and fro, and 
shuffled off from the Jury to the Judge, and from the Judge to the Jury, but really 
sticks fast to both, but especially on the Jurors.50
To Hawles, jury trial was something akin to a children’s game, in which judge and jury 
each tried to see to it that the other ended up “it.”  Many pre-modern procedures took 
such forms:  Pre-modern judges feared “the Guilt of Blood,” and were eager to “shuffle it 
off” on to some other actor.  The medieval ordeal offers a striking example of a 
procedure that could serve such a guilt-shuffling, children’s-game-like purpose:  As 
historians have recognized, ordeals were sometimes inflicted on persons whose guilt was 
already certain.  The ordeal, in such cases, did not serve as a means of proof.  Instead, its 
purpose was to force God to make the decision to convict the accused, thus shuffling 
what Peter Brown calls “the odium of human responsibility” off the shoulders of the 
community, and onto the shoulders of the Almighty Himself.51  Let God be the one who 
makes the decision to kill him! 
Such guilt-shuffling procedures are not the only ones we find.  There is also a 
second, and especially important, approach to easing the judge’s sense of moral 
responsibility, which involves what we may call agency-denial.  Agency-denial 
procedures allow the judge to disclaim meaningful personal agency even while entering a 
capital verdict.  A fine example of such agency denial, as we shall see, is the law of 
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51 Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural : A Medieval Change,” in Brown, Society and the Holy in 
Late Antiquity (California, 1982), 313.  This point is discussed more fully below, footnote.   
evidence that developed on the medieval continent.  Medieval canon lawyers insisted that 
the judge should convict the accused pursuant to a highly rule-bound heuristic.  By so 
doing, they aimed to guarantee that the judge would incur no personal moral 
responsibility:  In a perfectly rule-bound system, the canonists declared, it was the law 
that made the decision, and not the judge.  Or, to quote the starker language of the great 
twelfth-century canonist Gratian:  In a perfectly rule-bound system, “it is the law that 
kills him, not you,” “lex eum occidit, non tu.”52  This idea too would reappear among 
English jurors:  As one of the leading moral theologians of the seventeenth century 
described it, jurors were eager to avoid the moral “agency” for judgment by declaring “It 
is the Law that doth it, and not we.”53
Now, these sorts of procedures, involving what to us seem infantile efforts to 
evade moral responsibility, stand in a complex relationship to proof procedures.  By 
“proof procedures” I mean nothing complicated or elusive.  Proof procedures are 
procedures intended to aid in the discovery of the truth in cases of uncertainty.  Take, for 
example, a rule holding that a confession by the accused cannot support a conviction 
unless that confession is corroborated by independent evidence.  The purpose of such a 
rule is obviously to guarantee that the trial procedures will arrive at the truth, given the 
inherent unreliability of any confession.  There are of course many other examples of 
truth-finding rules, from rules requiring proper authentication of evidence to rules about 
the evaluation of witness demeanor.  
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There is indeed nothing complex about the idea that some procedures are intended 
to ascertain the truth.  The complexities begin to multiply, though, when we turn to the 
relationship between proof and moral comfort.  Often the same procedure can serve both 
purposes.  This is largely for the simple reason that the pursuit of the truth can always 
serve as a means of easing the sense of moral responsibility:  If we can claim that our 
decision was dictated by “the truth,” we can disclaim our personal responsibility for 
making it.  We can say something like what the medieval church lawyers said about their 
highly rule-bound procedures:  that the law made the decision.  We can declare ourselves 
to be simple servants of the truth, rather than judges with undiluted moral responsibility. 
Indeed, there are many examples of procedures that can serve either to provide 
proof or to provide moral comfort.  The treatment of uncorroborated confessions is one.  
If we allow convictions to be based on uncorroborated confessions, we may be doing so 
for two independent reasons:  first, because we believe that confessions prove the truth 
even if they are not supported by independent evidence (a dubious proposition); or 
second, because we prefer to convict only where the accused has been compelled to take 
the responsibility for his punishment upon himself.54  Not least, jury trial can serve both a 
moral comfort function and a proof function.  To the extent that the use of the jury serves 
to “shuffle the guilt of Blood and ruin” from the shoulders of the judge to the shoulders 
of the jurors, it serves to ease the judge’s sense of responsibility.  To the extent the jury, 
in cases of uncertainty, acts as a “lie-detector,” in George Fisher’s phrase, distinguishing 
true testimony from false testimony, it serves a proof function. 
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In many instances, it will indeed be impossible to say whether a given procedure 
serves the end of proof or moral comfort.  Nevertheless, there is one important class of 
cases in which we can be certain that procedures are serving exclusively the end of easing 
the sense of moral responsibility:  cases in which the guilt of the accused is already 
known before trial.  This was by no means a small class of cases in the pre-modern 
world, as we shall see:  It was not at all uncommon to hold trials of one sort or another in 
which the accused was already known to be guilty.  Indeed, even in the modern world, 
common sense tells us that almost all criminal defendants are guilty.  Yet if the accused is 
already known to be guilty, trial does not serve any truth-finding purpose.   
Why then do we hold a trial?  There is more than one possible answer.  In the 
modern world, it may be that we try persons already known to be guilty in order to 
achieve what Luhmann calls “legitimation through procedure”—in order to make our 
decision acceptable to all persons involved, or to reinforce the values of due process that 
we regard as fundamental of justice in society.55  But the procedures of the pre-modern 
world, as we shall see, often call for a different answer.  In the pre-modern world, it is 
clear that trials of the manifestly guilty were often held in order to avoid or mitigate the 
sense of moral responsibility of the persons charged with entering judgment.  This is true 
whether we are speaking of ordeals, of the continental law of evidence, of compelled 
confessions—or of jury trial. 
The desire for proof and the desire for to avoid responsibility have, finally, 
something else in common as well.  They both tend to raise the bar against conviction.  If 
the truth of the allegations against the accused must be adequately proven, it is of course 
more difficult to convict.  By the same token, if judges are reluctant to judge, that 
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reluctance too may make it more difficult to convict.  In this sense, both the commitment 
to finding the truth and the urge to avoid moral responsibility for judgment can lie at the 
foundation of a system of procedural protections for the accused. 
    
II. The Medieval Theological Tradition (I):  The Judge, the Ordeal and the Taint of Blood
 
With those distinctions in hand, we can turn to the rise of the “reasonable doubt” 
rule.  That rule emerged, not as a standard of proof, but as a means of providing moral 
comfort to English and American jurors—as a way of reassuring them, to quote Hawles 
once again, that they were not making themselves guilty of the “Murther” of the 
defendant.  The rule emerged over the course of the seventeenth- and eighteenth 
centuries.  The full history of this moral comfort rule begins, though, well before the 
seventeenth century.  The theology that underlay the “reasonable doubt” rule that had 
emerged by the 1780s was very old, dating back into the central Middle Ages.  This 
medieval theology was applied to the case of English criminal juries only at a very late 
date.  For a simple reason:  Until the sixteenth century, English criminal juries were never 
forced to take moral responsibility for condemning the accused.  Medieval criminal juries 
were not compelled to peform the most spiritually dangerous act: entering the general 
verdict of “guilty.”  It was only in the early modern period, after the Tudor Crown began 
to coerce criminal juries into entering guilty verdicts, that the moral dangers for English 
jurors began to become acute.  
Thus the narrowly English part of my story does not really begin before the 
sixteenth century.  Nevertheless, to understand the English history fully, we must begin 
with the medieval continental background.  In particular, we must be familiar with the 
medieval theology on three topics:   The theology of blood punishments; the theology of 
the judge’s “private knowledge”; and finally, the theology of doubt.  We must also 
understand some of the arguments that surrounded the seminal event in the making of the 
western legal tradition, the abolition of the judicial ordeal. 
Let us begin with the problem of the blood punishments.  Pre-modern Christian 
observers did not regard all cases as equally risky for the salvation of the judge.  The 
cases that were by far the most dangerous to the judge’s soul were those that resulted in a 
blood punishment.  This was not by any means a small class of cases.  “Blood 
punishments”—execution and mutilation—were the ordinary forms of punishment 
everywhere in the western world until the nineteenth century, at least for low-status 
persons.56  When Christian theologians and jurists declared that the judge’s soul was in 
peril in any case ending in a blood punishment, what they meant was that the judge’s soul 
was in peril essentially any time he judged a criminal matter. 
Scripture set the basic terms of discussion about this peril—though not 
necessarily the scripture one might expect.  There are certain scriptural passages that 
might seem to have obvious relevance to problem of judicial ethics.  Pontius Pilate’s 
attempt to wash his hands of the guilt of Christ is one.57  Another is the famous New 
Testament injunction, “Judge not, lest ye be judged.”58  Nevertheless, most Christian 
discussions turned on other texts.  First, there was the familiar Sixth Commandment, 
“Thou shalt not kill.”  Then, alongside the Sixth Commandment, came a much less well-
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known, but particularly important text, 1 John 3: 15:  “Whosoever hateth his brother,” 
declared this pasage, alluding in an obvious way on the tale of Cain and Abel, “is a 
murderer: and ye know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him.”  This last was 
especially important:  These verses were frequently quoted by authorities on the ethics of 
judging, and they set the basic terms for discussion:  The question was how to avoid 
becoming a “homicida,” a “murderer,” thus losing one’s hope of eternal life.  This was 
the question that would still be troubling Hawles in the 1670s. 
For western Christendom, the seminal discussions of these themes are to be found 
in the great Latin Church Fathers of Late Antiquity, Saint Augustine and Saint Jerome.  
Both took kindred approaches, rejecting any sort of extremism that would make the 
administration of criminal justice impossible.  As these Church Fathers explained, killing, 
while always morally troubling, was nevertheless sometimes justified—but only as long 
as it was done pursuant to the law.  Thus Saint Jerome spoke of some killings as “the 
ministry of the laws.”  In particular, he held, there was no ban on fiercely punishing 
criminals or those guilty of sacrilege.  Such punishments, Jerome insisted, did not really 
amount to shedding blood at all:  “To punish murderers, and those who commit sacrilege 
and poisoners, is not to shed blood.  It is the ministry of the laws.”59 This was frequently 
quoted by Jerome’s Christian successors looking for moral comfort in the execution of 
the criminal law in subsequent centuries. As for Augustine, in his Commentary on the 
Ten Commandments, he too used a phrase that would be repeated for centuries:  “cum 
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homo juste occiditur, lex eum occidit, non tu,”60 “when a man is killed justly, it is the law 
that kills him, not you.”   
It was this approach that permitted these great Church Fathers to avoid the 
radicalism of the Tenniya Jataka, developing a Christian theology that permitted judges 
to contribute their efforts to killing criminals, without themselves suffering the loss of 
eternal life as “murderers.”  In effect, this approach allowed Christians to deny their own 
meaningful personal agency:  They could declare themselves to be acting, not in their 
own persons, but merely as “ministers of the law.”  Augustine offered the classic account 
in his tract On the Free Will.  Judges, he strikingly explained, were akin to soldiers:  Both 
killed.  This was disturbing on its face.  Yet it had to be understood that both judges and 
soldiers were permitted to kill.  In justifying the special license to kill of judges and 
soldiers, Augustine first offered an argument from ordinary language:  Neither the soldier 
nor the judge, he noted, was ordinarily called “a murderer.”61 Second, Augustine 
emphasized once again that judges and soldiers, unlike true “murderers,” killed pursuant 
to “the law.”  Augustine’s tract is framed as a dialogue between the himself and his 
interlocutor Evodius: 
Evodius. If “murder” means killing a man [Si homicidium est hominem occidere], 
nevertheless sometimes a killing can be done without sin:  After all, a soldier can 
                                                 
60 PL 34, p. 707. 
61 This argument from ordinary language would be repeated for centuries afterward.  Indeed down to the 
present day, the law is sometimes framed as the question of who may be called “murderer.” For a medieval 
example, see Agobard of Lyon, quoted and discussed below this Section.  The fundamental Augustinian 
attitude can arguably still be seen in the German Criminal Code.  StGB § 211 (2) is still concerned, as 
Augustine was, with defining what persons can be characterized as “murderers.”  Rather than framing the 
question as one of defining the offense, it (quite uncharacteristically for German criminal law) focusing on 
describing who may be called a “murderer”: 
StGB §211 (2): Mörder ist, wer aus Mordlust, zur Befriedigung des Geschlechtstriebs, aus 
Habgier oder sonst aus niedrigen Beweggründen, heimtückisch oder grausam oder mit 
gemeingefährlichen Mitteln oder um eine andere Straftat zu ermöglichen oder zu verdecken, einen 
Menschen tötet. 
 
kill an enemy; and a judge, or the judge’s minister, can kill a malefactor.  Or 
again a person may unintentionally let his spear fly from his hand.  These do not 
seem to me to sin when they kill a man. Augustine. I agree.  But they are not 
ordinarily called “murderers.”  But in that case tell me:   Suppose somebody kills 
his master, because he is afraid of being punished brutally.  Do you think he 
should be counted among those who kill in man in such a fashion as not to 
deserve the name “murderer”?  Evodius. His case seems to me to be very different 
indeed:  After all, the others kill pursuant to the law, or at least not against the 
law; whereas his misdeed is not approved by any law.62
A few pages later, Augustine elaborated by explaining that those who killed pursuant to 
the law, did not sin, because they killed without passion or personal interest, “libido.”  
Indeed, the absence of personal interest or passion was what distinguished the just 
government from the unjust one: 
Now a soldier killing the enemy is a minister of the law, because he can easily 
perform his office without any passion.  . . . Those who repel the forces of the 
enemy with equal force in order to keep the citizenry safe, are capable of obeying 
the law, by which they are commanded to act, without passion;  and the same can 
be said of all ministers who are properly subject to the powers that be.63
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The just state was one whose officials always acted as impersonal ministers of the law, 
never yielding to passion or personal interest.  Only such officials could be certain of 
avoiding the name of “murderer.” 
These late antique Church Fathers established the basic doctrines that would 
eventually underlie the “reasonable doubt” rule centuries later.  But to follow the detailed 
application of those doctrines, we must turn to the lawyers and theologians of the Middle 
Ages.  Most especially, we must understand how the ideas of the Church Fathers were 
embraced and elaborated by the medieval scholars who were largely responsible for 
creating modern law:  the canon lawyers of the twelfth century and afterwards.  And we 
must see how the canon lawyers applied those ideas to the most important campaign in 
the early development of western law:  the campaign against the judicial ordeal.   
Canon law, the law of the Christian Church, was once relatively neglected by 
historians, and it may still seem a distant and irrelevant corpus to Americans.  Yet today 
scholars know that it is a body of profound importance for the development of the 
western legal tradition, one whose concepts and analyses lie at the foundation of much of 
the common law as well as of continental law.64  Canon law is largely a creation of the 
centuries after 1000 A.D.  Early medieval canon law was a chaotic body, based on a 
                                                                                                                                                 
ille qui tulit, si Dei jussu tulit, id est quod praecepit aeterna justitia, expers omnino libidinis id 
agere potuit: si autem ille cum aliqua libidine hoc statuit, non ex eo fit ut ei legi cum libidine 
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tulit. Potest ergo illi legi quae tuendorum civium causa vim hostilem eadem vi repelli jubet, sine 
libidine obtemperari: et de omnibus ministris, qui jure atque ordine potestatibus quibusque subjecti 
sunt, id dici potest. Sed illi homines lege inculpata, quomodo inculpati queant esse, non video: non 
enim lex eos cogit occidere, sed relinquit in potestate 
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Jr., Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England: An Imperfecct Reception of the 
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scattered and contradictory assemblage of church councils, papal pronouncements and 
more, all difficult to locate and difficult to interpret.  Lawyers of the period after about 
1020 A.D. effectively created canon law by bringing order to these sources.  There were 
two important canon compilations produced during the eleventh century, one by 
Burchard of Worms early in the century, and a second by Ivo of Chartres at the very end 
of the century, sometime before 1096.  But the great leap forward in learned canon law 
came with the completion of the so-called Decretum of the monk Gratian, in Bologna 
around 1140.65
These were the men who created western law, in many ways.  All of these figures 
were concerned with the ethics of judging and the dangers of blood guilt, and all of them 
drew eagerly on the writings of the Church Fathers, especially those of Augustine.  Thus 
Ivo of Chartres, who produced the second of the great canon compilations of the reform 
in the 1090s, cribbed from Augustine’s Free Will, endorsing the distinction between 
“murderers,” on the one hand, and soldiers and judges on the other.  The great difference 
was that judges, like soldiers, followed “the law,” and acted without “passion.”66  
Gratian, the great scholar who definitively initiated the modern tradition of canon law 
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omnino libidinis id agere potuit 
fifty years later, also quoted the classic texts of Augustine, editing them down to a pithy 
and powerful statement: 
If “murder” means killing a man, nevertheless sometimes a killing can be done 
without sin:  After all, a soldier can kill an enemy; and a judge, or the judge’s 
minister, can kill a malefactor.  Or again a person may unintentionally let his 
spear fly from his hand.  These do not seem to me to sin when they kill a man. 
Nor indeed are they ordinarily called “murderers.”   When a man is killed justly, it 
is the law that kills him, not you.67
So it was that the basic doctrines of western law were founded on late antique theology.  
Those canon doctrines were more than just otherwordly theology, though.  By the 
alter twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they became a basic part of western law, both on the 
Continent and in England.  In particular, they played a fundamental role in the event that 
all scholars regard as marking the beginning of the distinctively western legal tradition, 
the abolition of the judicial ordeal; and to understand the full impact of the theology of 
bloodshed—even for jury trial in the late eighteenth century—we must know something 
about the role of these canon doctrines in the debates surrounding the abolition of the 
ordeal in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.   
Ordeals, frightening and seemingly barbaric procedures that went by the name of 
the “judicium dei,” the “judgment of God,” were in widespread use in western Europe 
throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries.  Most important of them were two.  The 
first of these was the ordeal of the hot iron, by which the accused was forced to grasp a 
                                                 
67 Si homicidium est hominem occidere, potest occidere aliquando sine peccato. Nam et miles hostem, et 
iudex uel minister eius nocentem, et cui forte inuito atque inprudenti telum manu fugit, non michi uidentur 
peccare, cum hominem occidunt. Sed nec etiam homicidae isti appellari solent. Idem in questionibus 
Leuitici: [quest. 68.ad cap. 19.] §. 1. Cum homo iuste occiditur, lex eum occidit, non tu. 
 
red hot iron.  After three days, under this particular ordeal, the bandages were removed 
from the accused’s hand, to see whether the burn wound was healing (taken as a sign of 
innocence) or not (taken as a sign of guilt.)  The second was the ordeal of the cold water, 
by which the accused was thrown into a body of water.  An accused person who sank was 
regarded as innocent; one who floated was guilty.  These ordeals, and others like them, 
were typically surrounded with awe-inducing religious ceremony.  The person destined to 
suffer the ordeal was sanctified in various ways; and the ordeal itself took place 
commonly in church, after a blessing prounced by a priest. 
Scholars have argued that these riveting proceedings were central to the 
functioning of early medieval society:  Horrific as they may sound, they held the 
precarious little societies of medieval Europe together, by allowing the community to join 
together in acts of communal re-affirmation.68  But beginning in the 1160s, church 
reformers embarked on a major campaign against them.  After several decades of reform 
agitation, priests were forbidden to participate by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.  
This effectively amounted to the abolition of the ordeals, though they hung on in certain 
cases, such as some involving witchcraft.69  The result of the effective abolition of the 
ordeal in 1215, as scholars have long understood, was a formative crisis in western 
adjudication, which yielded different responses in England and on the continent.  In 
England, where an early form of the jury had been introduced in the late twelfth century, 
it was the jury that took the place of the old ordeals.  On the Continent, by contrast, 
where inquisitorial procedure had been developing over the course of the twelfth century, 
                                                 
68 Esp. Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural : A Medieval Change,” in Brown, Society and the Holy 
in Late Antiquity (California, 1982), for this interpretation.  
69 For discussion, see Matthias Schmoeckel, Ein sonderbares Wunderwerck Gottes: Bemerkungen zum 
langsamen Rückgang der Ordale nach 1215, Ius Commune 26 (1999), 123-164. 
something else happened:  The ordeals were replaced by so-called “romano-canonical” 
procedure, a form of inquisitorial procedure governed by elaborate canon law rules.  So it 
was that, after 1215, the English common law split off decisively from the law of the 
Continent.  The abolition of the ordeals thus marks the beginning of modern western 
legal history. 
Every scholar writing about the making of western law has focused on the 
campaign against ordeals, and the interpretive literature is voluminous and complex.  
Consequently there is much more to be said about the abolition of ordeals than I will try 
say here.70  What I do wish to emphasize, for purposes of this Article, is that the great 
                                                 
70 In order to keep this Article to a reasonable length, I avoid mounting a full-scale discussion of the 
interpretation of ordeals in the text.  Nevertheless, I should note that there is more to be said on the tension 
between proof and moral comfort in ordeals than I will say here.  Most of the literature on ordeals has 
focused on the problems of proof:  Scholars have generally supposed that the right question to ask was 
whether ordeals contributed to a correct determination of guilt or innocence.  The older view was that 
ordeals were wholly “irrational” procedures, which could never have aided in uncovering the truth.  Recent 
decades, by contrast, have seen a scholarly reaction:  A number of historians have tried to demonstrate that 
ordeals could in fact have served a “rational” truth-finding purpose in the relatively simple societies in 
which they were used.  For citations and some discussion, see R.C. van Caenegem, Reflexions on Rational 
and Irrational Modes of Proof in Medieval Europe, 58 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 263 (1990). 
Nevertheless, there have always been a few sharp-eyed scholars who have seen that is not clear 
that the question of proof was always the critical question at all.  To be sure, it is undeniably the case that 
ordeals were sometimes used as a means of proof, in cases in which the guilt of the accused was uncertain.  
At the same time, though, it is critically important that the ordeals were sometimes inflicted on persons who 
were already known to be guilty, or at least very likely guilty.  This is something that we know must be true 
partly by hypothesis, because ordeals were commonly used in communities that were very small—villages 
of perhaps a few dozens of persons.  This implies, as two leading social historians noted some years ago, 
that there must frequently have been little uncertainty about the guilt or innocence of the proband: 
Essentially, in all small-scale societies, people know what is going on; they know who is 
untrustworthy, who may be a thief, who has farmed his land, just as they know who is sleeping 
with whom.  And that basic knowledge (generally accurate, although it may for the outcast, the 
weak or the unlucky, only be prejudice) underlies all the procedures, rational or irrational, of local 
dispute settlement, just as it is the basis too of collective judgment: the ordeal and the jury alike 
draw on it. 
Davies and Fouracre, Conclusion, in Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre, eds., The Settlement of Disputes in 
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge U.P., 1986), 222.  The most important evidence for this comes, though, 
not from social history, but from the literature of canon law.  In particular, it comes from the concept of 
“tempting God,” which, as Baldwin showed forty years ago, underlay the standard argument of canon 
critics who denounced ordeals.  The concept of “tempting God” was drawn from a passage of Augustine’s 
commentary on Genesis, in which the great fourth-century Saint condemned those who remitted matters to 
God’s judgment in cases where men were capable of uncovering the truth themselves.  Quaest. in 
Heptateuchum. Qu. 26:  XXVI. [Ib. XII, 12, 14.][=PL vol.34, col 554].  To late twelfth-century canonists, 
ordeals were dangerous forms of “tempting God”—precisely because they were used, at least some of the 
campaign was largely framed in terms of the theology of bloodshed:  The ordeals were 
abolished precisely because they subjected those who participated in them to the taint of 
bloodshed.  In particular, the clergy who presided over the ordeals, in the eyes of key 
reformers, could not claim the privilege that judges could claim:  Unlike judges (or 
soldiers), they were not immune from the moral danger associated with joining in a 
collective killing.   
As early as the ninth century, Agobard of Lyon, the first leading critic of ordeals, 
had denounced them precisely because they involved the spilling of blood, in ways that 
made everyone involved a “murderer,” whose eternal life was in danger.71  Eleventh-
century critics of the ordeal continued to see the problem in the same terms.  This was 
true in particular of Peter the Chanter, an especially influential critic whose role was 
                                                                                                                                                 
time, when men were perfectly capable of determining the truth themselves.  John W. Baldwin, The 
Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 Against Ordeals, Speculum 36 (1961): 620-621.  This too 
implies clearly that ordeals were used in cases in which the guilt of the accused was already essentially 
clear. 
The critical question is thus why an ordeal would be used in cases in which the guilt of the 
accused was already clear.  The right answer was given in a famous article by Peter Brown.  The function 
of the ordeal was less to determine guilt, than to shift the responsibility for conviction from the shoulders of 
the community to the shoulders of God, thereby forestalling the dangers of feud, and eliminating “the 
odium of human responsibility.”    Brown pointed to the Latin terminology current throughout the Middle 
Ages.  The ordeal was everywhere called a form of “iudicium dei,” “judgment of God.”  But as Brown 
notes, it was not a procedure per iudicium dei, but a procedure ad iudicium dei; the ordeal “is not a 
judgment by God; it is a remitting of the case ad iudicium Dei, ‘to the judgment of God.’”  What does this 
imply?  As Brown contended, it suggests that the concern, at least in part, was not so much with the 
certainty of the judgment, as with the responsibility for the judgment:  “By being brought to the judgment 
of God, the case already stepped outside the pressures of human interest [in a society threatened with clan 
conflict], and so its resolution can be devoid of much of the odium of human responsibility.”  Peter Brown, 
Society and the Supernatural : A Medieval Change,” in Brown, Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity 
(California, 1982), 313.   
71 Agobardus Lugdunensis, Liber contra judicium dei (= PL 104) :  
Sanguinem enim animarum vestrarum requiram de manu cunctarum bestiarum, et de manu 
hominis: de manu viri et fratris ejus requiram animam hominis. Quicunque effuderit humanum 
sanguinem, fundetur [col. 263C] sanguis illius; ad imaginem quippe Dei factus est homo. Haec 
prima lex, a Deo data hominibus, prohibet attentissime humanum sanguinem fundere Non omnis 
qui hominem occiderit, corporaliter occidetur. Sed secundum illud accipiendum est quod Dominus 
in Evangelio dicit: Omnis enim qui gladium acceperit, peribit. Et Apostolus ait: Quoniam omnis 
homicida non habet vitam aeternam in se manentem. Quare autem hunc reatum tanta poena 
sequatur, haec causa est, quoniam ad imaginem Dei factus est homo. 
For a broader collection of early medieval passages, see Charlotte Leitmaier, Die Kirche und die 
Gottesurteile (Vienna, 1953), 44-62. 
investigated forty years ago in pioneering studies by the medievalist J. W. Baldwin.  For 
Peter, as Paul Hyams has written, “the ordeal was a kind of obsession”; and when faced 
with it “he concentrated as much on its connection with sin and bloodshed as on his 
attempted ‘scientific’ refutation.”72  Indeed, there was little by way of “scientific” 
argument in Peter’s attack at all.  What Peter wrote was the clerics should not “lend their 
ministry to the spilling of blood, and thereby make themselves in a certain fashion into 
murderers.”73  In this statement, which has never received quite the attention it deserves 
from historians, we can hear the the clear echo of Augustine, Ivo and Gratian on 
“murder.”  What concerned Peter was the same old core fear associated the moral 
responsibility of judging, the fear of blood taint.  “They deceive themselves perilously,” 
as the canonists declared, “who believe that the only murderers are those who kill a man 
with their own hands.”  On the contrary, anyone who counseled or exhorted murder was 
guilty too, just as the Jews made themselves guilty when they cried “crucify Him!”74
The great issue, for men who thought this way, was escaping blood guilt; and the 
ordeal did not permit anyone involved to escape blood guilt.  It was this belief that drove 
the ultimate abolition of the ordeals.  The key date is 1215, the year in which the Fourth 
Lateran Council, summoned by the lawyer-Pope Innocent III, forbade priests to 
participate in “judgments of God.”  In issuing its ban, the Council followed precisely the 
                                                 
72 Paul Hyams, Trial by Ordeal:  The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in M. Arnold, T. Green, S. 
Scully and S. White, eds., On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne, 
102 [91-126]. 
73 Peter the Chanter, Summa, quoted in Baldwin, Intellectual Preparation, 632 n. 113:  “quodam modo 
homicide efficantur.” 
74 Burchard of Worms, Decretum Bk. 6, Chap. 31: 
Periculose se decipiunt, qui existimant eos tantum homicidas esse, qui manibus hominem 
occidunt, et non potius eos, per quorum consilium, et fraudem, et exhortationem homines 
extinguuntur. Nam Judaei Dominum nequaquam propriis manibus interfecerunt, sicut scriptum 
est: Nobis non licet interficere quemquam, sed tamen illis Domini mors imputatur, quia ipsi eum 
lingua crucifixerunt, dicentes: Crucifige eum.  
Sim. Ivo Carnotensis, Decretum Pars 10, chap. 160;  Gratian, Decretum Pars Secunda, c. 33, q. 3, dist. 1, c. 
23. 
line of argument that Peter the Chanter had pursued in his denunciation of ordeals a 
couple of decades earlier:  Priests who participated in ordeals, held the eighteenth canon 
of the Council, were involving themselves in an activity akin to pronouncing death 
sentences or otherwise shedding blood.  This was forbidden: 
No cleric may pronounce a sentence of death, or execute such a sentence, or be 
present at its execution. . . . Nor may any cleric write or dictate letters destined for 
the execution of such a sentence. Wherefore, in the chanceries of the princes let 
this matter be committed to laymen and not to clerics. Neither may a cleric act as 
judge in the case of . . . men devoted to the shedding of blood. No subdeacon, 
deacon, or priest shall practice that part of surgery involving burning and cutting. 
Neither shall anyone in judicial tests or ordeals by hot or cold water or hot iron 
bestow any blessing; the earlier prohibitions in regard to trial by combat remain in 
force. 
Participation in ordeals was only one of many ways of becoming involved in the 
shedding of blood; and priests, as sacred persons, were not to become involved in the 
shedding of blood, even if only by performing surgery.  This had, needless to say, 
nothing to do with the problems of proof.  Indeed, it is worth emphasizing that this canon 
shows no concern with issues of guilt or innocence at all.  Its concern is to guarantee only 
that clerics not become involved, at any remove, in the unsavory and polluting business 
of shedding blood—except in one capacity:  as judges, who acted as properly 
dispassionate servants of “the law.” 
. 
 
III.  Conscience and the Judge (1):  The Spiritual Dangers of “Private Knowledge” 
 
The moral drama of bloodshed was thus the great issue that hovered behind the 
canon law of the twelfth century, whether the issue was the license to kill of the judge, or 
the legitimacy of ordeals;  and the moral drama of bloodshed would still be the great 
issue with the rise of the “reasonable doubt” rule centuries later.  The link between acts of 
judgment and the fear of bloodshed was crucial.  The consequence of the fateful legal 
transformation that took place from roughly 1140 to 1215 was this:  In light of the grave 
moral dangers of bloodshed, the trial acquired a morally privileged status over the ordeal.  
As leading reformers saw it, participating in ordeals created blood guilt for everybody 
involved, priests included:  It made them, in Peter the Chanter’s phrase, “ministers of 
bloodshed.”  Participating in a proper trial, by contrast, was different, in the eyes of the 
canon lawyers:  A proper trial permitted the judge to escape blood guilt, as long he 
remained emotionally aloof from the proceedings, acting as a dispassionate “minister of 
the law.” 
This made it clear enough that a morally acceptable system of justice must be 
based, not on ordeals, but on trials.  Nevertheless, the developments of the period 1140-
1215 did not make it clear what form of judging was to replace the ordeal.  Nor did they 
make it clear precisely what was involved in maintaining proper attitude of judicial 
“ministry.”  It is in the answer to those questions that we can find the ultimate origins of 
the “reasonable doubt” rule. 
Judges could be safe from the becoming “murderers” if they acted somehow as 
mere “ministers of the law.”  But how?  The answers to this pressing question of judicial 
ethics were offered by a body of law little remembered today, but one of great importance 
for understanding all forms of western adjudication:  the canon law of conscience.  This 
distinctive body of medieval law developed two striking solutions to the basic problems 
of judicial moral responsibility.  First, it held that judges in criminal matters must never 
make use of their “private knowledge.”  In order to maintain a properly cool distance 
from the proceedings before them, they were to judge purely on the record developed in 
court, ignoring any extrinsic information they happened to possess.  Second, it held that 
judges were to avoid the dangers of judging when in “doubt.”  These were injunctions 
that applied equally on both sides of the English Channel, as the common law and 
continental traditions evolved in the wake of the abolition of ordeals. 
To see how, let us now turn to some of the details of the continental law and the 
common law, the two great western systems that now dominate the law everywhere in the 
world.  Historians have long interpreted both of these systems in light of the experience 
of the twelfth-century campaign against ordeal.  Both have been understood as two 
deeply different efforts to continue the functions of the ordeal by other means. 
Deeply different the two systems certainly were.  The Continental system that 
grew up after Lateran IV employed highly rationalized procedures, which aimed to 
guarantee both professionalization and transparency in judgment.  Under this continental 
system, the judge was to apply a set of elaborate rules, following a detailed schedule that 
assigned different weights to different pieces of evidence.75  This was not, as has 
sometimes been said, a purely mechanical system, designed to eliminate judicial 
                                                 
75 The system is acutely analyzed, on the basis of recent scholarship, by Schmoeckel, Humanität und 
Staatsraison, 187-294. 
discretion.76  In fact, judges retained considerable discretionary wiggle-room under the 
continental system.77  This is particularly because continental judges, like common law 
jurors, had to make their decision “according to conscience.”  As recent scholarship has 
emphasized, the obligation to judge “according to conscience” created an ineliminable 
residue of subjective evaluation in the task of judging.78  It is true that the continental 
judge was guided by an elaborate law of evidence; but in the end, he had to make an 
authentic conscientious decision, through what canon lawyers called a “motus animi,” a 
“movement of the mind.”79
Nevertheless, though the system was by no means mechanical, it was certainly 
highly rule-bound, providing the judge with detailed, scripted guidance every step of the 
way, and carefully delimiting the sorts of evidence he could consider.80  It was also a 
system that emphasized the careful creation of a written dossier, explaining and 
evaluating all of the evidence.  In these senses, the continental system replaced the 
impersonal voice of God with the impersonal voice of the professional judge, expressed 
in that most impersonal of forms, the bureaucratic file.   The Fourth Lateran Council thus 
brought a revolution in favor of professionalization and bureaucracy to the Continent.81
                                                 
76 This view was famously presented by John Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England 
in the Ancien Regime (Chicago, 1977), 6.  See also, in a more extreme formulation, Shapiro, Probability 
and Certainty, 174 (continental judge “an accountant”). 
77 See especially the discussions, disagreeing with Langbein, of Richard Fraher, Conviction According to 
Conscience; The Medieval Jurists’ Debate Concerning Judicial Discretion and the Law of Proof, 7 Law & 
Hist. Rev. 23, 56-64 (1989); Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 267-294 ; and Susanne Lepsius, 
Von Zweifeln zur Überzeugung : Zum Zeugenbeweis im gelehrten Recht ausgehend von der Abhandlung 
des Bartolus von Sassoferrato (Frankfurt a.M., 2003), 167-175. 
78 Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 286-287. 
79 For discussion of this terminology, and its parallels in the Romanist writings of Bartolus, see Lepsius, 
Von Zweifeln zur Überzeugung, 169-175. 
80 Id., 288-289 
81 Cf. the interpretation of Richard Fraher, IV Lateran's Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in Studia in 
Honorem Eminentissimi Cardinalis Alphonsi M. Stickler (=Studia et Textus Historiae Iuris Canonici 7) 
(Rome, 1992), 97-111. 
The common law cousin of the continental law took a different path.  Instead of 
introducing judges of the continental type, the common law developed jury trial, within a 
few years after 1215.  It is important not to exaggerate the difference between the 
common law juror and the continental judge:  The juror too made his decision in the 
confrontation with his “conscience.”82  But unlike contemporary Continental law, the 
common law never produced dossiers, giving reasoned explanations for its decisions.  
Historians often describe this unbureaucratic English response to the abolition of the 
ordeals by saying that jury trial, unlike continental trial, retained the “inscrutability” of 
the judgment of God:  There was no way of saying why God judged as He did, and no 
way of saying why the jury did either.83  Nor was the decision-making process of the 
common law juror guided by the kind of careful script that governed the decision-making 
of the Continental judge.  All this made the post-ordeal common law world very different 
from the world across the Channel. 
Yet different as these two western systems were, both can and must be understood 
as responding, in part, to the same moral dilemmas of judging that played such a large 
role in the agitation of the period 1140-1215:  For both put new burdens on persons 
obliged to enter judgment “according to conscience.”  To understand those burdens 
properly, we must turn to the medieval law of conscience, an aspect of canon law that 
began to take form during the same decades in which the ordeal went into decline, and 
that shaped both the continental and the common law traditions. 
What is “conscience”?  “Conscience” has a long history in the West, extending 
back both to the Stoic philosophers and to Saint Paul.  The original form of the word 
                                                 
82 See the texts assembled below, text at note. 
83 S.F.C. Milsom, Law and Fact in Legal Development, 17 U. Toronto L. J. 1 (1967);  Hyams, Trial by 
Ordeal:  The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, 118-119. 
“conscience” is Greek:  This is Saint Paul’s “syneidesis,”84 upon with the Latin 
“conscientia” was modeled.  It is important to linger for a moment over these ancient 
words.  Both terms are built from roots meaning “knowledge of facts”—“eidesis” in 
Greek, “scientia” in Latin.  Literally “syn-eidesis” and “con-scientia” mean something 
like “shared knowledge” or perhaps better “deepened knowledge.”  This has important 
consequences for the meaning of the word “conscience.”  In Latin (as in modern-day 
Romance languages) the term is ambiguous, in a way important for the history I recount 
here.  On the one hand, “conscientia” can signify a form of moral perception—an ability 
to distinguish between right and wrong.  It is in that sense, of course, that we use the 
word “conscience” in English today.  But the Latin “conscientia”—like the modern 
French “conscience” or the modern Italian “coscienza”—can also mean “awareness of 
certain facts,” or “the state of being informed.”85  This ambiguity matters a great deal for 
the history of Christian judicial ethics:  Both senses of the term played important roles in 
Christian thinking about the proper role of the conscientious judge:  “The conscience of 
the judge” can refer both to the judge’s moral convictions, and to the judge’s knowledge 
of particular facts—to what canon lawyers would call his “private knowledge.” 86
The problem of conscience was always centrally important to Christian thought 
throughout the later Middle Ages and the early modern period.  Sometimes it was the 
problem of “knowledge of facts.”  But it was first and foremost the problem of 
“conscience” conceived as an inner moral voice—an inborn sensitivity to the danger of 
sin, implanted by God.  Our conscience was the voice of our “internal forum,” the voice, 
                                                 
84 Also in Philo of Alexandria:  Padoa-Schioppa, Sur la conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 105. 
85 See G. Krieger, Gewissen, -sfreiheit , in 4 Lexikon des Mittelalters (Munich, 1989), cols. 1424-1426. 
86 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 13. 
implanted by God, of the “little judge” who sits within us, passing upon the rightness and 
wrongness of our every act. 
In the medieval tradition, though, the governance of conscience was not left 
entirely to the inner voice.  The regulation of conscience was also associated with a 
particular institutional structure:  The conscience of the individual Christian was 
supervised within the confessional.   Confession probably has a long history in the 
Christian world.  But it is especially associated with the same Fourth Lateran Council of 
1215 that forbade priests to participate in the shedding of blood.  Alongside its ban on 
clerical association with the shedding of blood, the Fourth Lateran Council promulgated 
the famous canon “omnis utriusque sexus”—“perhaps the most important legislative act 
in the history of the Church,” as Henry Charles Lea declared in his classic History of 
Auricular Confession.87  This canon required that “all the faithful of both sexes shall after 
they have reached the age of discretion faithfully confess all their sins at least once a year 
to their own (parish) priest . . .  otherwise they shall be cut off from the Church 
(excommunicated) during life and deprived of Christian burial in death.”  As for the 
priest taking confession:  He was enjoined, upon hearing the sins confessed to him, to 
administer penance, pouring “wine and oil into the wounds of the one injured after the 
manner of a skilful physician, carefully inquiring into the circumstances of the sinner and 
the sin, from the nature of which he may understand what kind of advice to give and what 
remedy to apply.”  The priest was also sternly warned never to reveal any of the sins 
revealed to him in the confessional.88
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With this, confession, which existed in some form from the early years of the 
Church, became indisputably a major part of Catholic practice.  As for the “wine and oil” 
of penance, the “remedies” to be applied to the sinner:  These became the stuff of the law 
of conscience.  The rules that determined the gravity of various sins, and the proper 
approach to chastising them, were developed in great casuistic detail by medieval canon 
lawyers.  In time, the medieval canon law of conscience was made available to priests 
through an important species of semi-popular legal literature called “confessors’ 
manuals.”  Thus in the medieval Catholic tradition the work of the “internal forum” was 
not exclusively entrusted to the inner voice of the individual Christian.  Instead, the inner 
voice of conscience was supplemented, or perhaps (as Calvinists would later insist) 
replaced, by the voice of the confessor; and the internal forum was supervised, or perhaps 
supplanted, by the bench of the confessional.89
Now, within the developing rules of conscience, the problem of judging featured 
prominently from a very early date.  Indeed, the problem of judging appeared in the 
canon law of conscience contemporaneously with the twelfth-century attack on ordeals.  
And from the beginning, the problem was approached in a way centrally important for 
our understanding of jury trial, as a problem of “private knowledge.” 
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The basic tale was told almost forty years ago by Knut Wolfgang Nörr.90  It is a 
tale of judicial efforts to avoid the moral responsibility for judgment—efforts that often 
strike the modern reader as bizarre, and ones in which the themes of blood taint and 
private knowledge played the dominant role.  The key formula for medieval canon 
lawyers read as follows: “iudex secundum allegata non secundum conscientiam iudicat,” 
“the judge judges according to the evidence presented, not according to his ‘conscience.’”  
What the formula did was to forbid judges to use their independent knowledge of the 
case—their “private knowledge.”  It was a formula that led to strange moral paradoxes 
for the judges of the Continent, and severe moral dilemmas for the criminal jurors of 
early modern England. 
As Nörr demonstrated, the ban on the use of “private knowledge” began to 
develop over the course of the twelfth century, the same period in which clerical agitation 
against ordeals was gathering momentum, and the same period in which Ivo and Gratian 
were exploring the distinction between the judge, the soldier, and the “murderer.”  The 
key text for the lawyers who developed the ban on “private knowledge” came from the 
Gospels; and the key example was that of Jesus himself, in the matter of the woman taken 
in adultery: 
                                                 
90 K. W. Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters im gelehrten Prozess der Frühzeit : Iudex secundum allegata non 
secundum conscientiam iudicat (Munich: Beck, 1967).  For other literature on this problem, which is well-
known to specialists in continental legal history, see Jacques Delanglade, S.J., Le Juge, Serviteur de la Loi 
ou Gardien de la Justice selon la Tradition Théologique, 10 Revue de Droit Canonique141, 151-153 
(1960) ;  Domenico Maffei, Il Giudice Testimmone e una « Quaestio » de Jacques de Revigny (MS. Bon. 
Coll. Hisp. 82), 35 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 54-76 (1967) ; Richard Fraher, Conviction 
According to Conscience; The Medieval Jurists’ Debate Concerning Judicial Discretion and the Law of 
Proof, 7 Law & Hist. Rev. 23 (1989); Laurent Mayali, Entre Idéal de Justice et Faiblesse Humaine: Le Juge 
Prévaricateur en Droit Savant in Justice et Justiciables, Mélanges Henri Vidal (Montpellier, 1994), 95-103 ; 
Antonio-Padoa-Schioppa, Sur la conscience du juge dans le ius commune europée, in Jean-Marie Carbasse 
and Laurence Depambour-Tarride, eds., La conscience du juge dans la tradition juridique européenne 
(Paris, 1999), 95-129. 
John 8:2   Early in the morning he came again to the temple; all the people came 
to him, and he sat down and taught them. The scribes and the Pharisees brought a 
woman who had been caught in adultery, and placing her in the midst they said to 
him, “Teacher, this woman has been caught in the act of adultery. Now in the law 
Moses commanded us to stone such. What do you say about her?” This they said 
to test him, that they might have some charge to bring against him. Jesus bent 
down and wrote with his finger on the ground. And as they continued to ask him, 
he stood up and said to them, “Let him who is without sin among you be the first 
to throw a stone at her.” And once more he bent down and wrote with his finger 
on the ground. But when they heard it, they went away, one by one, beginning 
with the eldest, and Jesus was left alone with the woman standing before him. 
Jesus looked up and said to her, “Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned 
you?” She said, “No one, Lord.” And Jesus said, “Neither do I condemn you; go, 
and do not sin again.” 
As medieval commentators on this famous and beautifully rendered story observed, Jesus 
did not concern Himself with His own knowledge of the accused woman’s guilt.  Instead, 
He affected a posture that was something like a caricature of the studied indifference of a 
Roman bureaucrat.  Writing unperturbedly with his finger, too busy even to glance up for 
more than a moment at the crowd of petitioners before him, He asked only whether she 
had been formally accused—and let her free because she had not been:  “the Lord said,” 
read an early text from the twelfth-century revival of Roman law, “‘Go, woman. Since 
nobody accuses you neither shall I condemn you.’  From which it manifestly follows that 
a judge must never supplement the record with facts from his own knowledge.”91
The judge, like Jesus, was to confine himself to inhabiting his official role, 
busying himself with his dossiers while awaiting proper proof of the guilt of the accused.  
Such was the ban on “private knowledge,” the key means by which, in the canon law of 
conscience, the judge was afforded the chance to avoid the moral responsibility for 
judgment, maintaining the studied professional distance of a mere “minister of the laws.” 
Modern readers may doubt that this ban had much practical significance.  How 
often did judges really have “private knowledge”?  Yet to appreciate the authentic impact 
of the ban, we must begin by recognizing that it was very common indeed for medieval 
judges to bring “private knowledge” to the case before them, especially on the Continent.  
This was in part because continental judges were local officials who lived and worked in 
small medieval communities.  As scholars have observed, it cannot have been a rare 
occurrence for judges in a medieval town to have some knowledge of cases before 
them,92  and even to have been eyewitnesses.  Indeed, medieval jurists often discussed the 
problem of the judge who personally witnessed a crime—as the jurists liked to say, 
“while looking out his window.”93  This was something that they regarded as perfectly 
possible even in relatively large cities.  For example, Guillaume Durantis, the leading late 
thirteenth-century authority on criminal procedure, began a learned disquisition on the 
problem of “private knowledge” like this: “Suppose the judge is looking out his window, 
                                                 
91 “dominus dixit, vade mulier, quia nemo est qui te accuset, nec ego te contempnabo.’  Unde manifeste 
colligitur, qui iudex nequaquam debet de facto supplere.”  Gloss on C. 2.10 un., quoted and discussed in 
Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 17-18;  Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 98. 
92 Emphasized by Nörr, Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 101. 
93 For this topos, see Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 192. 
and sees a certain nobleman kill somebody in the public square in Bologna.”94  This was 
by no means a fanciful example:  Nobles did indeed kill people in the public square in 
medieval Italian cities, as readers of Italian history95 (and Romeo and Juliet96) will know; 
and an Italian judge’s window did indeed typically look out on that same public square.97  
But it was of course in smaller communities that judges must most commonly have 
acquired knowledge independent of the record in court. 
The fact that continental judges lived in relatively small communities was not, 
however, the only reason that they were likely to bring “private knowledge” to their 
decisions, or even the most important reason.  The most important reason, as scholars like 
Nörr and Antonio Padoa-Schioppa have emphasized, brings us back to a fundamental 
datum of medieval law:  Continental judges were commonly priests; and as priests, they 
would frequently have taken confessions that bore on the case they were deciding.  The 
problems of the priest/judge had been present for some time in the Christian world.  From 
late Antiquity onward, Bishops acted as judges.  Even before the Fourth Lateran Council, 
priest/judges were taking confession.98  But of course after the Council, with its 
introduction of an annual obligation to confess, judges were even more likely to have 
done so.  This had the obvious consequence that a judge-confessor was likely to have 
“private knowledge,”99 whether because the accused had confessed to him, or because 
                                                 
94 Spec. 2.3. de Sententia § qualiter sit ferenda.  Quoted and discussed in Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 
78. 
95 For a fifteenth-century Florentine example, in which a vendetta agreement required the wrongdoer to 
“sally forth once every eight days, unarmed and unaccompanied, on the streets of Florence and go at least 
as far as the Mercato Vecchio,” see Thomas Kuehn, Law, Family & Women: Toward a Legal 
Anthropology of Renaissance Italy (Chicago, 1991), 147. 
96 Romeo and Juliet, Act 3, Scene 1 (set in “a public place”). 
97 Most famously to tourists in Siena, where the Palazzo Pubblico, which housed the Podestà, looks out on 
the Campo.  In Bologna too, the Palazzo Communale does indeed look out on the Piazza Maggiore. 
98 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 13. 
99 Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 101 (discussing of Stephen of Tournai). 
other parties had done so.  The judge/priest was likely to know a great deal about the case 
before him:  Confessors and confessands shared much of their lives.  As John Bossy has 
observed, “medieval confession . . . was a face-to-face encounter between two people 
who would probably have known each other pretty well . . . . [and] the average person 
was much more likely to tell the priest about the sins of his neighbours than about his 
own.”100  This stifling intimacy of the world of confession was also the stifling intimacy 
of the world of the continental trial. 
These problems were, as we shall see, less pressing for English judges:  English 
judges (though not English jurors) probably had independent knowledge much less 
frequently than continental judges did.  Nevertheless, even English judges certainly 
sometimes had “private knowledge”;  and scholars have long been aware that the same 
canon rules applied in England “from an early date.”101  The “private knowledge” 
problem was a common western problem, addressed through a common western body of 
law.  
So when you appeared before a judge in most small communities during the 
Middle Ages, there was every chance that he already knew something about your case, 
and perhaps a lot.  Could your judge make use of his private knowledge?  If the judge 
knew the accused was innocent, could he use his private knowledge to acquit?  
Conversely, if he knew the accused to be guilty, could he use his private knowledge to 
convict?  With regard to medieval English criminal jurors, the answer would be Yes:  
Jurors would not only be permitted to use their “private knowledge,” they would be 
                                                 
100 John Bossy, The Social History of Confession in the Age of the Reformation, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 5th Series, 25 (1975): 24 [21-38]. 
101 Holdsworth, History of English Law; and the discussion below, Sections V and VII. 
obliged to do so.  But when it came to professional judges, whether in England or on the 
Continent, the canon law of judging gave exactly the opposite answer. 
Indeed, canon lawyers, citing the example of Christ and the woman taken in 
adultery, arrived, over the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, at a momentous, 
and morally paradoxical, conclusion:  Judges simply could never make use of their 
private knowledge, even if it meant convicting the innocent.  This was in part because of 
the peculiar problems of confession:  It was a solemn rule that the secret of the 
confessional could not be violated.102  But the rule went beyond the treatment of 
knowledge acquired in the confessional, and it had a different purpose than protecting the 
confidentiality of matters confessed.  Its purpose was to protect the judges themselves.  It 
was by refusing to use their “private knowledge,” the jurists held, that judges could 
escape personal moral responsibility for entering judgment, and so escape the threat of 
“building themselves a mansion in Hell.”  The ban on “private knowledge” was a moral 
comfort rule, a way for professional judges to assure themselves that they had maintained 
a safe distance from the bloody consequences of the case they were judging. 
When this ban first began to develop during the twelfth-century, jurists did not 
fully agree on its reach.  In particular, they often tried to distinguish between civil and 
criminal matters.  It was, they most frequently held, only in criminal matters that the 
judge must not make use of his independent knowledge.103  As Nörr observed, this seems 
                                                 
102 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 39. 
103 This view was represented in particular by Martinus of Gosia, a famous twelfth-century lawyer whose 
views often aimed to christianize the doctrines of Roman law.  Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 18-19, 25. 
M[artinus] dicit, quod si iudex sciens veritatem negotii, de quo iudex et testis est, quod potest 
sententiam ferre, secundum quod noverit in civili causa, sed non in criminali, ubi sine accusatore 
iudicare non potest, exemplo Christi, qui mulierem accusatam de adulterio absolvit, dicens:  
Mulier, non est qui te accuset, nec ego to condemnabo.  Alii contra: dicunt enim et in civili et in 
criminali causa iudicem secundum quo scit iudicare posse . . . . 
perverse to the modern continental lawyer:  Modern continental lawyers think of the 
problem of criminal justice as a problem of proof.  Considering the high stakes in a 
criminal trial, modern continental jurists hold that all available evidentiary means must be 
deployed in order to determine whether the accused is in fact guilty.  It is in civil trials, 
where less is at stake, that there is more room for evidentiary play.  So why did twelfth-
century take the opposite point of view?  As Nörr showed, it is because for them, the 
problem was not a problem of proof at all, but a problem of conscience.   Medieval jurists 
were worried about protecting the soul of the judge—of a judge who, as Peter the Chanter 
had worried, might too easily “make himself into a murderer.”   For such a judge, it was 
of course criminal matters that presented the gravest threat; for it was criminal matters 
that involved blood. 
Indeed, to feel the full meaning of the ban on “private knowledge,” we must 
recognize that blood taint was, throughout the central centuries of the Middle Ages, still 
the dominant concern.  We can see this in the first classic formulation of the “private 
knowledge” problem—“is the judge to judge only according to the evidence offered, or 
according to his conscience?”— probably offered in Paris around 1160, around the same 
time that the first proto-juries were being assembled in England.104  This was a period 
during which the literature of Canon law was forming rapidly, after the completion of 
Gratian’s standard Decretum around 1140.  It was in reliance on Gratian that the 
anonymous Parisian author attacked the problem of the “private knowledge” of the judge: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dissensio on C. 41.21.13, quoted and discussed in Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 22.  Not every twelfth-
century jurist, it should be said, saw things the way Martinus did.  Yet another early opinion held, sensibly 
enough, that the judge could use his own knowledge to benefit the case of the accused, but not that of the 
complainant .  Pillius, in Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 27.  For a rapid survey of the criminal/civil 
distinction in later centuries, see Jacques Delanglade, S.J., Le Juge, Serviteur de la Loi ou Gardien de la 
Justice selon la Tradition Théologique, 10 Revue de Droit Canonique141, 151-153 (1960). 
104 Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 99-100. 
It may happen either in a criminal matter, or in some other transaction, that an 
innocent person is convicted by false witnesses, while a criminal or wrongdoer is 
claimed to be innocent.  The judge knows the truth of what happened.  Query 
whether he should judge according to his knowledge [secundum conscientiam], or 
according to the evidence presented before him [vel potius secundum allegata]. 
The question permits of little doubt.  The guilty person should be absolved, 
according to the evidence he has offered, if nothing, or only trivial matters, are 
have been offered in proof against him.  In doing so I act against “conscience,” 
that is to say contrary to what I know he deserves, but I do not act against 
“conscience,” that is to say what I know I ought to do.  After all, any prudent 
judge must be aware othat he is obliged to judge according to the evidence offered 
before him, if it is unrebutted.  It cannot be said that he is the one who acts.  
Rather it is the law that acts.  See C. XXIII, q. 5, c. si homicidium; et C. XXXIII, q. 
2, c. quos.105
This passage deserves to be read closely.  Scholars have interpreted it as calling for a 
complete ban on the judge’s use of any “private knowledge.”106  But its ban is not clearly 
quite so absolute.  The judge, according to this author, was not to make use of his own 
knowledge—even if it meant letting the guilty go free.  The author’s argument, we should 
                                                 
105 Quaestiones Dominorum Bononiensium, in Giovanni Palmerio, Scripta Anecdota Glossatorum, 1, 
additions, 237 (Bologna: Azzoguidiana, 1913): 
Tam in crimine, quam in negotio innocens falsis testibus convincitur, et criminosus, vel obnoxius, 
innocens astruitur. Iudex scit veritatem negotii. Queritur an secundum conscientiam, vel potius 
secundum allegata iudicare debeat. Solutio: Ultimus questionis articulus non multum habet 
dubietatis. Solvendum enim puto nocentem, secundum quod allegatum est a parte sua, si nulla vel 
minus frivola contra ipsum allegantur. Et facio contra conscientiam, idest contra id quod scio eum 
mereri, non tamen facio contra conscientiam, idest contra id quod scio me facere debere. Debet 
enim quisque prudens iudex scire secundum testimonia inducta se debere iudicare, si ea nullatenus 
posit repellere. Nec dicitur ipse hoc facere, sed lex, ut C. XXIII, q. 5, c. si homicidium; et C. 
XXXIII, q. 2, c. quos 
106 Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 99-100 
note, thus paralleled exactly the argument of contemporary critics of the ordeal:  His 
concern was with cases in which the guilt of the accused was clear.  It was in those cases 
that he insisted the judge should not use his own certain knowledge.   
And why did the author conclude this?  To answer that question, we must read the 
authority that he cited.  If the judge simply followed the dictates of the evidence 
developed before him, our Paris author wrote, then “it cannot be said that he himself” had 
condemned the accused.  Instead, “the law” had done so.  His citation for this proposition 
came from Gratian; and it is of course the same passage I have already quoted, the 
passage on how to avoid becoming a “murderer”: 
If “murder” means killing a man, nevertheless sometimes a killing can be done 
without sin:  After all, a soldier can kill an enemy; and a judge, or the judge’s 
minister, can kill a malefactor.  Or again a person may unintentionally let his 
spear fly from his hand.  These do not seem to me to sin when they kill a man. 
Nor indeed are they ordinarily called “murderers.”   When a man is killed justly, it 
is the law that kills him, not you.107
Like Peter the Chanter, the author was worried about the classic danger of judging: that 
the judge might “make himself into a murderer.”  His response was to shield the judge 
from responsibility by insisting that the law make the decision, rather than the judge 
himself.  After all, in that case, as Augustine and Gratian had said, “lex eum occidit, non 
tu.”108   
                                                 
107 Latin text above, note. 
 
108 The author also cited C. XXXIII, q. 2 c. quos: “C. XVIII. Non homo separat quos pena condempnat.  
Quos Deus coniunxit homo non separet." Queris quomodo? subaudis uiolenter, sine lege, absque ratione 
quos Deus coniunxit homo non separet. Non enim homo separat quos pena dampnat, quos reatus accusat, 
quos 
As long as you do not use your private knowledge, it is the law that kills him, and 
not you.  Judges were not to use their “private knowledge” in order to avoid making 
themselves “murderers,” and thus endangering their eternal life.  In subsequent years, the 
doctrines banning “private knowledge” developed rapidly.  By the late 1170s, they had 
taken a classic, and charming, medieval form:  Canon lawyers declared that judges could 
judge without peril to their souls because they had more than one “body.”  In this, the 
judge was akin to the King:  The King had two bodies, his private person and his royal 
one.109 The judge went this one better:  He was a triple person. The judge might know 
some things from the confessional.  There were things known to him “ut Deus,” “as 
God.”  Other things were known to him in his professional role as judge, “ut iudex.”  
Finally things were know to him as a witness, as a private person—“ut homo,” “as a 
man”110 or (as later canonists would put it) “ut privatus,” as a private person.111  Of the 
three, only the judge was permitted to judge.112  During the twelfth century, there was as 
yet no general agreement on these doctrines.113  After the early thirteenth century, though, 
the law of conscience came into clearer focus.  This is unsurprising:  After the Fourth 
Lateran Council the need for a law of conscience became pressing.  Once confession was 
universalized and regularized, the difficulty of judicial knowledge became an intense one.  
                                                                                                                                                 
maleficium coartat. 
Gratian. Verum hoc pro his dictum intelligitur, quos iudices seculi pro suis sceleribus legum seueritate 
percellunt, quos uel morte puniunt, uel deportari iubent.” 
109 For the comparison: Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 71. 
110 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 45 n. 37. 
111 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 50. 
112 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 40; Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 103.  
For civilians like Azo, there were naturally only two persons:  ut iudex, and ut privatus.  Padoa-Schioppa, 
Sur la conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 107. 
113 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 28. 
And indeed, it was in the early decades of the thirteenth century the rule became clear, 
that the judge could never deploy his knowledge as a “private” person.114   
But with this, medieval moral theologians found themselves facing a paradoxical 
and disturbing result, famous in the Middle Ages, both on the Continent and (as we shall 
see) in England.  Judges were never permitted to use their “private knowledge.”  To do so 
would be to confuse their three separate “bodies.”  But this meant that, in the name of 
conscience, judges would sometimes end up convicting persons they knew to be 
innocent.  Let me emphasize that, in the social setting of the age, this cannot have been an 
entirely rare problem.  How could one deal with this quandary?  Much of the mature 
canon law of conscience, as it emerged during the thirteenth century and after, turned 
precisely on this question.  Some jurists thought the judge could simply find ways to prod 
the witnesses toward creating a record that reflected what he knew to be the truth.  Most 
insisted that a judge in possession of private knowledge should refer the case to a judicial 
superior.115  Some thought the judge should testify himself publicly, describing what he 
had seen.116  Failing these expedients, though, the common view held that the judge was 
simply under an obligation to judge according to the proofs offered by the parties—even 
if it meant condemning an innocent person.117   
                                                 
114 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 32 (discussing Azo). 
115 On these and other expedients:  Jacques de Langlade, S.J., Le Juge, Serviteur de la Loi ou Gardien de la 
Justice selon la Tradition Théologique, 10 Revue de Droit Canonique 141, 143-144 (1960) ;  Nörr, Zur 
Stellung des Richters, 51-84. 
116 This was the view of Thomas de Cajetan, Secunda Secundae Partis Summae Theologicae S. Thomas de 
Aquino, cum Cannentariis (Venetiis: Apud Iuntas, 1638), 163v, marginal commentary bottom right (judge 
must declare publicly “vidi in tali loco, &c.”). 
117 There was also a tradition, notably in France, that held that the King was not bound by any such moral 
dilemma.  Only inferior magistrates were bound to judge exclusively on the record.  Nörr, Zur Stellung des 
Richters, 86-88;  and the “Quaestio” of Jacques de Révigny published in Domenico Maffei, Il Giudice 
Testimmone e una « Quaestio » de Jacques de Revigny (MS. Bon. Coll. Hisp. 82), 35 Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 54, 74-76 (1967).  It is conceivable that this has some bearing on the English tradition, 
to the extent juries were conceived as “judges without a superior.”  
That, for example, is how no less a figure than Saint Thomas Aquinas saw the 
matter.  In a manner typical of the tradition I have been tracing, Aquinas treated the 
problem of conscientious judging as part of his larger discussion of murder:  The question 
was precisely how a judge might avoid “making himself a murderer.”  Aquinas’ answer 
summarized the wisdom of the Continent, while introducing a new variation on Gratian’s 
approach: 
If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is 
innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find 
a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him 
for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he 
pronounces sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the 
innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty.118
It is, said Aquinas in effect, deviating from Gratian,  the witnesses who kill him, and not 
you.  If this sort of argument seems unpalatable, the answer lay to hand for medieval 
casuists:  “multa cum conscientia contra conscientiam fiunt,” “doing things in good 
conscience often requires doing things against one’s conscience.”119  It might seem that a 
judge who condemned an innocent committed a mortal sin, but in fact he did not 
condemn the accused in his private person, but in his official person as judge.120  At any 
rate, it was necessary at all costs to maintain a strict role-separation between judges and 
witnesses.121  The alternative was to build oneself “a mansion in Hell.” 
                                                 
118 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2-2 q. 64 n. 7, at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/306406.htm.  Cf. 
Raymund de Penafort, counseling the judge to try to prevent the false witnesses from testifying, but 
insisting that the judge must otherwise delegate the case.  See Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 66 n. 1.                                             
119 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 52; Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience dans le Ius Commune Européen, 100-
101 (Summa Colonensis). 
120 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 52-53 (Alanus). 
121 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 77, with citations to further literature. 
As we shall soon see, this great debate in moral theology too was not confined to 
the Continent.  Max Radin demonstrated seventy years ago that the English were full 
participants from the Middle Ages onward.122  Indeed, the English moralists of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were all still immersed in the same debate:  In this 
too, English justice did not develop independently of wider western trends.   But as we 
shall also see, English justice presented peculiar problems, problems faced by no one on 
the Continent.  The continental law solved the moral challenge of judging by insisting on 
a strict role-separation between judges and witnesses in cases of blood.  Yet this was 
precisely the role separation that would prove impossible for the common law criminal 
juror. 
 
IV. The Conscience and the Judge (2);  The Problem of “Doubt” 
 
During the great centuries of medieval Church reform, the ban on “private 
knowledge” thus developed as a fundamental bulwark of the law—but not as a bulwark 
protecting the accused against false conviction.  Instead, it developed as a bulwark 
protecting the soul of the judge against the dangers of judging.  Indeed, so far was the ban 
from being a protection for the accused, that jurists expressly condoned the conviction of 
the innocent.  Medieval jurists concluded that there was no other way to keep the judge 
safe from damnation than to allow him sometimes to send the innocent to the gallows. 
This same strange constellation of ideas also shaped the development of criminal 
procedure both on the Continent and in England after 1215.  Anxieties about blood taint, 
                                                 
122 Radin, The Conscience of the Court, 192 Law Quarterly Review 506 (1932) (506-520). 
and the desire to minimize the moral risks of judging, informed procedure on both sides 
of the Channel.  To understand how, we must begin once again on the Continent. 
This is not the place to investigate all the details of continental development.  
Nevertheless, it is essential that we understand some of the basic outlines of continental 
criminal procedure in order to understand the common law.  This is above all because it 
was on the continent that ideas of criminal justice came to be framed in terms of the 
moral theology of “doubt”;  and it was in the language of the moral theology of “doubt” 
that the problems of judging were ultimately analyzed both on the Continent and in 
England. 
Let us begin by briefly reviewing the famous romano-canonical rules of proof, 
which lay at the foundation of continental law through the eighteenth century. 123  
Continental criminal procedure, post-1215, was a system that continued to turn on the 
infliction of “blood punishments,” the principal concern of the Fourth Lateran Council.  
When it came to blood punishments, the procedures that developed over the course of the 
thirteenth century set sharp limits.  Blood punishments could only be administered if 
there was perfect certainty about the guilt of accused:  as the canon lawyers put it, there 
could be no blood punishment unless there were proofs “luce meridiana clariores,” 
“clearer than the light of the midday sun.”124  To that end, the continental system adopted 
a measure also to be found in other pre-modern systems, such as Islamic law and 
traditional Chinese law:  It declared that perfect certainty should ideally be attained 
                                                 
123 For important recent studies, see Richard Fraher, Conviction According to Conscience; The Medieval 
Jurists’ Debate Concerning Judicial Discretion and the Law of Proof, 7 Law & Hist. Rev. 23, 24 (1989).  
124 Giorgia Alessi Palazzolo, Provo Legale e Pena. La crisi del sistema tra evo medio et moderno (Naples, 
1979), 3-5 ;  and in the older literature Paul Fournier, Les Officialités au Moyen Age: Etude sur 
l’Organisation, la Comptétence et la Procédure des Tribunaux Ecclésiastiques Ordinaires en France, de 
1180 à 1328 (Paris: Plon, 1880), 247. 
through the testimony of two unimpeachably trustworthy eye-witnesses.   Such testimony 
constituted “full proof”—“plena probatio” in the Latin of the Middle Ages. 
Of course, the testimony of two unimpeachably trustworthy eyewitnesses is rarely 
available.  What was to be done if full proof was impossible?  Failing full proof, 
Continental law sought a different means of certainty:  It sought a confession.  That 
confession was to be obtained through the most notorious of Continental practices, one 
that, until recently, we all thought had vanished from the western world: judicial torture.  
Torture could not, however, be ordered in all cases.  Persons of high social standing—
members of the nobility and the like—could not be tortured at all.  Even with regard to 
lower status persons, moreover, judges were forbidden to order torture unless there were  
“half-full proof”—“semiplena probatio.”125  And how was a judge to determine whether 
there was half-full proof?  He was to follow a kind of script for the weighing of evidence.   
The technical term for such evidence was “indicium,” “hint” or “proof,” and what judges 
were commanded to find were “indicia indubitata,” “proofs that did permit of any doubt.”   
Such was the continental law of evidence.  Common law commentators have 
regarded this law with contempt and horror since the Middle Ages, condemning its use of 
torture in particular.126  Yet historians have amply demonstrated that the continental rules 
were known, studied and absorbed in England as well from the Middle Ages onward.  
The English regularly borrowed the continental vocabulary of concepts, if often without 
acknowledgement.127  It can be argued that the English even had their own form of 
                                                 
125 See the fuller discussion in Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 212-213, 219-228.  At 212-213, 
Schmoeckel emphasizes the extent to which Enlightenment critics caricatured this system. 
126 See the classic passage in Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legaum Anglie, ed., S.B. Chrimes (repr. 
Holmes Beach, Fla., 1986), 42-53. 
127 E.g. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 120-121. 
torture.128  In any case, in various ways and forms, English lawyers drew intellectual 
sustenance from the magnificent body of continental scholarship129—as indeed one might 
expect.  The brilliant work of the continental jurists too was a common western 
possession. 
This is not the place to review the full brilliance of romano-canonical proof, 
though.130  For my purposes here, I want to focus on only one, neglected, aspect of this 
system:  its connection with the theology of “doubt.”  For the carefully elaborated rules of 
the continental law of evidence, in their effort to regulate the use of blood punishments, 
turned precisely on the question of “doubt,” in ways that were intimately bound up with 
the law of conscience, and that were fateful for the shaping both of continental judging 
and of common law criminal jury trial.  Leading historians of the common law—notably 
again John Langbein,131 James Franklin,132 and Barbara Shapiro133—have all seen that 
some aspect of the continental concept of “doubt” must have had some influence on the 
making of “reasonable doubt.”  Nevertheless, the story has not been properly understood 
or rightly told. 
Let us turn then to the theology of “doubt.”  Within the law of conscience, 
“doubt” was a term of central importance.  Indeed, any reader with a good Catholic 
                                                 
128 This was the peine forte et dure, frequently compared to continental torture.  For this procedure, used as 
late as 1726, see Cockburn, History of English Assizes, 117, see the survey in Fisher, Jury’s Rise as Lie-
Detector, 588-589. 
129 For examples from a leading eighteenth-century text, see Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence 
(repr. New York: Garland, 1979) (1754), at e.g. 104-106 (discussing problems of probability in terms 
drawn bothe from “the Common and Civil Law”);  110-112 (“weighing” of evidence); 191 (English rules 
“in Conformity to the Rules of the Cannon Law”). 
130 For recent surveys see Matthias Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison. Die Abschaffung der Folter in 
Europa und die Entwicklung des gemeinen Strafprozeβ- und Beweisrechts seit dem hohen Mittelalter 
(Cologne, 2000), 187-506;   
131 Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: The View from the Ryder Sources, 96 Col. L. 
Rev. 1168, 1199 n. 152 (1996) (discussing rule “in dubio pro reo”). 
132 Below. 
133 Below. 
education is likely to know this, since “doubt” remains a term of central importance in 
Catholic moral teaching.  The Catholic Encyclopedia explains how “doubt” is understood 
down to this day, in phrases that date back to the Middle Ages: 
Doubt 
(Lat. dubium, Gr. aporia, Fr. doute, Ger. Zweifel).  
A state in which the mind is suspended between two contradictory propositions 
and unable to assent to either of them. . . .Doubt is either positive or negative. In 
the former case, the evidence for and against is so equally balanced as to render 
decision impossible; in the latter, the doubt arises from the absence of sufficient 
evidence on either side. . . . Again, doubt may be either theoretical or practical. 
The former is concerned with abstract truth and error; the latter with questions of 
duty, or of the licitness of actions, or of mere expediency. A further distinction is 
made between doubt concerning the existence of a particular fact (dubium facti) 
and doubt in regard to a precept of law (dubium juris). Prudent doubts are 
distinguished from imprudent, according to the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the considerations on which the doubt is based. 
Every reader of this passage will notice instantly that the question of “doubt,” in Catholic 
moral theology, is particularly framed as the question of when doubts are reasonable.  
Every reader will also notice that, according to that theology, unreasonable doubts are 
imprudent ones, ones we must not follow.  With this we have nothing other than a 
“reasonable doubt” standard:  Indeed, we have the very “reasonable doubt” standard that 
is still applied in American criminal trials, as I want to show in the balance of this 
Article.  But to see how “reasonable doubt” crept from Catholic moral theology into 
American criminal procedure, we must once again burrow into the history of the 
Christian theory of adjudication as it developed in the Middle Ages, and especially on the 
medieval Continent. 
The moral theology of doubt began taking shape during the same reformist 
centuries we have been discussing all along.  To understand its place in criminal 
procedure, we must begin from an oft-quoted principle laid down by the early medieval 
Pope Gregory the Great:  “Grave satis est et indecens, ut in re dubia certa detur 
sententia”:  “It is a serious and unseemly business to go giving certain judgments in 
doubtful cases.”134   That principle was picked up by reforming lawyer-popes of the later 
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, in ways that would affect legal analysis for many 
generations on both sides of the Channel.  It also became associated with another 
intellectual creation of those same reforming Popes:  the so-called “safer path” doctrine, 
which would still be guiding moral theologians in eighteenth century England. 
Let us begin with the “safer path.”  The first statements of the “safer path” 
doctrine, like so much of what we have seen, involved efforts to guarantee the ritual 
purity of clergy faced with possible blood taint.  Clement III, Pope very briefly from 
1187-1191, presented the doctrine in a decision involving a cleric and an arguably 
accidental death: 
A certain priest wished to punish a member of his family using the belt that he 
ordinarily wore, and tried to flog the fellow.  However it happened that his knife 
slipped out of the sheath that was attached to the belt, and gave the man 
something of a wound in the back.  The wounded fellow lived for a while, and the 
                                                 
134 Jaffé-Ewald, 1779, quoted and discussed in Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 41-42;  Schmoeckel, 
Humanität und Staatsraison, 195. 
wound was healing, but then matters took a turn for the worse, and he went the 
way of all flesh.  This created some doubt about whether the priest in question 
should be suspended from his office.135  
The question was thus whether the cleric in question had so polluted himself through a 
fatal shedding of blood that he could no longer perform his sacramental duties.  The 
answer to that question was of course doubtful.  Clement responded by the kind of 
injunction that is common in many legal systems committed to norms of ritual purity.136  
When in doubt, it was necessary to take “the safer path,” avoiding any risk of pollution: 
Since we must choose the safer path in cases of doubt [cum in dubiis semitam 
debeamus eligere tutiorem], it is proper to tell this priest not to involve himself 
further in sacred orders;  but having done penance he should content himself with 
minstering to the minor orders.137
Such was the “safer path” doctrine:  In cases of doubt, “in dubiis,” one should act in such 
a way as to minimize the possibility of pollution.  The doctrine was reiterated in famous 
form a few years later by Innocent III, the lawyer-Pope who presided over the Fourth 
                                                 
135 Clemens III, PL vol 204 [note (10) [col. 1485D] : 
Ad audientiam apostolatus nostri ex parte vestra pervenit quod quidam presbyter volens corrigere 
quemdam de familia sua eo cingulo, quo cingi solebat, illum verberare tentavit: et contingit quod 
cultellus de vagina, quae cingulo adhaerebat, elapsus eum in dorso aliquantulum vulneravit. 
Postmodum vero cum ille vulneratus aliquandiu vixisset, et jam convaluisset a vulnere, graviori, ut 
creditur, infirmitate perculsus, cum sana mente, [col. 1487A] ac devotione debita viam est 
universae carnis ingressus. Quia vero utrum occasione vulneris decessisset dubium habebatur, 
[eodem presbytero ab omni officio, beneficioque suspenso,] quid super hoc vobis esset agendum 
apostolicam sedem consultare voluistis. 
136 E.g. Lingat, Classical Hindu Law;  Talmud 
137 Clemens III, PL vol 204 [note (10) [col. 1485D]: 
Nunc itaque vestrae discretionis industriae duximus respondendum, quod, cum in dubiis semitam 
debeamus eligere tutiorem, vos convenit injungere presbytero memorato, ne de caetero in sacris 
ordinibus administrare accedat; injuncta tamen poenitentia congruenti potestis ei concedere, ut sit 
contentus in minoribus ordinibus ministrare. Si vero [vobis legitime constiterit, quod] ex alia 
infirmitate obierit, de vestra licentia poterit, sicut erat solitus, divina officia celebrare 
Lateran Council.138  Innocent produced the classic formulation of the “safer path” 
doctrine:  In dubiis via eligenda est tutior, “When there are doubts, one must choose the 
safer path.”  This phrase, which English moralists would still be repeating seven centuries 
later, became standard.139  
One must choose the safer path, since “doubtful matters” presented a serious 
danger to the soul.  But what was a “res dubia,” a “doubtful matter”?  And how was one 
to stay on the “safer path”?  Theologians addressed this urgent moral question by 
dividing judgment into four famous degrees of certainty.  A Christian concerned about 
the salvation of his soul was enjoined to seek certainty of the highest degree.  Certainty of 
this highest degree was called—note well the phrase—“moral certainty.”  Below moral 
certainty lay three lower degrees.  These were, in order, opinion, suspicion and doubt.  
“Doubt” was thus the technical term for the lowest degree of certainty in judgment.  
Doubt took a variety of forms, of which “practical doubt”—doubt about whether or not to 
engage in a particular act—posed especially pressing problems.  To act when one was 
uncertain about the rightness of wrongness of the action in question was to engage in an 
act evil in itself, and so to commit a mortal sin.  Thus with regard to “practical doubts,” 
                                                 
138 Innocent too was concerned, unsurprisingly, with the ritual purity of clerics.  The details of the case are 
not worth repeating. 
139In Decretalium Gregorii Papae IX, Compilationes, Liber V, Titulus XXVII . De clerico excommunicato, 
deposito vel interdicto ministrante, Chapter V.  Available at http://www.fh-
augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost13/GregoriusIX/gre_5t27.html:
Quod autem, postquam se novit excommunicatum a nobis, divina sibi fecerit officia celebrari, et 
fidelium communioni se ingesserat frequenter, id non in contemptum sedis apostolicae vel tanti 
etiam sacramenti, sed spe veniae asserit se fecisse, ne videlicet induresceret amplius, vel durius 
eius animus proterviret, si nunquam divinis officiis interesset; licet in diebus solennibus se 
nunquam celebrationi divinorum ingesserit, sed cum paucis in angulo alicuius ecclesiae occulte 
non festivis diebus divina sibi fecerit interdum officia celebrari. Licet autem in hoc non videatur 
omnino culpabilis exstitisse, quia tamen in dubiis via est tutior eligenda, etsi de lata in eum 
sententia dubitaret, debuerat tamen potius se abstinere, quam sacramenta ecclesiastica pertractare. 
the rule of Innocent III held with special force:  “In dubiis practicis tutior via est 
eligenda,” “in cases of practical doubt, one must take the safer path.”140
These teachings came to involve immense and fascinating complications, 
particularly as the doctrine reached its maturity in the writings of sixteenth-century 
Spanish moralists141 and their seventeenth-century French successors.142  As historians of 
epistemology and science have shown, the theology of doubt was especially important for 
the making of western epistemology.  The famous four degrees of certainty—moral 
certainty, opinion, suspicion, and doubt—could be thought of as representing a scale of 
proof as well as a scale of moral responsibility.  So it was that, in the early modern 
period, scientists and philosophers concerned with epistemological proof drew directly on 
the terminology of the theology of doubt.  Philosophical programs like Descartes’ 
exercise in “radical doubt” grew out of this theological tradition.  So did many of the 
basic terms of the scientific search for certainty.143   
Indeed, the fact that the moral theology of doubt influenced early modern science 
is at the root of some of the most troubling confusion in our literature on the history of 
“reasonable doubt.”  It is precisely because the theology of doubt worked its way into the 
philosophy of science that historians of science like Franklin and Shapiro could come to 
the conclusion that the “reasonable doubt” rule had something to do with the search for 
scientific certainty—had something to do with an early effort to create a standard of 
proof.  This has led them into important misinterpretations.  When Shapiro studied the 
                                                 
140 E.g. Enciclopedia Cattolica (Città del Vaticano, 1950), 4: col. 1945 (s.v “dubbio”). 
141 Jacques de Langlade, S.J., Le Juge, Serviteur de la Loi ou Gardien de la Justice selon la Tradition 
Théologique, 10 Revue de Droit Canonique 141, 153-156 (1960)  
142 Franklin, Science of Conjecture. 
143 For  brief general accounts, see see Pietro Palazzini, Dubbio, in Enciclopedia Cattolica (Florence, 1950), 
4: cols. 1944-1948; and J.M. Harty, Probabilism, in New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12441a.htm. 
law of “satisfied conscience,” for example, she studied it as a law of evidence, 
epistemology and proof, not as a law of the moral responsibility of the judge—she 
studied it as the law of the satisfied conscience, not the law of the safe conscience.144  
Similar things are true of Franklin.145
Yet if the terminology of doubt could be used for the philosophy of knowledge, it 
never lost its connection with the moral problematics of judging, and it is a mistake to 
focus too much on the epistemological puzzles of science if we want to understand the 
rise of “reasonable doubt.”  The theology of doubt was not just about achieving scientific 
certainty;  it always concerned itself with doubt in moral matters, and indeed with 
“reasonable doubt” in “moral matters.”146  Precisely because it remained a moral 
theology, it applied quite directly to the moral dilemmas of criminal justice.  If we fail to 
understand this, we condemn ourselves to permanent confusion about the history of 
“reasonable doubt.”  
In fact, the moral theology of doubt lay at the very foundation of criminal 
procedure as the continental jurists developed it, in ways we must understand if we are to 
                                                 
144 Thus while Shapiro has understood that the “reasonable doubt” rule was a rule of conscience, and that 
the Continental parallels deserve to be explored, she has nevertheless not investigated the passages in the 
literature of conscience that bear directly on the moral dilemmas of judging.  Many of those passages are 
discussed below, Section VII.  For Shapiro’s efforts, see her Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable 
Cause:  Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (Berkeley: U. of California, 
1991), at e.g. 14-16, and the discussion of Jeremy Taylor at 263-264 n. 57 (discussing Taylor on knowledge 
but not on judging).  To Shapiro, the questions of law remain those an historian of science naturally asks:  
questions about fact, epistemology and assumptions.  See Barbara Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 
1550-1720 (Ithaca, 2000), 8-16. 
145 Franklin has lengthy discussions both about the law of evidence, Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, 1-
63, and about “the doubting conscience and moral certainty,” id., 64-101.  Nevertheless, he does bring his 
wide and learned treatment together in the right way.  These excellent scholars have focused too much on 
the modern concept of “reasonable doubt” as a standard of proof, failing to catch sight of its pre-modern 
meaning.  The best account in the literature on moral theology that I have seen is in the two pages of 
Margaret Sampson, Laxity and Liberty in seventeenth-century English political thought, in Edmund Leites, 
ed., Conscience and Casuisty in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, England, 1988), 85-87. 
146 E.g. Margaret Sampson, Laxity and Liberty in seventeenth-century English political thought, in Edmund 
Leites, ed., Conscience and Casuisty in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, England, 1988), 78. 
understand our onw common law history.147  To follow the development of criminal 
procedure as an aspect of the theology of doubt, we must start once again with Ivo of 
Chartres, the brilliant and influential reformer of the late eleventh century.  In his 
Decretum, his compilation of canon texts, Ivo recorded the text of a letter from the 
second-century Pope Sixtus II.  This letter addressed the ticklish question of when one 
could condemn sinners.  The answer Sixtus gave was reminiscent of the theology of 
“private knowledge”:  God, he declared, was the only judge who could always judge with 
certainty.  For humans it was different.  When humans confronted “incerta”—uncertain 
allegations—they could not condemn an accused person unless it was by “indiciis certis,” 
evidence sufficient to create certainty.148  The key phrase here, “certis indiciis,” was to 
become a standard in Continental criminal procedure, always associated with the concept 
of “doubt.”     
That association was made in particular by Gratian, in a passage that, as scholars 
have observed, definitively introduced the doctrine of “doubt” into canon criminal law.  
In two consecutive passages, Gratian echoed first Gregory the Great’s declaration on 
doubt, “ut in re dubia certa detur sententia”; and then Ivo: 
C. LXXIV. A decision that purports to be certain does not resolve a doubtful 
matter.  
                                                 
147 For a discussion that highlights the moral challenge of judging as medieval jurists saw it, see Palazzolo, 
Prova Legale e Pena, 41-42, and esp. 110-111 n. 23, which presents the basic connection between the 
structure of moral theology and the structure of crimininal procedure traced here. 
148 Ivo, Decretum, PL 161, col. 399B: 
Justo enim judicio Dei plerumque peccatoribus potestas, qua sanctos ipsius persequuntur, 
conceditur, ut qui Spiritu Dei juvantur et aguntur fiant per laborum exercitia clariores. Illi tamen 
qui hoc agunt nullatenus evadunt poenam; quia, ut ait Dominus: Vae illi per quem scandalum [col. 
399C] venit (Matth. XVIII). Item. Paulo post. Incerta non judicemus quoadusque veniat. Dominus, 
qui et illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum, et manifestabit consilia cordium (I Cor. IV). Et quamvis 
vera sint, non tamen credenda sunt, nisi quae certis indiciis comprobantur, nisi quae manifesto 
judicio convincuntur, nisi quae judiciario ordine publicantur. Nullus ergo humano potest 
condemnari examine, quem Deus suo judicio reservavit 
It is a serious and unseemly business to go giving certain judgments in doubtful 
cases 
C. LXXV. Things that are not proved through certain evidence are not be 
believed.  
 . . .  
Even though certain things may be true, nevertheless they are not to be believed 
by the judge, unless they are proved by certain evidence.149
Thus were the two key terms—“indicia,” “evidence” and “dubia,” “doubts”—linked in 
canon law.  By the end of the twelfth century, the connection between the theology of 
doubt and the technicalities of criminal procedure had been clearly drawn, in ways that 
linked it just as clearly with the moral problems of “private knowledge.”  Thus the late 
twelfth-century canonist Huguccio analyzed the problems of criminal procedure as 
follows:  A “doubtful matter,” was a matter “not proven by witnesses, or documents, or 
evidence such as a confession.”  A “doubtful matter” was a matter “known to the judge in 
some other way.”150  To Huguccio, the question of doubt was thus was thus identical with 
the question of “private knowledge.”  Conversely, obeying the rules of evidence was no 
different from declining to use one’s “private knowledge.” 
As continental criminal procedure developed over the subsequent centuries, jurists 
never lost sight of the connections among “doubt,” “proof” and “private knowledge”:  
                                                 
149 Decreti Pars Secunda, C.11, q.3 c.74: 
C. LXXIV. Res dubia non diffiniatur certa sententia.  
Graue satis est et indecens, ut in re dubia certa detur 
sententia. 
C. LXXV. Non credantur que certis iudiciis non demonstrantur.  
Item Augustinus in libro de penitencia. [c. 3.] 
Quamuis uera sint quedam, tamen iudici non 
sunt credenda, nisi certis indiciis demonstrentur  
See the discussion in Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 195-196. 
150 In Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 42 
Criminal procedure was about “doubt”; and the great task of a criminal justice system 
was to arrive at “indicia indubitata,” evidence that permitted no doubt.151  It was precisely 
in the course of wrestling with “doubt,” for example, that Albertus Gandinus, a leading 
thirteenth-century criminal law scholar, developed the basic hierarchy of proofs in 
criminal procedure, explaining how evidence was to be weighed.152   Many other 
medieval proceduralists could be cited.  I will simply summarize the mature version of 
the law as we find it in the writings of a leading scholar of the sixteenth century, Prosper 
Farinacci.153   
As we open Farinacci’s standard Practice and Theory of Criminal Law, and turn 
to the chapter “de indiciis et tortura,” “on proofs and torture,” we find a wealth of the 
moral theology of doubt.  Indeed, we find that mature continental criminal procedure 
adopted the moral theology of doubt as its very framework.154  The problem of proof, as 
Farinacci presented the standard learning, was nothing other than the problem of “rei 
dubiae,” “doubtful matters,” in the phrase that dated back to Gregory the Great and 
Gratian.155  Faced with such “doubtful matters,” one needed proof.  But what was a 
“proof,” an “indicium”?  A proof, explained Farinacci, was a kind of probable guess:  It 
was a “conjecture” that was so probable that it “compelled the conscience of the judge to 
                                                 
151 See the discussion in Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 187-189, beginning from the formula of 
Azo, “probatio est rei dubie per argumentum ostensio.” 
152 See the discussion in Peter Holtappels, Die Entwicklung des Grundsatzes ‘in dubio pro reo’ (Hamburg: 
Cram, de Gruyter, 1965), 9. 
153For Farinacci as an example of the connection between moral theology and criminal procedure, see 
Palazzolo, Prova Legale e Pena, 110-111 n. 23. 
154Specialists in continental legal history are in the midst of exploring the relationship between theology 
and law.  See most recently the stimulating discussion of Lepsius, Von Zweifeln zur Überzeugung, at e.g. 
244-297. I do not attempt to offer any full account here.  I simply give the examples in the text in order to 
set the stage for the discussion of the moral theology of doubt in the common law.  A detailed investigation 
of the relationship between the moral theology of doubt and the structure of criminal procedure on the 
Continent would burst the bounds of this Article. 
155 Prosper Farinacci, Praxis et Theoricae Criminalis Partis Primae Tomus Secundus (Lyon: Sumptibus 
Iacobi Cardon, 1634), 157 (=De Indiciis & Tortura, Titulus V, Quaestio xxxvi, nos. 5,6, 9). 
judge according to it.”156  And how was one to evaluate the probability of one’s 
“conjectures”?  Farinacci’s answer was drawn in the most straightforward way from 
moral theology:  One was to apply the familiar scale of certainty developed by the moral 
theologians.  Thus some conjectures gave rise to “opinions”; while some gave rise to 
“suspicions”; and others gave rise to “doubt.”  Farinacci presented all this in the classic 
language of the moral theologians.  Farinacci’s account paints a lovely picture of the 
continental doubting mind, flitting back and forth from possible conclusion to possible 
conclusion, until the final decision is seized by a movement of the mind: 
At times the judge, faced with the evidence presented before him, feels doubt, 
now leaning to the one party, now to the other, and his mind is not able to come 
down on one side, as when the proofs are equal or there some obscurity about 
them.  Now after this period of doubting, the judge begins to incline to one party 
more than the other.  At that point, doubt ends, and suspicion begins.  And if this 
suspicion is the result of grave proofs [si ista suspicio oritur ex gravibus indiciis], 
then suspicion ends, and opinion begins. . . .  Now properly speaking, we say that 
the judge “doubts,” when no reason or cause is present [quando nulla adest ratio, 
nullaque causa],which inclines him more to one party than the other  . . . and a 
person is “in doubt” when his mind does not incline more to the plaintiff than it 
does to the defendant.  But if after doubting, the judge is moved by some piece of 
evidence or argument to lean in the direction of the other party, then he is no 
longer said to “doubt” but to “have a suspicion.”157
                                                 
156Id., p. 157, no. 28:  “Indicium esse coniecturam ex probabilibus & non necessariis ortam, à quibus potest 
abesse veritas, sed non versimilitudo, & quae quandoque iudicantis mentem ita perstringit, ut cogat Iudicis 
conscientiam secundùm eam iudicare.” 
157 Id., 164, no. 198: 
It was in these movements of the doubting mind that the fundamental decisions of 
criminal procedure were to be made:  Only if there were “indicia indubitata” “proofs 
permitting no doubt,” could the judge proceed to the next step in continental justice: 
ordering torture.158
Even once the judge proceeded to torture, though, he was by no means done with 
moral theology.  For the decision to torture a defendant itself presented the familiar 
problem of “private knowledge.”159  Already in the thirteenth century it was understood 
that the problems of private knowledge dictated the very details of the regulation of 
torture:  As Nörr has shown, medieval jurists insisted that tortured persons could not be 
asked leading questions, probably because doing so would effectively inject the judge’s 
own “private knowledge” into the proceeding.160  Those same problems continued to 
haunt the understanding of torture thereafter.  We can take a summary of the mature 
position of continental law from a seventeenth-century Italian handbook of criminal 
procedure.  The author cited Farinacci among many others to make the point that a judge 
could never use his “private knowledge” in proceeding to torture: 
                                                                                                                                                 
quando iudex ex deductis coram eo dubitat modò ad unam partem, & modò ad aliam, nec ad unam 
potiùs quam ad aliam animum applicat, ut est quando probationes sunt aequales vel quando habent 
aliquando obscuritatis.   Et adverte, quòd si post hanc dubitationem Iudex inclinare incipiat in 
unam partem potiùs, quam in aliam, tunc cessat dubitatio, & intrat suspicio.  Et si ista suspicio 
oritur ex gravibus indiciis, tunc cessat suspicio, & intrat opinio. . . .  tunc propriè dubitare Iudicem 
dicimus, quando nulla adest ratio, nullaque causa, ex qua magis in unam partem quàm in alteram 
inclinet  . . . & dubius is dicitur, quando non magis animum suum ad actorem, quàm an reum 
inclinat.  At si Iudex post dubitationem aliquo motus indicio, vel argumento in alteram partem 
flectat, licèt cum dubitatione, & tunc non ampliùs dubitare, sed suspicari dicitur. 
158 Id., 158, no. 42. 
159 This was already true in the thirteenth century.  I have quoted before the thirteenth-century scholar 
Durantis, who spoke of the judge who, looking out his window onto the public square, saw a nobleman 
committing murder.  What troubled Durantis in that case was precisely the question of torture.  Nobles 
could not ordinarily be tortured.  So could this rule be abrogated, since the judge had certain “private 
knowledge” of the noble’s guilt?  Durantis held that it could notSpec. 2.3. de Sententia § qualiter sit 
ferenda.  Quoted and discussed in Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 78. 
160 Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 21 (discussing Placentinus).  Indeed, leading questions were frowned 
upon, for this reason, in all phases of adjudication.  Id.  The ban on leading questions was older, though, 
already to be found in the Roman sources.  See Schmoeckel, Humanität und Staatsraison, 262. 
Whether Torture can be ordered on the basis of the Knowledge [Conscientia]  
of the Judge. 
Summary. 
1 Tortura cannot be ordered solely on the basis of the judge’s knowledge 
[conscience], even if the judge is empowered to exercise discretion, & even if he 
is of strongest opinion. 
 *  *  * 
The judge is warned that he must not proceed to torture on the basis of his own 
knowledge, since it is a well-worn rule, repeated by everyone, that the judge must 
judge according to the dossier, and evidence properly developed on the record.161
 
Torture was a problem of “conscience”—which, given the ambiguities of the word 
“conscience,” meant that it was a problem of the judge’s “private knowledge.” 
 In all this, continental criminal procedure was built on the foundations of the 
moral theology of doubt.  Jurists understood this, and so did moral theologians.  Indeed, 
moral theologians took an active and continuing interest in the dilemmas of the judge 
throughout the later Middle Ages and early modern period.  For example, Leonard 
                                                 
161 Sebastiano Guazzini, Tractatus ad Defensam Inquisitorum, Carceratorum, Reorum, & Condemnatorum 
super quocunque crimine (Venice: Apud Bertanos, 1699), Bk. 2, 98-99 (= Defensio XXX, Cap. XXIX): 
Tortura an inferri possit ex conscientia iudicis. 
Summarium. 
1 Tortura non potest inferri ex sola conscientia iudicis, quod procedit etiam in iudice habente 
arbitrium in procedendo, & si iudex esset optimae opinionis. 
 *  *  * 
Iudex caveat in ista materia, ne proceduat ad torturam ex sola sua conscientia, cum regula sit satis 
trita, & in ore omnium, quod iudex debeat secundum acta, & et allegata iudicare . . . . 
 
Et in specie, ut non possit inferri tortura ex sola iudicis conscientia, Boss. Tit. de indic. Numero 
141. Speculat. In tit. de sent.§.qualiter,versic.item debet ferri, Marsil.d.sing.266.in fin. 
Iul.Clar.q.8.num.5.vers. & licet, ubi testatur, quod ita teneant Doct.& q.66.num.2. 
Farin.cons.83.ubi concludunt, quod si iudex viderit Seium committere delictum, & non adsint alia 
indicia contra eum, non posset iudex illum toquere, licet Dec.d.c.14.num.3.& sub vers.prior opinio 
videatur isto casu tenere contrarium, & ibi allegat aliquas rationes. 
Lessius, a leading Flemish theologian of the later sixteenth and early seventeenth century, 
offered the same sort of analysis that Farinacci did.  Lessius too reviewed the standard 
four-part scale of certainty:  doubt, suspicion, opinion and firm judgment.  He then 
explained how the scale of certainty bore the question of “indicia”: 
These degrees [of certainty] are so constituted, that greater proofs are required to 
arrive at suspicion, than at simple doubt, and greater proofs for the definitive 
determination of guilt [“sententia”] than for a mere judgment. . . .162
A judge who judged in a state of doubt,163 always committed a mortal sin, Lessius added 
ominously.164  Such warnings were found in abundance among the moral theologians, 
notably the great figures at work in sixteenth-century Spain,165 and they would continue 
to be found right through the eighteenth century.  We may cite, for example, a standard 
French “dictionary of conscience,” used from the early eighteenth through the early 
nineteenth century to guide priests: 
In every case of doubt, where one’s salvation is in peril, one must always take the 
safer way:  In dubiis via eligenda est tutior, as Innocent III says. . . . 
A judge who is in doubt must refuse to judge, whether the doubt has to do with 
the person, the law or the fact.166
                                                 
162 Leonardus Lessius, De Iustitia et Iure (Venice: Apud Andraeam Baba, 1625), Lib. 2 Cap. 29, 6-8.  [= p. 
275]:  Hi gradus ita se habent, ut maiora indicia requirantur ad suspicionem, quam ad simplicem 
dubitationem, & maiora ad sententiam quam ad iudicium. 
163 Leonardus Lessius, De Iustitia et Iure (Venice: Apud Andraeam Baba, 1625), Lib. 2 Cap. 29, 6-8.  [= p. 
275] (“iudicium temerarium”—defined as judging in a state of doubt at top of column) 
164 Leonardus Lessius, De Iustitia et Iure (Venice: Apud Andraeam Baba, 1625), Lib. 2 Cap. 29, 6-8.  [= p. 
275]. 
165 Jacques de Langlade, S.J., Le Juge, Serviteur de la Loi ou Gardien de la Justice selon la Tradition 
Théologique, 10 Revue de Droit Canonique 141, 153-156 (1960)  
166 Collet, Abrégé du Dictionnaire des Cas de Conscience de M. Pontas, Paris : Libraires Associés, 1767, 
1 : 467-468 : 
Dans tous les doutes, où il s’agit du péril du salut, il faut toujours suivre le parti le plus sûr:  In 
dubiis via eligenda est tutior, dit Innocent III, cap. 3 de Clerico excomm.  Clément III enseigne la 
même maxime, ainsi qu’Eugene III, cap. 3 de sponsalib. & matrim. . . . 
“A judge may never judge, when he is in doubt.” 
The structure of continental criminal procedure was thus modeled on the structure 
of the theology of doubt, in ways that implied that a judge’s salvation was at stake in 
every evidentiary decision he made.  Correspondingly, the old theological language rang 
through some of the leading texts right to the end of the Middle Ages:  For example, 
Aegidius Bossius, a leading authority of the fifteenth century, still spoke about the 
dangers of “passion,” about judges who hastened too merrily to punishment:  “si iudex 
gloriatur in morte hominis sicut nonulli faciunt nostra tempestate, homicida est,” “if the 
judge glories in the death of a man, as no small number do in our age, he is a 
murderer.”167
Despite that, though, it would probably be a mistake to imagine that most 
continental judges were terribly worried about the safety of their souls by the sixteenth 
century.  As Nörr observed forty years ago, the real drama in the development of this law 
was the drama of the emergence of a distinctive professional identity.  By the sixteenth 
century, continental judges—unlike common law jurors—were hardened professionals, 
who probably treated adjudication as a matter of routine, rarely suffering from 
conscientious qualms or any lesser form of moral indigestion.  Scholars have recognized 
that sixteenth century continental jurists took a toughened attitude, displaying more of an 
interest in proof than in charged moral dramas of the criminal law that had preoccupied 
the Middle Ages.168  Indeed, when we browse in the juristic literature of the sixteenth 
                                                                                                                                                 
Un juge ne peut jamais juger, lorsqu’il est dans le doute, soit que son doute regarde la personne, le 
droit ou le fait. 
167Aegidii Bossii Patricii Mediolanensis . . .  Tractatus Varii (Lyons: Apud Antonium de Antoniis, 1562), 
457.  
168 See the discussion of sixteenth century changes in Paolo Marchetti, Testis contra se: L’Imputato come 
fonte di Prova nel Processo Penale dell’Età Moderna (Milan, 1994), 27-38 (noting diminished focus both 
century and after, we do not find the jurists repeating the warnings of their contemporary 
moral theologians.  To be sure, there is plenty of vitriol on the subject of malfeasant 
judges.  Farinacci, for example, declared that judges who tortured without proper proof 
were “dogs,” who should be criminally prosecuted.169  This is violent language, from a 
man who thought the the criminal justice systems of his day were doing evil.  (This may 
have something to with the fact that Farinacci himself was an ex-convict.)  But it is not 
precisely the language of conscience. 
No, for most professional continental judges by the sixteenth century, it is 
undoubtedly the case that the continental rules had become merely a means of proof—as 
a way of determining what had really happened in cases of uncertainty.  The old moral 
comfort function of the rule probably withered away for most continental judges after the 
fifteenth century.  Their world was one in which the old anxieties about blood taint had 
been fully absorbed into a professional judicial ethos by the end of the Middle Ages.  But 
for English jurors of the same period, the situation was different. 
Before turning directly to English jurors, though, we must review one more aspect 
of “doubt” in continental law.  This is the famous continental rule, “in dubio pro reo,” “in 
doubt you must decide for the defendant.”  This celebrated rule represented the 
continental form of the presumption of innocence.170  John Langbein has already noted 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the soul of the accused and on the relative discretion in decision of the judge); and his discussion of later 
centuries in id., 169-208. 
169 Farinacci, 183 (nos. 110 and 111). 
170 See Peter Holtappels, Die Entwicklung des Grundsatzes ‘in dubio pro reo’ (Hamburg: Cram, de Gruyter, 
1965); and for the place of the maxim in modern law, e.g. Jan Zopfs, Der Grundsatz “in dubio pro reo” 
(Baden-Baden, 1999).  
that it must have some connection with the “reasonable doubt” standard171; and as we 
shall see, he is entirely right. 
The maxim “in dubio pro reo,” whose history was traced by Peter Holtappels 
forty years ago, is yet another a rule that grew more or less directly out of “safer path” 
doctrine.  Albertus Gandinus, a leading thirteenth-century jurist, described the rule this 
way: 
When there are doubts and the evidence is uncertain [in talibus dubiis et incertis 
probationibus] it is better to leave the malefactor’s misdeed unpunished than to 
convict an innocent, since in cases of doubt [in dubiis] punishments are better 
made milder than harsher.172
This rule was in counterpoise to the rule of “private knowledge.”  Maybe judges who had 
“private knowledge” were obliged sometimes to convict the innocent.  But when judges 
judged on the basis of the evidence produced before them, they were obliged to making 
the contrary error, leaning to the side of innocence.  The “in dubio pro reo” rule was 
indeed a rule of moral theology just like the “private knowledge” rule:  It too offered 
counsel about how to act when you found yourself, in Innocent III’s constantly cited 
phrase, “in dubiis,” “facing cases of doubt.”  Indeed, as the standard juristic writing of the 
early modern Continent explained, “in dubio pro reo” was the other side of the procedural 
coin that required proof “clearer than the midday sun” before sending a person to blood 
punishment.173  Thus it is no surprise that Aegidius Bossius, who was the first to turn the 
                                                 
171 Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: The View from the Ryder Sources, 96 Col. L. 
Rev. 1168, 1199 n. 152 (1996). 
172 In Holtappels, 10: 
Et in talibus dubiis et incertis probationibus melius est facinus impunitum relinqui nocentis quam 
innocentem damnare, et quia in dubiis pene sunt potius molliende quam exasperende 
173 E.g. Holtappels, 43 (quoting Gaill). 
phrase “in dubio pro reo,”174 in the fifteenth century, spoke in terms that echoed the 
moral theology whose history I have traced: 
First of all, you should know that judge must not be quick to punish, but must 
consider everything carefully:  Err in haste, repent at leisure. . .   He must follow 
proper procedures, and try to determine the truth, only judging after he has done 
so . . .  the judge must be brought to punish only in sorrow . . if the judge glories 
in the death of a man, as no small number do in our age, he is a murderer.175
“In dubio pro reo” was a rule that created a form of protection for the accused that grew 
out of the familiar fear that the judge might make himself into a “murderer.” 
This is not the place for a full-scale survey of the continental literature of “in 
dubio pro reo,” which is very rich.  It is important, though, to note two of its 
characteristic themes, both of which would play important roles in later English 
jurisprudence. 
First, continental jurisprudence framed the question of “in dubio pro reo” as one 
involving “benignity” and “mildness”:  When faced with “doubts,” the literature held, the 
judge must choose the “more benign” and “milder” path.176  Second, the jurists who 
                                                 
174 See the article “In dubio pro reo” in Detlef Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, 6th 
ed. (Munich, 1998).  On Bossius, an unoriginal but faithful reporter of the state of the doctrine of his time, 
see Palazzolo, Prova Legale e Pena, 81-85. 
175 Aegidii Bossii Patricii Mediolanensis . . .  Tractatus Varii (Lyons: Apud Antonium de Antoniis, 1562), 
457 : 
1.Et in primis sciendum est, quòd iudex non debet esse manu promptus in puniendo, sed prius 
omnia cautè considerare, quod enim incautè factum est cautè evitandum est, c.j. & fin. de 
sacra.non.reiter. nec debet facilè se movere iudex, nec literis in alterius detrimentum 
adhibere.c.inquisitionis.§.j.extrà, de accusat. Sed secundum iuris ordinem procedere, & veritatem 
inquirere, & rectè posteà iudicare, ut not.per Ioan.Fab. in rubr.instit.de publi.iudi. ubi dicit quod 
cum dolore iudex trahi debet ad poenam infligendam & invitus.xxiij.q.v. quasi per totum maximè 
in c.miles.& in c.cum minister.  Et si iudex gloriatur in morte hominis sicut nonulli faciunt nostra 
tempestate, homicida est, ubi aliâs minister Dei dicitur, ut per Io.Fab.ubi suprà, & per Angel. ibi, 
& vera iustitia habet compassionem, ut ait Gregor.xlv.distinct.c.vera iustitia 
176 E.g. Holtappels, In Dubio pro Reo, 42 (quoting Fichard:  “in poenis benignior interpretatio facienda”);  
50 (quoting Carpzov:  “in dubio semper in mitiorem partem sit praesumendum.”) 
created the “in dubio pro reo” rule were not unaware that their creation presented dangers 
for the management of public justice.  Indeed, continental jurists understood full well the 
danger in any rule of lenity:  the danger that criminal justice might break down.  The 
demands of conscience were in conflict with “the wellspring of thirteenth-century 
criminal jurisprudence: ‘it is a matter of public interest that crimes no go unpunished.’”177  
As Albertus Gandinus put it, it was perfectly clear that there was a “public interest” that 
misdeeds should not go unpunished.  Yet this “public interest” was in unavoidable 
tension with any rule that counseled mildness.178  This medieval conflict would be fought 
and re-fought repeatedly in subsequent centuries, as jurists reflected on the tensions 
between private conscience and the role of the judge as a “public person.”179   In 
particular, it was a conflict that English observers would still be fighting out four 
centuries later, and in urgent tones. 
.     
 
V. The Common Law World (I):  The Judge, the Jury, and Moral Theology 
 
With that background, we can at last turn to England, in the damp northwestern 
corner of Christendom.  There is an old habit of praising the English common law as a 
tradition that stood nobly aloof from the Continent, and it is a habit that undoubtedly still 
matters a lot for the self-consciousness of many Americans.  Nevertheless, historians 
                                                 
177 Richard Fraher, Conviction According to Conscience; The Medieval Jurists’ Debate Concerning Judicial 
Discretion and the Law of Proof, 7 Law & Hist. Rev. 23, 24 (1989).  
178 Quoted and discussed in Holtappels, 11. 
179 E.g. Thomas de Cajetan, Secunda Secundae Partis Summae Theologicae S. Thomas de Aquino, cum 
Cannentariis (Venetiis: Apud Iuntas, 1638), 163r (marginal commentary bottom left) (judge a “persona 
publica”).  
have been well aware, for a very long time, that the teachings of continental law, and 
especially of canon law, were well known and regularly applied in England.  Indeed, all 
of the doctrines whose continental history I have traced, from the law of “private 
knowledge” to the principle of “in dubio pro reo,” were embraced and embroidered by 
English lawyers.180  When it comes to conscientious judging, though, there were 
distinctively English problems:  The institutional structure of jury trial changed the 
calculations about the teachings of canon law should be applied.  It was this that gave rise 
to the “reasonable doubt” rule. 
 
As we have seen, the Christian theological tradition had created, by the end of the 
thirteenth century, elaborate measures intended to protect the judge against the spiritual 
dangers of judging in cases involving blood punishments.  All of those measures can be 
thought of as ways of giving flesh to ideas originally proposed by Saint Jerome and Saint 
Augustine in late Antiquity:  The judge could keep himself safe from the taint of blood as 
long as he acted strictly as “the minister of the laws.”  This meant that he must refrain 
assiduously from deploying his own “private knowledge” or acting with “passion.”  It 
also meant that he was to hew to the “safer path,” carefully following procedures 
intended to guarantee that his judgment would never be polluted by unvetted “doubt.” 
Holdsworth recognized long ago that these canon rules were familiar in England, 
and were applied to judges there just as they were on the Continent: 
It was an old question among the civilians and canonists “utrum judex secundum 
allegata judicare debeat an juxta conscientiam.”  In other words, could a judge 
have recourse his private knowledge to decide cases judicially before him?  It was 
                                                 
180 See the discussion above, 
well established from an early date in English law that the judge must decide, not 
upon his on private knowledge, but upon the matters proved before him.181
Indeed, the familiar canon formulas were known and cited for centuries in England.182  
Knowledge of the canon tradition dated well back into the twelfth century, the era when 
both canon law and the common law were in the first heat of formation.  In fact, among 
the leading schools of thought on the problems of conscience in judging was the circle of 
the Anglo-Norman canonists of the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.183  Recent 
has even shown that jury trial itself, when it developed in the late twelfth century, was 
based on canon law concepts of evidence.184
 England was thus not by any means outside the circle of western Christian 
cultures, and by the fifteenth century at the latest the English had their own body of 
precedent digesting the fundamental canon teaching on “private knowledge.”  A much-
cited case of 1406 offered an English version of the standard canon learning.  The case 
presented a dialogue between Tirwhitt, J, and Gascoigne, CJ: 
                                                 
181 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 
182 For mid-nineteenth-century examples:  Aldridge v. Great Western Railway 3 Man. & G. 516, 521 
(1841) (ER 1249); Gautret v. Jones [L R], 2 C P 371 (1867) [CITATION FORM?] ; Hallows v. Fernie [L 
R] s Ch App 467 (1868) [CITATION FORM?].  In these cases, though, the formula is used purely to create 
a rule of evidence, with any notion of the older function of the rule.  E.g. Hallows v. Fernie:  “But whatever 
may be the fair meaning of the prospectus, and even if the Plaintiff’s construction of it is correct, he can 
only be entitled to succeed secundum allegata et probata.  But he has not alleged, and he has failed to prive, 
that he read the prospectus in a sense which involved an untruth . . . .”  For a Connecticut example of this 
use of “secundum allegata” as a purely evidentiary rule, see Treat v. Barber, 7 Conn. 274, 1828 Conn. 
LEXIS 38 (1828).  The rule also mutated into a rule on damages.  See, The Sarah Ann, 21 F. Cas. 432, 
1835 U.S. App. LEXIS 288, 2 Sumn. 206 (Circ. Court D. Mass. 1835);  Richard v. Clark, 43 Misc. 6222, 
88 N.Y.S. 242, 1904 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 216 (1904);  Wilson v. Kelso, 115 Md. 162, 80 A. 895, 1911 Md. 
LEXIS 13 (1911). 
183 This was the period of a vigorous and lively culture of the study of the canon law, “well abreast” of the 
latest learning, especially from France at first,  Stephan Kuttner and Eleanor Rathbone, Anglo-Norman 
Canonists of the Twelfth Century, Traditio 7 (1949-1951): 279, 288-290, and later from Italy. Id., 327.  
This is not substantially affected by the palinode sung in Kuttner, Studies in the History of Medieval Canon 
Law.  Texts like the Cologne Summa “Elegantius in iure divino,” which included an important discussion 
of the problems of judicial conscience, Nörr, Zur Stellung des Richters, 52; Padoa-Schioppa, Conscience 
dans le Ius Commune Européen, 100-101, were known to the English.  Kuttner and Rathbone, Anglo-
Norman Canonists, 298-299.  The basic canon formulas continued to be cited into the nineteenth century. 
184  
Tirwhitt :  Sir, Suppose a man killed another in your presence and actual sight, 
and another who is not guilty is indicted before you and found guilty.  You ought 
to respite the judgment against him, for you know the contrary, and to inform the 
King he may pardon (faire grace). . .   Gascoigne:   Once the King himself 
questioned me as to this case which you put, and asked me what the law was; and 
I told him as you say.  And he was well please that the law was so.185
Despite his private knowledge, the English judge, like his continental counterpart, was to 
go ahead and enter judgment, seeking to evade the resulting injustice by engineering a 
pardon for the offender.  This case was mis-cited in later years, by jurists who believed 
that Gascoigne, CJ, was describing a personal experience.  This is clearly incorrect:  
Gascoigne was discussing a familiar chestnut, a moral poser known all through western 
Christendom, not retailing a personal anecdote.186  But in any case the precedent was 
there, and was well-known. 
Yet if conscience and canon teaching were around from the earliest date in the 
history of the common law, they could not possibly have had the same significance that 
they did in continental Europe.  There was undoubtedly the occasional moment when an 
English judge brought personal knowledge to a case; and we do have some evidence of 
                                                 
185 7 Hy IV, Pasch. Pl. 5 (p. 41): 
Tir. Sir, mittom[us] que un home occist un auter en votre presence vous veiant, & un auter q~ 
n’est culp~ est endict devant vous, & trove culp~ de m~ la mort, vous duisses respiter le 
judgement devers luy, p~ c~ vous estes sachant del contrary, & faire ouster relation a Roy p~ fair~ 
grace, nient pluis deves vous don~ judgement en c~ case, avant c~ q~ ceux p~ q~ maines le Roy 
fuit pay (ut supra) soient faits venire, & p~ c~ q~ vous estes apris de record q~ le Roy fuit accept 
Sñr immediate p~ eux, ut supra. ¶  Gas. Un foits le Roy mesme dda de moy m~ ceo case, que vous 
aves mis, & moy dda q~ fuit la ley, & jeo luy disoie sicome vous dites; & il fuit bien please q~ la 
ley fuit tiel. 
I have taken the translation given by Thayer, Prelminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 291. 
186 As observed by Radin, The Conscience of the Court, 192 Law Quarterly Review 506, 507-508 (1932). 
such cases. 187  Nevertheless, the dangers that dogged continental judges could never have 
been as grave for English ones, and it is not surprising that Gascoigne had no personal 
anecdote to retail.  In part this was because English judges were less frequently residents 
of the locality in which events took place:  Unlike continental judges, so often local 
clerics or local royal officials, the judges of the common law sat in Westminster, 
traveling to an alien and somewhat hostile “country” on eyre or on circuit.188  When in 
need of local knowledge, they depended on local jurors.  They were thus less likely to 
have direct exposure to the facts of the cases they judged.  Moreover, since they were not 
clerics, they did not take confession.   
But most important of all, English common law judges were unlikely to face the 
continental dilemmas of conscience because they, unlike their continental counterparts, 
were not charged with entering verdicts.  Indeed, from the point of view of the English 
judge, it could be described as a special glory of the common law that, by leaving the job 
of the verdict to the jury, it avoided putting the souls of its professional judges in any 
jeopardy. 
So indeed English judges seem to have regarded the matter, as familiar passages 
from the literature of the common law show.  One striking early statement comes from 
Sir Thomas More.  More was Lord Chancellor from 1529-1533.  As such, he had charge 
                                                 
187Note the evidence of Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, of The Rule of Conscience in all her General 
Measures; Serving as a great Instrument for the determination of Cases of Conscience (London: Printed by 
R. Norton, for R. Royston, Bookseller to the King’s Most Sacred Majesty, 1676), 65:  “[H]ow if [the judge] 
sees the fact done before him in the Court? A purse cut, or a stone thrown at his brother Judge, as it 
happened at Ludlow not many years since?”—evidence not only of what judges might know, but of what 
the atmosphere in seventeenth-century assizes was like.  For a description—including the throwing of a 
brickbat at a judge—see J.S. Cockburn, A History of English Assizes, 1558-1714 (Cambridge, 1972), 110.  
For private knowledge among jurors see John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before Lawyers, 45 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 263, 288 n. 74 (1978); id. 290, and the discussion below, text at note. 
188 See generally J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3d ed. (London, 1990), 14-26.  For 
a broad survey of “the Age of the Travelling Justices,” see Alan Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval 
England (London, 1973), 32-123. 
of Chancery—itself, as English lawyers understood it, a repository of “conscience”189—
and as Chancellor, he granted the occasional injunction against the enforcement of a 
judgment at common law.  The result, his biographer reports, was some revealing conflict 
with the common law judges.  When common law judges complained about interference 
from Chancery, More offered them the opportunity to take over the job of “conscience” 
themselves.  Here is the report of More’s biographer: 
[A]s few injunctions as he granted while he was Lord Chancellor, yet were they 
by some of the judges of the law misliked . . . 
[H]e invited all the judges to dine with him in the Council Chamber at 
Westminster.  Where, after dinner, when he had broken with them what 
complaints he had heard of his injunctions, and moreover showed them both the 
number and causes of every one of them in order,—so plainly that upon full 
debating of those matters, they were all enforced to confess that they in like case 
could have done no otherwise themselves.  Then offered he thus unto them:  that 
if the justices of every court—unto whom the reformation of the rigour of the law, 
by reason of their office, most especially appertained—would upon reasonable 
considerations, by their own discretions—as they were, as though, in conscience 
bound—mitigate and reform the rigour of the law themselves, there should from 
thence forth by him, no more injunctions be granted.  Whereunto they refused to 
condescend. 
Then said he unto them:  “Forasmuch as yourselves, my Lords, drive me to that 
necessity for awarding out injunctions to relieve the people’s injury, you cannot 
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hereafter any more justly blame me!”  After that he said secretly unto me, “I 
perceive, Son, why they like not so to do.  For they see that they may by the 
verdict of the jury, cast off all quarrels from themselves upon them, which they 
account their chief defense.  And therefore am I compelled to abide the adventure 
of all such reports.”190
Sixteenth-century common-law judges were eager to “cast the quarrels upon the jury,” 
since the jury “by its verdict” took the responsibility for judgment—so much so that they 
refused the opportunity More offered them to escape interference from Chancery.  
Historians have long used this passage as evidence that common law judges were eager to 
avoid the “agonies of decision.”191
Even more telling descriptions of the attitude of English judges come from the 
1660s and after—a time when, as we shall see, the conflict over the moral responsibility 
for judgment was growing intense.   First is a quote from Matthew Hale, writing in the 
1660s when he was Chief Baron of the Exchequer.  Juries, Hale assumed, made use of 
“their own knowledge”—something that, as we shall see, was quite normal.  And because 
they used their own knowledge, they relieved the judge of much of the “peril”192 of 
judgment: 
[T]he jury are judges as well of the credibility of the witnesses, as of the truth of 
the fact, for possibly they might know somewhat of their own knowledge . . .  and 
it is the conscience of the jury, that must pronounce the prisoner guilty or not 
guilty. 
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And to say the truth, it were the most unhappy case that could be to the judge, if 
he at his peril must take must take upon him the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, 
and if the judge’s opinion must rule the matter of fact, the trial by jury would be 
useless.193
The advantage of jury trial was precisely that it made it unnecessary for the judge to 
engage in the perilous business of “rul[ing] the matter of fact” and pronouncing the 
perilous verdict of “guilty.”  A few year later John Hawles said much the same thing, in a 
much less familiar passage to which I will return: 
[T]he Judges [can put] the Burthen . . . upon the Jurors, for we, may they say, did 
nothing but our duty according to usual Practise, the Jury his Peers had found the 
Fellow Guilty upon their Oaths of such an Odious Crime, and attended with such 
vile, presumptions, and dangerous Circumstances. They are Judges, we took him 
as they presented him to us, and according to our duty pronounced the Sentence, 
that the Law inflicts in such Cases, or set a Fine, or ordered Corporal punishment 
upon him, which was very moderate, Considering the Crime laid in the Indictment 
or Information, and of which they had so sworn him Guilty; if he were innocent or 
not so bad as Represented, let his Destruction lye upon the Jury &c. At this rate if 
ever we should have an unconscionable Judge, might he Argue; And thus the 
Guilt of the Blood or ruin of an Innocent man when 'tis too late shall be Bandyed 
to and fro, and shuffled off from the Jury to the Judge, and from the Judge to the 
Jury, but really sticks fast to both, but especially on the Jurors . . . .194
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Like so many other authors, Hawles saw the moral drama of jury trial as a struggle over 
the “burthen” of the responsibility for judgment—a struggle in which the judges had the 
upper hand.  
Most of these passages are well-known indeed to historians of the common law.  
Indeed, in light of them, it has become part of our orthodox teaching that jury trial 
seemed advantageous in part because it spared judges the responsibility for judgment.  
Thus Pollock and Maitland, the pioneers of the history of the common law, observed that 
judges sought to avoid, not only “moral” responsibility, but also the dangers of 
vengeance.  The rise of jury trial, they observed, had to be seen against the background of 
the decline of the ordeal; and it had to be seen as part of an effort to avoid the 
responsibility for judgment.  “[T]he justices are pursuing a course,” they noted: 
which puts the verdict of the country on a level with the older modes of proof.  If 
a man came clean from the ordeal or successfully made his law, the due proof 
would have been given; no one could have questioned the dictum of Omniscience.  
The veredictum patriae is assimilated to the iudicium Dei.  English judges find 
that a requirement of [jury] unanimity is the line of least resistance; it spares them 
so much trouble.  We shall hardly explain the shape that trial by jury very soon 
assumed unless we take to heart the words of an illustrious judge of our own day:-
-“ It saves judges from the responsibility—which to many men would appear 
intolerably heavy and painful—of deciding simply on their own opinion upon the 
guilt or innocence of the prisoner.”  It saved the judges of the middle ages not 
only from this moral responsibility, but also from enmities and feuds.  Likewise it 
saved them from that as yet unattempted task, a critical dissection of 
testimony.”195
Most recently, J. H. Baker, made much the same observation:  “The judges sought refuge 
from the agonies of decision,” as he put it; and aimed to make certain that “the ultimate 
responsibility for a conviction rested on jurors’ consciences.”196   
Yet if historians have long understood this great advantage of jury trial from the 
point of view of the judges, they have not really reckoned with the other side of the coin:  
the consequent discomfort of the jury.  To be sure, historians all know that “juror 
timidity” must have played some role in the dynamic of English criminal justice.197  But 
they have not put this in the context of the moral theology whose importance for judges is 
so well understood.  Historians have not grasped the gravity of the moral challenge faced 
by jurors; and as consequence they have not grasped the original sense of the “reasonable 
doubt” rule. 
Why is this?  In large part, it is because historians have been victims of a process 
of historical forgetting:  They have gradually lost the memory of the moral anxieties of 
judging that haunted our ancestors.  James Fitzjames Stephen still well understood those 
anxieties in the later nineteenth century.  But Pollock and Maitland were already perhaps 
beginning to lose sight of them:  To explain the dangers of judging, they felt the need to 
speak, not only of moral responsibility, but also of “enmities and feuds.”  In subsequent 
decades historians because less and less conscious of the old moral world.  There have 
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certainly always been scholars who understood the old moral dramas, including Radin, 
and Fraher.  But most historians have tried to explain pre-modern fears by anything 
except the fear of damnation.  Some scholars, following Pollock and Maitland, have been 
able to explain the fears of jurors only by calling them fears of vengeance violence.198  
Other have thought that the fears of jurors were the fears of criminal liability,199 or a 
desire to avoid “the perils of undue influence.”200  Most recently, George Fisher has 
described the fear of judging as a fear of making “false steps” that could end a career.201   
There is undoubtedly some truth in all of these explanations of the dangers of judging.  
Nevertheless, in the end all these explanations of the anxiety of pre-modern judging miss 
the large story.  As we shall see, there is no way to explain “reasonable doubt” unless we 
focus resolutely on the spiritual anxieties of judging, as most historians since Stephen 
have failed to do. 
There is another reason, too, why historians have not appreciated the dilemmas of 
the criminal jury.  The moral anxieties of judging are not the only aspect of jury trial that 
historians have forgotten.  There is also critical institutional fact that has been forgotten 
or misunderstood:  Well into the early nineteenth century, jurors were still expected to 
make use of their private knowledge of the case, at least occasionally.   
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As we have seen, continental moral theology rested on a core prohibition:  Judges 
were not to use their “private knowledge.”  Indeed, it was by scrupulously avoiding any 
recourse to their “private knowledge” that continental judges could keep themselves safe 
from the perils of judgment, speaking in their “body” as judge, never in their “body” as 
witness, maintaining the cool distance of a mere “minister of the laws.” 
Yet from the earliest period, juries were not in a position to affect any such 
stance.  On the contrary, they were expected to serve not only as judges but also as 
witnesses.  “Inquests” of various kinds can be dated far back into the Middle Ages, 
especial ones convoked for purposes of gathering fiscal information.  These all involve 
juries gathered in order to be canvassed about their knowledge of facts.  When the great 
leap in the development of jury trial came sometime during the 1160s and after, this did 
not change.  That great leap came when the monarchy of Henry II established certain 
proto-juries.  These were gatherings of local witnesses from “the vicinage,” the 
neighborhood, both to resolve property disputes and to serve as a panel of accusing 
witnesses in criminal matters.  The juries convoked for all these purposes were, historians 
agree, “self-informing”:  That is to say, they were understood to be witnesses to the 
events in issue, capable of making decisions from their direct personal knowledge.  It was 
these early forms of jury trial were generalized, after a brief period of hesitation, as the 
normal form of English adjudication after the effective abolition of the ordeal in 1215.202
As anyone familiar with the canon tradition can immediately see, this created a 
morally delicate situation:  Early English jurors, once they were charged with the 
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obligation of entering verdicts, mixed the two “bodies,” serving both as judges and as 
witnesses.  Indeed, as Mike MacNair has shown, early jurors were defined as “witnesses” 
through the technical vocabulary of canon law.203  Moreover, and more importantly, they 
would continue to be witnesses for many centuries.  This deserves to be underlined, since 
historians have not gotten the history quite right.204  Historians have generally supposed 
that jurors ceased making use of their private knowledge before the end of the Middle 
Ages.  Thus historians have observed that jurors began to hear witness testimony in court 
by the fifteenth century, and especially by the sixteenth.205  On the basis of this fact, and 
on the basis of a seriously misinterpreted passage from Saint Thomas More,206 they have 
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be regarded as witnesses, but as judges of fact.”  J. H. Baker, Introduction, in Baker, ed., 2 The Reports of 
Sir John Spelman (London: Selden Society, 1978), 109;  sim. Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of 
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Christopher St. German, turned entirely on the question of what sorts of witnesseses could properly testify 
before courts investigating heresy through the use of inquisitorial procedure.  See generally John Guy, 
Ralph Keen, Clarence Miller and Ruth McGugan, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More (New Haven: 
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undergo purgation, rather than being tried by juries.  Id., liii-lvii.  St. German defended jury trial, holding 
that jurors’ “conscience” offered adequate guarantees:  “that al his honest neighburs wene that he were one 
[i.e. a heretic], and therefor in their conscience dare not swere, that he is any other.”  Id., Appendix, 356.   
More disagreed, and it was in this context that he insisted that jurors were not “witnesses.”  They were not 
the sort of witnesses it was necessary to examine in a case of heresy, for which More viewed inquisitorial 
procedure as proper.  More’s passage says nothing whatsoever about whether jurors might have private 
knowledge.  It simply says that they cannot be closely examined with regard to their knowledge of 
particular facts, as would be the case with witnesses subject to inquisitorial procedure.  Instead, their 
verdict, qua general verdict, must be accepted: 
[B]ycause I spake in myne apologye of such witnesses in felonye: thys good man [i.e. St. German] 
maketh here a doute/ what manner wytnesses I mene/whyther I mene ye .xii. men that are the iury, 
or other wytnessys that are  brought into the court for to enforme them. . . .  But veryly as for me, I 
shal put hym out of that dowt, that I ment not them.  For I neuer toke the .xii. men for wytnessys 
in my lyfe.  For why shold I call them witnesses, whose verdycte the iudge taketh for a sure 
sentence concernynge the facte, without any examynacyon of the cyrcumstaunces, wherby they 
know or be ledde to byleue theyr verdicte to be trew? 
Id., p. 149.  Within the context of More’s argument, this had the important implication that jury trial was 
inappropriate in heresy cases, where close examination of the testimony was, to More’s mind, essential.  It 
generally concluded that jurors ceased in any sense to be witnesses by the early modern 
period.   
Yet this is clearly false.  Even once the jurors started hearing witnesses in court, 
they were still expected to make use of their own independent knowledge of the case, at 
least occasionally.   Thus in 1768 Blackstone could still declare, matter-of-factly, that 
“evidence in the trial by jury is of two kinds, either that which is given in proof, or that 
which the jury may receive by their own private knowlege.”207  If jurors had any 
independent knowledge of the case, Blackstone explained, they should simply testify to 
what they knew in open court, so that everyone present could evaluate it.208  The 
eighteenth-century moralist literature continued to assume that jurors might have private 
knowledge.  Thomas Gisborne’s 1771 Enquiry into the Duties of Men in the Higher and 
Middle Classes of Society in Great Britain, for example, explained how jurors were to 
treat evidence—including evidence they had from their own “private knowledge”:  “The 
special juror is not less obliged in conscience than the grand juror to diligence in 
investigating all the circumstances of the matter at issue; to promptness and accuracy in 
disclosing additional facts known to himself; and to incorruptible integrity in pronouncing 
upon the whole evidence.”209  This may not have happened frequently in places like 
eighteenth-century London.  But then again it may: We have reports of such cases from 
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An interesting passage in Gisborne explores the problems of commercial matters in particular:  “In deciding 
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both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.210  Well into the nineteenth century, there 
were reported cases in which jurors did make use of the extrinsic knowledge, and were 
even instructed by the court to do so.211
Jurors thus potentially judged on the basis of “private knowledge” from the 
beginning, and would potentially do so for a long time.  Yet the law of conscience made 
it clear that the safer path for the soul lay in studiously abjuring any judgment on the 
basis of “private knowledge.”   Indeed, from the point of view of moral theology, as we 
shall see in Section VII, it did not matter all that much whether jurors only potentially 
had such knowledge.  What moral theology required was a kind of spiritual exercise:  a 
determined effort to keep the “body” of the judge separate from the “body” of the 
witness.  The very structure of the office of the juror made this spiritual exercise 
impossible. 
Nor could anxious jurors take refuge in the other spiritual strategy adopted by 
continental judges:  They could not claim that their decision was dictated by a strictly 
rule-bound heuristic;  they could not asssert, with Gratian, that they were mere “ministers 
of the law,” and that it was the law that killed the defendant.  On the contrary:  They were 
personally charged with entering the perilous verdict of “guilty,” and they were charged 
with doing so “according to conscience.”  “[S]ay what is right according to your 
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conscience,” jurors were told as early as 1185.212  Or as fifteenth- and sixteenth-century 
jury instructions put it:  “[D]o in this matter as God will give you grace, according to the 
evidence and your conscience”213;  “[D]oe that which God shall put in your mindes to the 
discharge of your consciences”;214 or even more simply “Doe in it as God shall put in 
your hearts.”215  Everything for jurors rested on whether they had properly heeded the 
voice of God within them; and if they had not, they risked mortal sin. 
The result was a peculiarly English dilemma.  Common law judges could feel 
entirely safe from the spiritual dangers of pronouncing verdicts on the basis of the 
knowledge and evaluation of facts.  Indeed, they were in far more advantageous moral 
perch than their continental counterparts.  After all, the common law lodged the power to 
find facts and enter verdicts, not in them, but exclusively in the jurors.  But the jurors, by 
contrast, were in a difficult position:  It was well understood that they might indeed 
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sometimes judge on the basis of “private knowledge”; and at the end of the trial they 
were to pronounce the perilous words “guilty.”   
 
VI.  The Immunity of the Medieval Criminal Jury 
 
By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this resulted in a kind of moral crisis 
of jury trial—a moral crisis that produced the “reasonable doubt” standard.  The crisis did 
not in fact arrive until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though.  This was 
because during the Middle Ages criminal jurors were not compelled to enter general 
verdicts in the morally fraught business of inflicting blood punishments. 
There were important conflicts in the Middle Ages, but they almost all involved 
the civil jury, not the criminal jury.216  Indeed, medieval civil juries seemed to have cared 
a lot about this issue: They often resisted entering verdicts.  As David Seipp has 
observed, surveying the evidence of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, jurors 
regularly tried to “shift the responsibility [of entering verdicts] to the person of the 
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judge.”217  In particular, civil jurors sought an important privilege:  Instead of entering the 
general verdict, they sought to enter special verdicts, making mere findings of fact while 
forcing the judge to pronounce the perilous judgment on ultimate liability.  Civil jurors 
were very eager to acquire this privilege:  Indeed, Parliament petitioned the King in 1348 
to allow jurors in all civil cases to enter special verdicts rather than general verdicts.218  
That petition was brusquely denied, though219:  In most civil cases,220 medieval jurors 
were compelled to enter the general verdict, even though they did so, in the language of 
medieval law, “at their peril.”221  In fact, civil juries that refused to enter the general 
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Morris Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, 18 Amer. J. Legal 
Hist. 267, 268 (1974).  This certainly may be right:  What thirteenth-century jurors feared may simply have 
been the danger of prosecution.  Nevertheless, it is important to observe that “peril” may have had another 
aspect already in the thirteenth century, as it clearly would later.  The “peril” in question may also have 
been not the peril of attaint in this world, but the peril of damnation in the next.  There is some evidence for 
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which the judgment was certain, Bracton explained, there were two possibilities:  Either the jurors were 
correct, in which case their judgment stood; or else they had perjured themselves, in which case they were 
vulnerable to the attaint.  In the second case, though, the case in which judgment was uncertain, matters 
were different.  Then there was “doubt,” which was “perilous.”  Here, he explained, the judge must 
examine the jurors carefully: 
verdict were subject to harsh measures:  They could be prosecuted through the attaint.  
This was a criminal procedure for perjury, which by the end of the Middle Ages 
subjected jurors to imprisonment and the loss of all their goods.  Indeed, from the 
fourteenth century onward, the Crown progressively tightened the screws on civil juries, 
forcing them to enter the general verdict.222  Only in the sixteenth century did civil juries 
acquire the privilege of entering special verdicts.223
With criminal juries, however, the story was different.  Medieval criminal juries 
were not threatened with the attaint; and they acquired a privilege that they retained until 
                                                                                                                                                 
Si autem incertum dixerunt iudex examinare debet, ut de incerto faciat certum, de obscuro clarum, 
de dubio verum: alioquin anceps et periculosum erit sacramentum et inde sequi poterit fatuum 
iudicium. 
Bracton, III: 74.  If we read the Statute of Westminster against the background of this passage, we can 
surmise that the English drama of 1285 was not different from the contemporary continental dramas.  In 
cases of uncertainty, jurors did not want the “peril” of judgment.  Yet if jurors were dispensed from it, the 
“peril” would pass to the judges instead. 
The question of “peril” was particularly associated, as we might expect, with giving the general verdict.  
Cf. Coke’s report of Rawlyns’s Case (Mich. 29 & 30 Eliz.): 
And Wray, C.J. said, that it was adjudged in Pleadal’s case, in 8 Eliz. that because a jury did not 
find such a lease by deed indented which took its operation only by conclusion, intending that they 
being sworn ad veritatem dicendam, and that estoppels conclude the parties, but not the jurors, to 
say the truth, were therefore attainted and had judgment accordingly: for the justices in the same 
case held, that the interest of the land as to parties and privies was in a manner by such conclusion 
bound, and no conclusion shall be by such deed indented after the term ended, as Wray, C.J. held; 
and in such a case the jury ought, if they will not find the special matter, and leave it to the 
judgment of the law, to find “at their peril” according to law. 
4 Co. Rep. 53b.  This was also true of Hale, in the passage quoted below, text at note. 
“Peril” remained a standard term thereafter, in ways that may deserve their own history.  Baker notes that 
“[t]he years books are full of references to the ‘peril’ or ‘ambiguity’ of the ‘lay gents’ who constituted the 
jury . . . .”  J. H. Baker, Introduction, in Baker, ed., 2 The Reports of Sir John Spelman (London: Selden 
Society, 1978), 103.  Baker interpreted the “peril” in question as the peril of favoritism, id. 103-104, and 
that again may certainly have been part of it.  See also Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 
Volume VI , 351-352.  There is no reason why such an open-ended term should have had no ambiguity.  
222 For the denial of food and drink during their deliberations, see Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of 
England, Volume VI, 365-369;  for the later medieval attaint,  
223 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 99; Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 
Volume VI, 400-403; S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 2d ed. (Toronto, 1981), 
77 (Slade’s Case).  The relationship between special and general verdicts raises issues that I do not discuss 
in this Article.  Historians recognize that the doctrinal development of the common law depends on the rise 
of the special verdict, which allows room for the judges to discuss nice questions of law.  This too could be 
related in revealing ways to the problem of avoiding moral responsibility for judgment, but I leave that 
issue aside. 
the nineteenth century224: the medieval system spared criminal juries the “peril” of 
delivering judgment by allowing them to enter special verdicts.225
The medieval criminal jury’s immunity to the attaint has always been regarded as 
somewhat mysterious226:  In theory, the attaint did apply to criminal juries, in an 
asymmetrical form:  As the treatise-writer Bracton explained it in the thirteenth century, 
the defendant could not bring an attaint if he was convicted.227  The Crown by contrast 
was entitled to bring an attaint, in theory, in case of an acquittal.  However, as Thayer 
demonstrated a century ago, there is essentially no evidence that the Crown ever did 
so.228  Medieval criminal juries were simply not attainted.  Indeed, the criminal attaint 
had to be introduced by separate statue in 1534, when the Tudor Crown was beginning to 
crack down on criminal juries, and even then it was introduced only “in Wales and its 
Marches.”229
So why were medieval criminal juries not attainted?  Thayer spent many pages on 
this problem, but could only propose an explanation that is obviously wrong.230  Yet the 
                                                 
224 See 2 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 619 (London: Sweet, 1824) (“It is settled . 
. .that a jury may give a special verdict in any criminal case . . . .)  
225 Certainly the jury did sometimes enter the general verdict.  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 17-
18.   
226 Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 19. 
227 There was a technical reason for this:  The accused, by “putting himself upon the country,” had offered 
the jurors as his witnesses, and could not therefore subsequently raise doubts about their credibility.   
228 James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (New York, 1969) 
(ORIGINAL DATE), 156-162. 
229 Statute of 26 H. VIII. c. 4. 
230 The Crown, Thayer argued, enjoyed overwhelming procedural advantages.  In particular, only the 
Crown could offer witnesses.  In light of this immense procedural leg up, the medieval Crown had no need 
of the attaint in the Middle Ages; it could be sure of winning anyway.  Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence, 157-162.  This explanation is hardly convincing, though.  As Green has shown, it is not in fact 
the case that only the Crown could offer witnesses.  Green, Verdict According to Conscience.  In any case, 
is not obvious why a party with some legal advantages would refrain from using others.  Indeed, there is an 
odd element of illogic in Thayer’s argument:  The Crown would only have needed the attaint in cases in 
which its other procedural advantages had not given it victory at trial.  Finally, and perhaps most important, 
Thayer’s explanation cannot account for later developments.  As we shall see, the Crown did begin 
prosecuting criminal juries in the sixteenth century, through Star Chamber.  Yet its other procedural 
right answer is not all that difficult to identify.  Thomas Green offers it:  “[T]he fact that 
the defendant’s life was at stake” made the attaint seem somehow inappropriate in 
criminal cases, Green suggests.231   Just so:  As we have seen, in Christian moral 
theology, the infliction of blood punishments raised special concerns; and criminal trials 
resulted in theory in blood punishments.232   If we keep this moral theology in mind, we 
have no difficulties in explaining why the medieval criminal jury would have been 
treated differently:  Forcing jurors to enter verdicts in cases of blood would have put the 
system under intolerable moral pressure. 
Cases of blood created moral pressure.  This fact also helps account for the 
second privilege of medieval criminal juries:  They were spared the “peril” of the general 
verdict by being allowed to enter special verdicts. Green has traced the rise of special 
verdicts in criminal trials in elegant detail.  It was through permitting special verdicts that 
medieval law dealt with matters of diminished responsibility.  In cases of homicide, the 
jury might desire to bring in a verdict of manslaughter or self-defense.  Yet the 
indictment permitted only the verdict of murder.  The law of the fourteenth century thus 
offered jurors a way out:  It allowed them to enter special verdicts, often finding 
demonstrably fictitious facts.233
Entering special verdicts was a significant privilege, denied to most civil juries:  
In the equivalent cases, most civil juries were forced to enter the general verdict.  And 
                                                                                                                                                 
advantages were no less imposing then.  There must have been some other reason why the medieval Crown 
declined to prosecute criminal juries. 
231 Verdict According to Conscience, 20.  At 66, however, Green leaves the same question unanswered. 
232Indeed, as Green has pointed out, the introduction of the power of the Crown through the jury of 
presentment changed the calculus.  In earlier periods, homicides could be dealt with through money 
compensation.  But once the Crown became involved, mutilation and execution became the natural 
consequence of a criminal conviction.  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 9-10.  This meant that the 
stakes were indeed especially high—not just for the defendant, but also for the jurors.   
233 Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 53-59;  Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 95-96. 
indeed, to understand why criminal jurors had this privilege, we must read the history of 
criminal juries alongside that of their civil counterparts.  The leading case permitting 
criminal juries to enter special verdicts dates to 1329.  The date is significant.  The early 
fourteenth century was generally a time of crisis and change for jury trial.234  The year 
1329 in particular comes in the midst of a period when the new regime of Edward III was 
clamping down steadily on civil juries, with one statute enhancing the threat of attaint in 
1326-27, and one further enhancing the attaint in 1331.235  There is evidence of criminal 
jurors too being browbeaten when they refused to give the general verdict in 1321.236  It 
was thus in an atmosphere of real tension that it was held that the criminal jury could 
                                                 
234The early fourteenth century saw “a major readjustment of the Crown’s administration of criminal 
justice.” This involved the decline of the Eyre and the rise of special commissions of trailbaston and oyer et 
terminer.  See Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 20-21; Hunnisett, Medieval Coronoer, 114-115;  
Richard Kaeuper, Law and Order in Fourteenth-Century England: The Evidence of Special Commissions 
of Oyer and Terminer,” Speculum 54 (1979): 738-742 [734-784].  Alan Harding, Early Trailbaston 
Proceedings from the Lincoln Roll of 1305, in R.B. Hunisett and J.B. Post, eds., Medieval Legal Records 
edited in memory of C.A.F. Meekings (London, 1978): 130-138.  By 1352, it also resulted in a clear 
distinction between the jury of presentment and the trial jury.  Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 3.  Green, Verdict 
According to Conscience, 21-22. 
The evidence of Bracton suggests that in the thirteenth century criminal inquiries were being 
conducted in more or less the continental way.  Bracton describes a judge acting very much like a romano-
canonical inquistor, investigating “fama,” local rumors and reputation: 
Iustitiarius igitur si discretus sit, cum propter famam et suspicionem per patriam debeat veritas 
inquiri an indicatus de crimine ei imposito culpabilis sit vel non, imprimis debet inquirere, si forte 
dubitaverit et jurata suspecta fuerit, a quo vel a quibus illi duodecim didicerint ea quae veredicto 
suo proferunt de indictato, et audita super hoc eorum responsione de facili perpendere poterit si 
dolus subfuerit vel iniquitas.  Dicet forte aliquis vel major pars iuratorum, quod ea quae ipsi 
proferunt in veredicto suo didicerunt ab alio tali, et sic descendere poterit interrogation et 
responsio de persona in personam usque ad aliquam vilem et abiectam personam, et talem cui non 
erit fides aliquatenus adhibenda. 
Bracton II: 404.  If judges were taking the active role in examining jurors implied by this passage, then 
criminal juries were not confronted with giving the general verdict in the full sense.  The responsibility for 
finding the facts in such a case would rest with the judge.  Indeed, Bracton implied exactly that.  If the 
judge did not carefully examine the jury, he warned, he would be adopted the morally dangerous position 
of Pontius Pilate:  “Et ita inquirat ne dicatur Ihesus crucifigitur et Barrabas liberator.”  Id. The later 
thirteenth-century judge as Bracton presents him seems to have shared in the task of entering judgment, and 
therefore in the ominous moral responsibility. 
235 ST. 1 Edw.III c. 6; 5 Edw. III c.7.  For the general chronology, see 1 Holdsworth, A History of English 
Law 161-165 (1903)  [UPDATE EDITION!] 
236 Lacer v. John, servant of Serjeant Cambridge (1321), 86 Selden Society 142, 143.  Quoted and discussed 
in Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 95 and 95 n. 38. 
avoid the general issue by entering a special verdict.237  The fact that criminal juries 
acquired this privilege at the height of a period in which civil juries were being 
disciplined suggests the same conclusion suggested by the criminal jury’s immunity to 
the attaint:  The English Crown was conscious of the special moral problems of the 
criminal jury. 
The immunity of the criminal jury to attaint, and its privilege of entering special 
verdicts, were perhaps enough to guarantee that medieval criminal jurors would not face 
any of the worst dilemmas of the Christian law of conscience.  The story is not complete, 
though, without mentioning one further aspect of medieval justice that offered criminal 
jurors some measure of moral comfort:  Courts could avoid inflicting blood punishments 
in some instances, by allowing the accused the benefit of clergy.  Benefit of clergy was a 
device by which accused persons were treated as fictive members of the clergy.  This 
meant that they were subject only to the punishments inflicted by the Church.  Yet the 
Church was forbidden to inflict blood punishments, which meant that defendants 
accorded benefit of clergy would neither be executed nor mutilated.  Benefit of clergy 
was became “a regular means of escape from the mandatory death penalty” during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,238 especially beginning in 1352239—that is to 
say,within a couple of decades after criminal juries acquired the privilege of giving 
special verdicts.  This measure too would have eased the moral pressures on the criminal 
                                                 
237 3. E. 3. Intinere North. Fitz. Coron. 284.  The jury found facts that presented a classic case of self-
defense.  For the pattern of fourteenth-century self-defense cases, see Green, Verdict According to 
Conscience, 36.  The fact findings in these special verdicts may often have been false, as Thomas Green 
argued.  Id., 35-46.  The court accepted the special verdict, then entered judgment for murder.  Thereafter 
the King pardoned the offender.  This solution—the King’s pardon—was thus the same one offered by 
Gascoigne seventy years later as a remedy for the case in which the judge convicted despite his private 
knowledge of innocence. 
238 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 587. 
239Statute of 25 Edw. c. 4.  
jury; and it too may in some measure reflect a concern about the moral dilemmas of the 
criminal judging. 
There is in short no way to understand the medieval criminal jury unless we 
remember the intensity of the moral pressures felt by anyone deciding cases of blood.  To 
be sure, moral pressures were not the only kind that medieval criminal jurors 
experienced.  There were certainly other pressures as well.  As historians have shown, 
there were the dangers of vengeance.240  Historians have also amply shown that jurors 
were also susceptible to financial inducements and threats—especially jurors who were 
not themselves persons of substance in the community.241  Both medieval and early 
modern legislation show considerable eagerness to keep poor men off juries, so as to 
keep the trial process safe from corruption.242  Such concerns were certainly present:  It 
would be quite wrong to explain every aspect of medieval criminal jury trial by reference 
to the moral dangers of bloodshed. 
Nevertheless, there remain fundamental aspects of jury trial that cannot be 
understood unless we focus on the specifically moral dangers felt by jurors.  Financial 
inducements and physical threats would have been just as much a danger in civil trials as 
criminal ones.  Yet criminal matters were treated specially.  The threat of juror corruption 
was especially a threat were jurors were low-status persons:  It “varied in inverse 
proportion to weath.”243  Yet as the evidence of later centuries will show, there was 
plenty of anxiety about the pressures even felt by the most upstanding and substantial 
                                                 
240 Seipp, Jurors, Evidences and the Tempest of 1499. 
241 E.g. J. H. Baker, Introduction, in Baker, ed., 2 The Reports of Sir John Spelman (London: Selden 
Society, 1978), 107; Cockburn, History of English Assizes, 113-114; Green, Verdict According to 
Conscience, 22. 
242 Id. 
243 Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume VI, 353-355. 
members of the community; and those pressures were, as we shall see, very clearly moral 
ones.244   Criminal trial mattered because it was criminal trial; and that meant that it was a 
moral trial for the Christian juror, as well as a legal trial for the accused. 
At any rate, at the end of the Middle Ages, the common law had developed 
mechanisms that effectively shielded criminal jurors from moral pressure.  William 
Staunford summarized the standard medieval law in his mid-sixteenth-century guide to 
criminal law.  Staunford spoke in the familiar language of moral theology: the key 
question was whether the verdict in murder cases was “dowtful”: 
As for the verdict “not guilty”:  It is not always necessary to give the general 
verdict, since if the fact is such, that it is doubtful [dowtful] to the members of the 
jury, they are permitted to disburden themselves  [pour lour mieulx discharge], by 
giving a special verdict, or as it is known a verdict at large, just as much in cases 
of felony as in the assize [of novel disseisin] or trespass, and this appears in the 
verdict that finds that the defendant has killed in self-defense. . . .  And just as 
they can give a special verdict in a case of self-defense, so can they do it in the 
case of a homicide per infortunium  . . . [or] chance medley . . . .245
                                                 
244 Below, Section VIII. 
245 Sir William Staunford, les Plees del Coron (repr. New York: Garland, 1979), 165: 
Sur lissue de rien culpable: nest touts foits requisit daver un general verdit, quar si le fact est tiel, 
que il est dowtful a eux del iurre, silsoit felonie ou non : ils posent pour lour mieulx discharge, 
doner un special verdit, cestascavoir verdit a large, auxibien in cas de felonie, come in assise ou 
trespass, et ceo apiert in le verdit que trova que un tuast auter in son defens.  Quar cestuy qui est 
arraigne, ladoit pleder de rien culpable, et unquore in le verdit : le iurie peut exprimer tout le 
circumstance del fact, & concluder que il luy tuast in son defense, & ceo apiert, titulo Coron in 
Fitz. P. 226. P. 284. P. 286. & P. 287, & H.44.E.3.P.94.  Auxi la apiert, que le court requirast de 
eux plus special verdit, que a dire que il luy tuast in son defence.s. le court examinast le iurre del 
circumstance del fact, quel quant le iurie aver disclose : ilz ceo [aiugoient ?] contrarie a ceo que le 
iure aver trove. s. que il ne luy tuast se defendendo, eins come felon quod nota.  Et come ilz poient 
doner un special verdist del tuer dun in son defens : issint poient ilz doner special verdit del tuer 
dun per misfortune, ou que le person qui tua ou fist le homicide de fuist de non sane memorie, al 
temps que il luy tuast, ou auter tiel matter : que prova que le fact ne fuist felonie come sils trovont 
le chose emblee : destre in value forsque.10.d.& que il fuist emblee del person de cestuy qui fuist 
Death and doubt:  These were the great issues.  Coke too cited the same doctrine at the 
end of the century.   For him too, the need for special verdicts arose in cases where the 
jury experienced “doubt”:  “[N]ote, reader, in all cases when jurors find the special matter 
doubtful in law pertinent and tending to the issue which they are to try, there the Court 
ought to accept it. . . .”246  Death and doubt presented the great challenges for the criminal 
jury. 
 
VII.  The Crises of the Seventeenth Century 
 
 If matters had rested as they were in the Middle Ages, there would have been little 
need to apply the law of conscience to criminal jurors in cases of blood.  But beginning in 
the sixteenth century, things changed, and starkly.  Princely governments in every part of 
sixteenth-century Europe embarked on tough crackdowns on crime.  The Tudor 
Revolution in Government, as G.E. Elton famously called it, made efforts typical of the 
age, and in particular sought to discipline criminal juries.  “A virtual revolution was 
underway from the mid-fifteenth century,” as the English Crown set out to bring criminal 
juries to heel.247  In particular this involved harsh discipline for criminal juries that 
refused to enter the general verdict.248  By 1516, a new actor came in:  Star Chamber.249  
                                                                                                                                                 
owner de ceo, per que il fuist pendus, & unquore lenditment ne conteina ascun robberie fait al 
person.  Mesme ley est si un arraine de murder, pleda de rien culpable, et est trove que il luy tua 
per chance medley, ou in son defense, et nemy de malice prepense, come apiert.T.26.H.8.f.6. ou si 
deuz sont enditz come principalx, & est trove qu lun fist le felonie per le procurement lauter, mes 
que cestui qui procure, ne fuist pas present al fesance del felonie.  Et issint cases home purrost 
imaginer sauns nomber, in queux special verditz, sur le general issue tendu : serront bons. 
246 9 Co. Rep. 14a. (=English Reports 752). 
247 Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 105, and generally 113-118. 
248 In part, this effort involved raising the property qualifications for jury service, so that jurors would be 
less subject to pressure.  Green, Verdict According to Conscience, at e.g. 114. 
Star Chamber took cognizance of criminal jury misconduct for the next century and a 
quarter.  Juries were bound over to Star Chamber for punishment throughout the sixteenth 
century, and sometimes punished by judges as well.250  Star Chamber actively disciplined 
recalcitrant criminal juries until it was abolished in 1641.  Even after 1641, the judges of 
the Common Law Courts continued fining and imprisoning criminal jurors,251 probably 
with increasing frequency during the 1660s in particular.252  The solutions of the 
medieval common law to the problems of conscience were thus radically rejected during 
the first period of the rise of the early modern state, as criminal juries would subjected to 
the same pressures that civil juries had been a couple of centuries earlier.   
 Meanwhile, another factor too would have increased the moral pressure on early 
modern criminal juries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries:  The state steadily cut 
back on the range of offenses for which benefit of clergy was available.  Especially from 
the mid-sixteenth-century onward, more and more offenses were exempted from the 
privilege of benefit of clergy.253  This too was part of the princely crackdown of the early 
modern period.  Its consequence was that throughout the seventeenth century, criminal 
juries would have faced the burdensome obligation of sentencing offenders to blood 
punishments more frequently than their medieval predecessors had done.   
                                                                                                                                                 
249 Michael Stuckey, The High Court of Star Chamber (Holmes Beach, FLA, 1998), 49-50;  J.A. Guy, The 
Court of Star Chamber and its records to the reign of Elizabeth I (London: Public Record Office, 1985), 53. 
250 Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 140-143; Cockburn, History of English Assizes, 123-124; 
Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume VI, 372-373. 
251 Holdsworth, 1st ed., 1: 164.  See Leach’s case (1664), Th. Raym. 98. 
252 Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 209 and 209 n. 31. 
253Generally chronology in Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 588; Green, Verdict According to 
Conscience, 117-118, 120-121.  The criminal justice of the period also created a growing summary 
jurisdiction for non-blood cases.  See the survey in John M. Murrin, Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century 
New England, in David Hall, John Murrin and Thad Tate, Saints and Revolutionaries: Essays on Early 
American history (New York: Norton, 1984), 152-206, here 155-156. 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was thus moral hard times for English 
crimianl jurors.  Only beginning in the later seventeenth century did relief gradually 
arrive.  Over the period from 1660 to 1800, the great period of the solidification and 
creation of common law “liberties,” English government took a critical turn away from 
the princely practices of the Continent.  During this period of slow liberalization, criminal 
jurors recovered the privileges they had enjoyed in the Middle Ages.   
Thus the 1660s saw tense conflict over whether jurors could be punished for 
refusing to enter general verdicts as directed.  Finally, in 1670, Bushel’s Case held that 
they were in principle immune from coercion.254  This was moreover only part of the shift 
of the period 1660-1800.  In the decades after Bushel’s Case, the nature of English 
punishment changed, too.  Benefit of clergy was effectively extended in various ways 
from the later seventeenth century onward.255  Between 1706 and 1718, some offenders 
who pleaded benefit of clergy were subjected to hard labor; and after 1718, offenders 
were routinely transported to the American colonies.  Transportation remained the 
ordinary punishment until the American Revolution broke out.  After a hiatus from 1775 
to 1787, it was resumed, with offenders now transported to Australia.  Mid-eighteenth-
century English criminal jurors thus found themselves in a position much like that of their 
medieval predecessors:   They did not generally need to experience moral anxiety over 
their verdicts they handed down.  The only exception came during the period of 
uncertainty from 1775 to 1787, when it was unclear whether transportation could be 
resumed as the ordinary non-blood punishment.  As we shall see, it was precisely toward 
the end of that uncertain period, after American victory in the Revolution made it clear 
                                                 
254 Full discussion below, this Section. 
255 3 and 4 Will. and M. c. ix, x 5 (admitting women to the privilege);  5 Anne c.vi (abolishing the [by then 
meaningless] requirement of demonstrating literacy.) 
that transportation to America was no longer an option, that the “reasonable doubt” rule 
introduced itself into English criminal justice. 
At any rate, it was during the period 1660-1800, the period during which the 
sixteenth-century pressures gradually came off the criminal jury, that the “reasonable 
doubt” instruction slowly emerged.  When it did, it emerged in an atmosphere rich in 
references to the classic moral theology of doubt and blood.  It is to that period that we 
must now turn. 
To follow what happened during these critical decades, we must read two 
different kinds of literature.  One is the familiar literature of the common law itself:   in 
particular the famous decisions in Wagstaffs’ Case (1665) and Bushel’s Case (1670); the 
trial of Chief Justice Kelyng before the House of Commons in 1667; the Boston Massacre 
trials of 1770; and numerous English criminal cases from the Old Bailey dating from 
1782 into the mid-1790s.  These are all familiar sources to legal historians.  But we will 
not understand these familiar common-law texts unless we read them alongside a 
different body of literature, much less well known to legal historians:  What was called 
the literature of “cases of conscience.”  It is in the literature of “cases of conscience” that 
we find the old Christian moral theology, with some new English slants, presented to the 
English reader, in ways that deeply colored the great debates about criminal justice. 
 The “cases of conscience” literature is the Protestant, and especially Calvinist, 
repository of the law of conscience whose history I have traced since the twelfth 
century.256  It is indeed a distinctly Protestant literature.  In the medieval Catholic world, 
as we have seen, the law of conscience had a close link with the sacrament of confession.  
                                                 
256 See Paolo Prodi, Una storia della giustizia. Dal pluralismo dei fori al moderno dualismo tra coscienze e 
diritto (Bologna, 2000), 363-370 (the Protestant world), and throughout for the fundamental tension 
between law and conscience in the western tradition. 
The canon law of conscience, developed by sophisticated jurists, was communicated to 
confessors through “Confessor’s Manuals.”  Following those manuals, confessors were to 
pour “wine and oil into the wounds of the one injured after the manner of a skilful 
physician,” ministering to the souls of their congregants.  The Catholic law of conscience 
thus supplemented the inner voice of conscience by the trained voice of the priest. 
This historic link between conscience and confession was inevitably shaken 
during the Reformation, as confession faded in importance within the Protestant world.  
In the eyes of leading Protestant sects—though certainly not of all of them—the 
individual sinner did not need the intermediation of a priest in order to hear the inner 
voice of conscience.  On the contrary, the practice of confession seemed, especially to 
Calvinists, a prime example of Catholic perversion of the original Christian impulse—a 
prime example of an evil corruption by which a priest was interposed between the 
believer and God.  Accordingly, in varying degrees and different ways, the Protestant 
sects eliminated confession.   
That does not mean, however, that the old literature of conscience vanished in the 
Protestant world.  While there was neither confession nor confessors’ manuals, there was 
nevertheless a semi-popular Protestant literature that purveyed the classic canon law of 
conscience in its own fashion.  This Protestant literature took the form of books of “cases 
of conscience,” of which the two most famous early versions were produced by two 
English Calvinists, William Ames and William Perkins, in the early seventeenth century.   
These books differed little in substance from the medieval canon law of conscience:  
They contained much the same simplifed version of the canon law of conscience that was 
found in the old confessor’s manuals.  But unlike the old confessors’ manuals, Protestant 
books of “cases of conscience” were meant to be read by the individual Christian himself.  
Indeed, to read the cases of conscience literature is to get a taste of the early modern 
Protestant experience in its most morally astringent form:  Protestants who read cases of 
conscience books were Protestants who found themselves alone with their consciences, 
forced to act as their own judges, without the supervision of a confessor able to dispense 
penance, able to pour “wine and oil into [their] wounds.”  The cases of conscience 
literature was the instrument of some of the most anxiety-inducing aspects of early 
modern Protestant life. 
It is only by reading the anxiety-inducing cases of conscience literature that we 
can understand the seminal developments of the late seventeenth century and after.  
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, “cases of conscience” books kept 
all of the traditional canon-law problems of conscience in the English vernacular 
literature—with certain striking English differences, attesting to a distinctive and 
somewhat radical English tradition of moral theology.  English authors were conscious 
that their thought represented a distinct strain.257  (“We are freed,” declared the leading 
seventeenth-century author Jeremy Taylor, in a most English way, “from the impositions 
and lasting errors of a tyrannical spirit, and yet from the extravagances of a popular spirit 
too.”258)  There were indeed distinctly English ways of talking about the problems of 
conscience.  One distinctive feature was that English authors did not focus exclusively on 
blood punishments, as their continental counterparts did.  To be sure, most of the English 
analysis did concern cases of blood; and we shall see that cases of blood were always the 
most important in English eyes.  Nevertheless, from an early date, English authors also 
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regarded questions of property as raising problems of conscience.  Indeed, as we have 
seen, medieval English civil juries strongly resisted giving the general verdict.  Perhaps 
we can detect in this evidence that property rights mattered more in the English tradition 
than they did in the continental tradition. 
The attachment to property rights was, however, only one of the striking 
differences between the English and the continental traditions of conscience.  Another 
great, and particularly important difference, was that the English moralists insisted more 
strongly than continental casuists that judges were not permitted to act against 
“conscience.”259  As we have seen, medieval Catholic moralists did not shy before the 
great moral paradox posed by the ban on “private knowledge.”  Even when a judge’s 
private knowledge told him that the accused was innocent, he must nevertheless convict 
if the record developed in court so dictated, and he could not find some way to evade the 
result.  As the paradoxical medieval conclusion ran:  “Many things must be done against 
conscience for the sake of conscience.”  The English tradition resisted this.  Already in 
fourteenth-century England, the fiery reformer Wyclif rejected this moral paradox.260  So 
did Christopher St. German in the early sixteenth century.261  Wyclif’s and St. German’s 
seventeenth-century English successors took the same stand, deeming it unacceptable that 
judges should contemplate convicting accused persons in the face of their “private 
                                                 
259 There were of course some continental moralists too who took this view, notably Nicolas of Lyra.  See 
Jacques de Langlade, S.J., Le Juge, Serviteur de la Loi ou Gardien de la Justice selon la Tradition 
Théologique, 10 Revue de Droit Canonique 141, 149-151 (1960)  
260 Discussed in Radin, Conscience of the Court, 517. 
261 As Christopher St. German put it, judges could “sometimes give judgment against their own knowledge, 
and also against the truth, and yet no default to be in them, as it is in all trials.”  However he denied the 
applicability of the rule in capital cases.  St. German, Little Treatise, ed. Guy, 124.  Cited and discussed in 
Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume VI, 47 and 47 n. 246, without reference to the 
continental parallels, 
knowledge” of innocence.  The English were characterized by a distinctive kind of 
rigorism, one that would do much to deepen the moral dilemma of criminal jurors. 
That English moral rigorism ran throughout the literature of the seventeenth 
century, as moral theologians created the literature that would guide Christian jurors of 
the formative era in the English law of liberty.  Thus William Ames, the leading authority 
of the early seventeenth century, held that the judge must simply lay down his office 
rather than convict a person whom he knew of his own “private knowledge” to be 
innocent.  Ames presented the issue in terms that harkened back to the Middle Ages, but 
that resonated with the conflicts over governmental power of his own century.  Medieval 
jurists had distinguished between the body of the “judge” and the body of the “man.”  
Within the “in dubio pro reo” literature, they had pointed to the conflict between the 
“public interest” and the moral requirement of lenity.  These were still the terms in which 
Ames spoke.  For Ames, the question was whether it was legitimate to distinguish 
between the judge as a “public person,” the embodiment of the “Common-wealth”; and 
the judge as a man with a “private conscience.”  Ames held that it was not.  In the classic 
manner of the casuistic literature, Ames presented the arguments for and against: 
Of Publique Judgements 
Quest 5.  Whether the Judge ought always to give sentence according to the 
things alleaged and proved? 
20. A. 1.  The Iudge ought not to passe sentence against the things alleaged and 
proved, whatsoever there bee in his private knowledge. 
For first, the Iudge sentenceth as a publique person, and instead of the Common-
wealth . . . But if the Common-wealth should sentence, it could not proceed, but 
upon publique knowledge. . . . 
If the Iudge could sentence either against, or beside things alleaged and proved, 
there would from thence follow great discommodities, and the perversion of 
judgements: when unjust Iudges would easily condemne the innocent, and quit the 
guilty, under pretext of a private knowledge, which disageeth from the things 
alleaged and proved. 
Thirdly, there can be no other way, by which the Common-wealth may remaine in 
quiet. 
21. A.2  Yet the Iudge is not so retrained to things alleaged and proved, that he 
must condemne him to death, whom hee knoweth plainely to bee innocent. 
First, Because things alleaged and proved, are onely means of manifesting the 
truth, and therefore ought not to prevaile with any against the truth which is 
certainly knowen . . . 
Secondly, Because a Iudge which pronounceth that to bee true which certainly 
hee knoweth to bee false, would bee a lyer, and sinne against his owne 
conscience. 
22.A. 3.  Neither is the argument solved by that distinction, betweene the publique 
and private conscience of a Iudge. 
For first, the private conscience ought not to be violated at any time. . . 
Thirdly, Because to slay an innocent, is a fact intrinsecally evill . . . 
23.A.4. If the Iudge would but doe his duty in procuring the manifestation of the 
truth, so much intricatenesse would seldome happen.  But if it should happen after 
hee hath tried all things for the delivery of the innocent, hee is bound to leave his 
office of Iudge rather than to condemne him.262
This was the standard English view, which authors on conscience frequently contrasted 
with what they found to be the ugly casuistry of the Catholic world, and especially of the 
Spanish.  As one example among many, we may take Joseph Hall’s 1654 Cases of 
Conscience, Practically Resolved.  To Hall, the judge who convicted in the face his 
exculpatory private knowledge was “guilty of blood”;  if such a judge was honest, he 
would heed the voice of his conscience, “the bird in his bosome,” which would tell him 
that he had made himself a “murtherer”:  
Case VI.  Whether a Judge may upon allegations, proofes, and evidences of 
others, condemn a man to death, whom he himself certainly knows to be innocent. 
The question hath undergone much agitation; The streame of all ancient Divines, 
and Casuists runs upon the affirmative; their ground is, that the Judge, as he is a 
publique person, so in the set of Judicature, he must exercise a publique authority; 
and therefore waving his private knowledge and interest, must sentence according 
to the allegations and proofes brought before him; since he is a Judge of the cause, 
not of the law; whereof he is to be the servant, not the master:  There he sits not to 
speake his own judgement; but to be the mouth of the law, and the law command 
him to judge according to the evidence; the evidence therefore being cleare and 
convictive, the doome can be no other than condemnatory. 
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For my part, I can more marvell at their judgement herein, than approve it . . . . 
It is an evident and undeniable law of God which must be the rule of all Judges; 
The innnocent and the righteous slay thou not, Exod. 23.27  This is a Law neither 
to be avoided, nor dispensed with: Accusations and false witnesses cannot make a 
man other than innocent; they may make him to seeme so; in so much as those 
that know not the cause exactly, may perhaps be mis-led to condemne him in their 
judgments: But to the Judge, whose eyes were witnesses of the parties innocence, 
all the evidence in the world cannot make him other than guiltlesse;  so as that 
Judge shall be guilty of blood, in slaying the innocent, and righteous. 
Secondly, the law of judging according to allegations and proofs is a good 
generall direction in the common course of proceedings; but there are cases 
wherein this law must vaile to an higher, which is the law of Conscience:  Woe be 
to that man who shall tye himselfe so close to the letter of the law, as to make 
shipwrack of conscience;  And that bird in his bosome will tell him, that if upon 
what ever pretences, he shall willingly condemne an innocent, he is no better than 
a murtherer. . . . 
Let no man now tell me, that it is the law that condemnes the man, and not the 
Judge; This excuse will not serve before the Tribunall of heaven;  The law hath no 
tongue;  It is the Judge that is lex loquens;  If he then shall pronounce that 
sentence which his owne heart tells him is unjust and cruell, what is he but an 
officious minister of injustice?  But, indeed, what law ever said, Thou shalt kill 
that man whom thou knowest innocent, if false witnesse will sweare him guilty?  
This is but a false glosse set upon a true text, to countenance a man in being an 
instrument of evil. 
Hall did not deny the difficulties of the matter.  He recognized that his world was one of 
severe disorder, in which the public interest might seem to require loyalty from the public 
servants charged with carrying out a severe criminal justice.  He even struggled to give 
some credit to the Spanish moral theologians: 
What then is in this case to be done?  Surely, as I durst not acquite that Judge, 
who under what ever colour of law should cast away a known innocent, so I durst 
not advise against plaine evidences and flat dispositions, upon private knowledge, 
that man to be openly pronounced guiltlesse; and thereby discharged; for as the 
one is a grosse violation of justice; so were the other a publique affront to the law; 
and of dangerous consequence to the weale publique:  Certainly, it could not but 
be extreamely unsafe, that such a gappe should bee opened to the liberty of 
judgement, that a private brest should be opposed (with an apparent prevalence) 
against publique convictions: our Casuists have beaten their braines to finde out 
some such evasions as might save the innocent from death, and the Judge from 
blood guiltinesse:  Herein therefore they advise the Judge to use some secret 
meanes to stop the accusation, or indictment; a course that might be as prejudiciall 
to justice, as a false sentence) to sift the witnesse apart, as in Susanna’s case, and 
by many subtile interrogations of the circumstances to find their variance or 
contradiction.  If that prevaile not, Cajetan goes so farre, as to determine it meet 
(which how it might stand with their law, he knowes, with ours it would not) that 
the Judge should before all the people give his oath, that hee knowes the party 
guiltlesse; as whom he himselfe saw at that very hyoure in a place far disant from 
that wherein the fact is pretended to bee done: Yea* Dominicus à Soto could be 
content (if it might be done without scandall) that the prisoner might secretly be 
suffered to slip out of the geaole, and save himselfe by flight.  Others think it the 
best way, that the Judge should put off the cause to to a superiour Bench, and that 
himselfe should (laying aside his scarlet) come to the Bar, and as a witnessse 
avow upon oath the innocence of the party, and the falsity of the accusation:  Or 
lastly, if he should out of malice, or some other sinister ends (as of the forfeiture 
of some rich estate) be pressed by higher powers to passe the sentence on his own 
Bench, that he ought to lay downe his Commission, and to abdicate that power he 
hath, rather than to suffer it forced to a willing injustice. 
But despite all that, Hall rejected the view of the Spanish moral theologians, even the best 
of them: 
And truly were the case mine, after all faire and lawfull indeavours to justifie the 
innocent, and to avoid the sentence, I should most willingly yield to this last 
resolution: yea, rather my selfe to undergoe the sentence of death, than to 
prounounce it on the knowne guiltlesse;  hating the poore pusillanimity of 
Dominicus à Soto*. . . .263
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Hall’s dislike (and grudging respect) for Spanish moral casuistry was typical of the 
English world.264  So was his insistence that judges must rigorously avoid violating their 
consciences. 
This was notably true of the most influential text of the late seventeenth century:  
Jeremy Taylor’s 1660 Ductor Dubitantium (The Guide for Those in Doubt).  Taylor is 
indeed a particularly important figure, since he remained highly influential throughout the 
eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries.265  Early on in his long text, Taylor turned to 
the problem of judging.  Like other English moralists, he rejected the canon law approach 
that permitted a judge to condemn the innocent.  In his charming baroque style, he 
decorated his discussion with an anecdote drawn from the literature of classical 
Antiquity: 
But then what shall a Judge do, who knows the witnesses in a criminal cause to 
have sworn falsly?  The case is this:  Conopus a Spartan Judge, walking abroad 
near the [garden?] of Onesicritus, espies him killing of his slave Asotus; who to 
palliate the fact, himself accuses another of his servants [Orgilus] and compell’d 
some to swear it as he affirmed.  The process was made, advocates entertain’d by 
Onesicritus, and the poor Orgilus convict by testimony and legal proof.  Conopus 
the Judge knows the whole process to be injurious, but he knows not what to do, 
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because he remembers that he is boud to judge according to allegation and proof, 
and yet to do justice and judgment, which in this case in impossible.  He therefore 
inquires for an expedient, or a peremptory resolution on either hand:  Since he 
offends against the Laws of Sparta, if he acquits one who is legally convicted; 
and yet if he condenns him whom he knows to be innocent, he sins against God, 
and Nature, and against his own Conscience. 
That a Judge not only may, but is oblig’d to proceed according to the process of 
Law, and not to his own private Conscience, is confidently affirmed by Aquinas, 
by his Master, and by his Scholars, and of late defended earnestly by Didacus 
Covarruvius a learned Man indeed and a great Lawyer . . . .  
But if after all this you inquire what shall become of the Judge as a man, and what 
of his private conscience? these Men answer; that the Judge must use what 
ingenious and fair artifices he can to save the innocent . . . .  yet I answer 
otherwise, and I suppose, for Reasons very considerable. 
Taylor too understood the question as one that opposed the public interest to the private 
conscience: 
 Therefore, To the Question I answer, That a Judge in this case may not do any 
publick act against his private conscience; he may not condemn an innocent 
whom he knows to be so, though he be prov’d crminal by false witnesses. 
And what if Titius be accused for killing Regulus, whom the Consul at that time 
hath living in his house, or hath lately sent abroad;  would not all the world hoot 
at him, if he should deliver Titius to the Tormentors for killing the man whom 
Judge knows to be at home, it be dressing of his dinner, or abroad gathering his 
rents? . . .  Of how if he sees the fact done before him in the Court? A purse cut, 
or a stone thrown at his brother Judge, as it happened at Ludlow not many years 
since?. . .  
I conclude therefore with that rule of the Canon Law, Melius est scandalum nasci 
quam ut veritas deseratur; It is better that a scandal should be suffered, and an 
offence done to the forms and methods of judicial proceedings, than that truth 
should be betrayed and forsaken . . . .266
By the 1660s and 1670s, then, it was well established in the English literature of 
conscience that judges must not convict against their “private knowledge,” despite their 
status as public persons.  Indeed, in the 1650s and 1660s it was presented as a mark of a 
distinctively high English standard of morality to reject the classic Catholic theology, and 
most especially Spanish theology.  This literature would have been fresh in the mind of 
every believing Englishman called to serve on a jury; and unless it is fresh in our minds 
as well, we will not understand the seminal events of the later seventeenth century.  
 With that, let us turn to the crises of the 1660s and 1670s.  The most famous 
conflicts of those years were cases that did not involve blood punishments:  These were 
the prosecutions of Quakers, of whom the most prominent was William Penn.  But there 
were also homicide cases, which cannot be neglected in describing the events of the time. 
We begin with the Quaker cases.  After the Stuart Restoration in 1660, the Crown 
attempted to forbid gatherings that might foster political or religious sedition, through the 
Conventicles Act of 1664.267  This measure was resisted in particular by Quakers, who 
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continued to gather.268  The Conventicles Act, importantly, did not threaten any blood 
punishments, merely imprisonment, fines, or in extreme cases transportation.269  Juries in 
the Quaker cases thus did not face the gravest moral challenges.  Nevertheless, when 
Quakers were prosecuted, conflict arose:  Jurors sought to deliver “not guilty” verdicts. 
What could be done to discipline such recalcitrant jurors, forgetful of their role as 
“public persons”?  Star Chamber had been abolished.  But the judges of the common law 
had assumed its disciplinary powers, and were fining and imprisoning criminal juries that 
refused to convict as they had been directed to do.  The question was thus framed as one 
of whether common law judges could exercise such powers, coercing criminal jurors as 
they had never been coerced before the sixteenth century.  Wagstaff’s Case presented a 
first important test in 1665.270  That case produced a complex result.  Nevertheless, the 
decision made it clear that King’s Bench could make use of its well-established authority 
to fine jurors who refused to enter guilty verdicts as directed.   
Yet a storm of change was gathering, which would end juror coercion within a 
few years.  It was in response to Wagstaff’s case that Matthew Hale, then first Baron of 
the Exchequer, and a critic of the practice of fining and imprisoning jurors,271 laid out his 
important views on the moral responsibility of judges.   
Hale was a man knowledgeable in the continental traditions.  His History of the 
Pleas of the Crown, offering his views as of the mid-1660s,272 presented much of the 
continental learning.  Margaret Sampson has shown that Hale drew directly upon the 
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continental law of conscience.273  Thus Hale cited the hallowed “safer path” precepts:  
“quod dubitas, ne feceris,” he wrote, “when you are in doubt, do not act, especially in 
Cases of Life.”274  This meant, he wrote, in language familiar from the continental 
literature,275 that the judge must err in favor of “mildness” and “mercy.”276  “The best 
Rule is in Dubiis,” he wrote, quoting the famous Latin of Innocent III, “rather to incline 
to acquittal than Conviction.”277  Hale was a man of his Christian times—not only as a 
scholar, but also in his practical life:  His biographer reported that “in matters of Blood, 
he was always to chuse the safer side.”278
In responding to Wagstaff’s Case, Hale wrote in the same long-familiar vein.  The 
question was whether judges could effectively decide the question of guilt themselves.  In 
the course of arguing against the practice of coercing jurors, Hale insisted that judges 
should want no such responsibility.  After all, as Hale noted, the responsibility for 
judgment carried with it, in the old language of the medieval common law, “peril.”  Hale, 
like all of the moral theologians of his day and of earlier centuries, emphasized the fact 
that jurors might possibly make use of their “private knowledge”: 
And although the witnesses might perchance swear the fact to the satisfaction of 
the court, yet the jury are judges as well of the credibility of the witnesses, as of 
the truth of the fact, for possibly they might know somewhat of their own 
knowledge, that what was sworn was untrue, and possibly they might know the 
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witnesses to be such as they could not believe, and it is the conscience of the jury, 
that must pronounce the prisoner guilty or not guilty. 
And to say the truth, it were the most unhappy case that could be to the judge, if 
he at his peril must take must take upon him the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, 
and if the judge’s opinion must rule the matter of fact, the trial by jury would be 
useless.279
Hale’s argument did not carry the day in Wagstaff’s Case, but opposition was growing.280   
Over the next couple of years, the opposition centered in particular on Kelyng, 
Chief Justice, who favored fining jurors not only in the Quaker cases, but also, 
disturbingly, in cases of homicide.281  Kelyng was an unbending representative of public 
power, who showed little patience for supposed English traditions of liberty that 
interfered with the administration of criminal justice.  (He was denounced in particular 
for having called Magna Charta (quoting Cromwell282) “Magna Farta”283—words that 
Kelyng denied having spoken, though he truculently admitted that “it might be possible, 
Magna Charta being often and ignorantly pressed upon him, that he did utter that 
indecent expression.”284)  In a number of cases, Kelyng compelled criminal juries, not 
only to convict Quakers, but also to enter guilty verdicts in homicide cases. 
Kelyng’s position on these homicide cases was by no means entirely 
unsympathetic:  To judge from the reports we have, he was especially eager to prevent 
juries from going easy on masters who brutally beat their apprentices to death: 
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[A] smith struck his prentice with a bar of iron, broke his skull, and the prentice 
died of the wound within two or three days.  The jury would not find this murder 
at the first, whereupon [Chief Justice Kelyng] threatened them  and made them go 
out again, and told them that they ought to find it murder, which accordingly they 
did. . . .285
[A] man was arraigned for killing a boy; this was the head man to a weaver.  The 
master in his shop gave him power to oversee the rest and correct them if they 
neglected their work.  This boy had neglected to wind some spindles of yarn, and 
therefore this man beat him about the head with a broomstaff, of which he died 
within a day or two.  The jury found this manslaughter, and because they did not 
find it murder nor would be persuaded to alter their verdict  [Chief Justice 
Kelyng] told them that if they would not go out again and find murder he would 
fine them £ 2 a man.  The jury for fear went out again and found it murder and the 
man was hanged.286
When we read cases like these, we may find it a little easier to sympathize with the 
program of the early modern princely states:  Not all of the “liberties” that Crown 
officials were attacking were ones that we would approve of.  At any rate, Chief Justice 
Kelyng, who also disciplined jurors who found a homicide to be a case of self-defense,287 
as well as grand jurors who refused to indict in a homicide case,288 was unapologetic:  “I 
am very strict and severe against high-way robbers and in case of blood,” he quite simply 
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declared.289  He was also severe in cases of Quakers:  When jurors refused to convict 
some of them, “he imprisoned and fined some of [the jurors] one hundred marks 
apiece.”290
Kelyng was a natural lightning-rod for the attacks of those who worried about the 
liberties of Englishmen.  Eventually he was charged by the House of Commons with 
using “an arbitrary and illegal power, which is of dangerous consequences to the lives 
and liberties of the people of England; and tends to the introducing of an arbitrary 
government.”291  What troubled the House, we should note, was not the Quaker cases, but 
the cases of blood:  The action against Kelyng was initiated by a report to the House that 
“there have been some innovations of late in trials for men for their lives and deaths; and 
in some particular cases, restraints have been put upon juries, in the inquiries.”292  The 
House called for Kelyng to suffer “condign punishment, lest every sessions produce the 
like tragical scenes of usurpation over the consciences of Juries.”293  In the end, nothing 
came of the House’s call for Kelyng’s punishment; but his denunciation contributed to 
atmosphere of gathering crisis over the coercion of “the conscience of Juries.”294
That crisis came to a head in the famous Bushel’s Case of 1670, involving the 
prosecution of the Quakers William Penn and William Mead for violation of the 
Conventicles Act.  The case is very famous one.  The jurors in Penn and Mead’s case, put 
under severe pressure, insisted in standing upon their “conscience” and rendered a verdict 
of not guilty295—upon which the jurors were fined forty marks, for refusing to 
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acknowledge the “manifest evidence” of guilt.  The case was rich in politically charged 
invective:  Penn and Mead’s report declares that the Recorder of London, one of the 
presiding officials, chose once again to describe Magna Charta as “Magna f----”.296  The 
report also shows the Recorder making a declaration that could have been calculated to 
scandalize pious Englishmen: 
Rec[order].  Till now I never understood the reason of the policy and prudence of 
the Spaniards, in suffering the inquisition among them:  And certainly it will 
never be well with us, till something like unto the Spanish inquisition be in 
England.297
Penn reacted indignantly to this:  It was no wonder, he observed, as he was dragged out 
of court,298 that the Recorder had no respect for “the fundamental laws of England,” 
“since the Spanish Inquisition hath so great a place in [his] heart.  God Almighty, who is 
just, will judge you for all these things.”299
At any rate, the events of the trial gave rise to Bushel’s Case.  Juror Edward 
Bushel, having been imprisoned, brought a writ of habeas corpus.  Chief Justice Vaughan 
discharged him, in a celebrated decision that definitely established that “a juror cannot be 
fined for a verdict given according to his conscience.”300  Scholars have found Vaughan’s 
decision puzzling:  It was founded on the ground, very strange to modern readers, that 
jurors might use “private knowledge.”301  Other arguments were certainly available to 
Vaughan.  For example, he noted that an attaint was technically available against the 
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jurors in the case, since the offense charged was not capital.302  Yet it was precisely 
where an attaint was available that fining jurors was unacceptable:  “[I]f an attaint lies, 
and a fine may also be imposed, the jury would be twice punished for the same 
offence.”303  This was a venerable technical argument, upon which the whole decision 
might presumably have rested.304  Yet this technical argument was not sufficient for 
Vaughan.  Nor was it enough for him simply to invoke the jury’s “conscience,” as he did 
notably in a phrase added at the last minute to his opinion:  “though the verdict be right 
the jury give, yet they being not assured it is so from their own understanding, are 
foresworn, at least in foro conscientiae.”305   
Instead, like Hale a few years before him, Vaughan insisted on focusing upon the 
classic question of the jury’s private knowledge.  What mattered was that juries might 
decide upon their “personal knowledge.”  This meant that they could not be coerced: 
It is true, if the jury were to have no other evidence for the fact, but what is 
deposed in court, the judge might know their evidence, and the fact from it, 
equally as they, and so direct what the law were in the case, though even then the 
judge and jury might honestly differ in the result from the evidence, as well as 
two judges may, which often happens. 
But the evidence which the jury have of the fact is much other than that: for, 
                                                 
302 Howell’s State Trials 6: 1009;  English Reports 84: 1123-1125. 
303 Bushel’s Case, English Reports 84: 1123-1125;  cf. Howell’s State Trials 6: 1009. 
304 For this issue in the earlier debates over Star Chamber, see William Hudson, A Treatise of the Court of 
Star Chamber, ed. Francis Hargarve (Birmingham, 1986) (ORIGINAL DATE), 72: “And first of perjury; 
wherein I must first meet with that positive opinion 8. Eliz. Dyer, that there was no punishment for perjury 
before the statute of 5. Eliz, but against jurors only by way of attaint: and I cannot but marvel that so 
learned and reverend men should light upon so fond an opinion . . .”   See the full discussion in id., 72-73. 
305 For the addition of this phrase after the manuscript of the opinion had been drafted, see Green, Verdict 
According to Conscience, 244 and 244 n.175. 
1. Being returned of the vicinage, whence the cause of action ariseth, the law 
supposeth them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in issue (and 
so they must) though no evidence were given on either side in court, but to this 
evidence the judge is a stranger. 
2. They may have evidence from their own personal knowledge, by which they 
may be assured, and sometimes are, that what is deposed in court, is absolutely 
false: but to this the judge is a stranger, and he knows no more of the fact than he 
hath learned in court, and perhaps by false depositions, and consequently knows 
nothing. 
True “private knowledge” must decide the case.  In particular, because the general verdict 
mixed findings of fact and law, jurors could never be punished for entering it: 
In special verdicts the Jury inform the naked fact, and the Court deliver the law . . 
.  . But upon all general issues; as upon not culpable pleaded in trespass, 'nil debet' 
in debt, nul tort, nul disseisin' in assize, 'ne disturba pas' in 'quare impedit,' and the 
like; though it be matter of law whether the defendant be a trespasser, a debtor, 
disseisor, or disturber in the particular cases in issue; yet the jury find not (as in a 
special verdict) the fact of every case by itself, leaving the law to the court, but 
find for the plaintiff or defendant upon the issue to be tried, wherein they resolve 
both law and fact complicately, and not the fact by itself. . . . 
Because the jury mixed its fact-finding—partly on the basis of private knowledge—in its 
general verdicts, it could not be fined or imprisoned.306
                                                 
306 Vaughan’s reasoning is presented in Howell’s State Trials 6: 1009-1019. 
Why did Vaughan make so much of the jurors’ possible private knowledge of the 
case?  John Langbein has derided Vaughan’s opinion as “wilfully anachronistic”307—
“dishonest nonsense,” in Langbein’s most recent phrase.308  As Langbein sees it, 
Vaughan’s opinion simply harkened pointlessly back to a long-lost world in which juries 
were self-informing.309  Yet this critique is strange.  If the opinion was such obvious 
“nonsense” it is difficult to understand how it could have had the immense impact it had 
on its contemporaries.  Surely Vaughan’s audience would have recognized his argument 
as an irrelevant anachronism, if that is really what is was.  The answer, as I hope I have 
shown, is that the “private knowledge” question did matter to Vaughan and his 
contemporaries—partly because juror private knowledge had not vanished, as Langbein 
himself has demonstrated310;  but largely because of the implications of even potential 
“private knowledge” for the moral position of the juror.  Vaughan was indeed only one of 
many figures of the time who took the issue very seriously indeed.  
In any case, 1664-1670 were watershed years for juror independence.  Let us note 
that the law of those watershed years laid heavy emphasis on the fact that jurors judged 
according to “conscience” in both senses of the word:  They both exercised a moral 
faculty in ways that put their own salvations at risk; and they judged on the basis of 
“private knowledge.”  To fully grasp the significance of the traditions of the moral 
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theology of judging in these cases, though, we must look beyond the narrowly legal 
literature, bringing in the contemporary literature of moral theology. 
In the aftermath of Bushel’s Case, there was indeed a burst of literature on the 
moral burdens and moral glories of jury service, which set the terms of a debate that 
would continue into the 1780s.311  Three years after Bushel’s Case, a new leading Cases 
of Conscience text appeared.  This was Richard Baxter’s A Christian Directory or a 
Summ of Practical Theologie and Cases of Conscience, which appeared in 1673.  Baxter 
was a major figure, a divine whose works who would be reprinted for two centuries.312  
Like other authors in the tradition, Baxter analyzed the classic claim, as old as Ivo and 
Gratian, that the judge could avoid moral responsibility by averring that it was not he 
himself who made the decision, but “the law.”  Writing in the wake of Bushel’s Case, he 
addressed himself directly to jurors: 
Quest. 12  Must a Judge and jury proceed secundum allegata & probata, 
according to evidence and proof, when they know the witness to be false, and the 
truth to be contrary to the testimony; but are not abel to evince it? 
Answ.  Distinguish between the Negative and Positive part of the Verdict or 
Sentence: In the Negative they must go according to the evidence and testimonies, 
unless the Law of the Land leave the case to their private knowledge.  As for 
example, They must not sentence a Thief or Murderer to be punished upon their 
secret unproved knowledge:  They must not adjudge either Moneys or Lands to 
the true Owner from another, without sufficient evidence and proof: They must 
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forbear doing Justice, because they are not called to it, nor enabled.  But 
Positively they may do no Injustice upon any evidence or witness against their 
own knowledge of the truth: As they may not upon known false witness, give 
away any mans Lands or Money, or condemn the innocent; But they must in such 
a case renounce the Office: The Judge must come off the Bench, and the Jury 
protest that they will not meddle, or give any Verdict (what ever come of it) : 
Because God and the Law of Nature prohibit their injustice. 
Object. It is the Law that doth it, and not we. 
Answ.  It is the Law and you: And the Law cannot justifie your agency in any 
unrighteous sentence.  The case is plain and past dispute.313
Any potential juror reading Baxter’s text would understand that knuckling under to a 
figure like Kelyng meant putting his own salvation at risk.  Other texts made the same 
point:  It was in 1682, for example, that Gilbert Burnet published his Death and Life of 
Sir Matthew Hale, declaring that the great judge had held that “in matters of Blood, he 
was always to chuse the safer side.”314
 But such moral rigorism did not settle the whole issue for jurors.  As the moralist 
literature of the time explained to them, there were great spiritual complexities and traps, 
which could not easily be evaded.  Particularly interesting is Benjamin Calamy, a 
preacher who would be still be cited a century later.  Calamy was a protégé of the most 
hated judicial figure of the 1680s:  Judge George Jeffreys, the servant of the Stuart King 
remembered ever after as the the most wicked and fearsome enemy of English liberties in 
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the years before the Glorious Revolution.  In 1683, Calamy, who had been appointed to 
the perpetual curacy of St. Mary Aldermanbury through Jeffreys’ patronage, published 
his “Discourse about a Doubting Conscience,” subsequently republished as “Discourse 
about a Scrupulous Conscience.”315  In this Discourse, preached as a sermon to great 
acclaim, Calamy, explained how to the immense public importance of avoiding excessive 
moral rigorism.   
Calamy, a champion of the public interest as understood by the Stuart Monarchy,  
laid out a method for dealing with doubts.  In particular, he distinguished between doubts 
and scruples.  This was a well-established distinction in moral theology.  As Jeremy 
Taylor had explained in 1660, scruples were dangerously irrational impulses316: 
Against a doubting conscience a man may not work but against a scrupulous he 
may.  For a scrupulous conscience does not take away the proper determination of 
the understanding; but it is like a Woman handling of a Frog or a Chicken, which 
all their friends tell them can do them no hurt, and they are convinced in reason 
that they cannot, they believe it and know it, and yet when they take the little 
creature into their hands they shreek, and sometimes hold fast and find their fears 
confuted, and sometimes they let go and find their reason useless. . . .317
Calamy seized on this distinction:  “Mind your plain and necessary Duty, and trouble not 
yourselves with scruples about little and indifferent things. . . .”318  “[N]eedless 
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scruples”319 might easily lead the Christian into a terrible error, the error of sins of 
omission.  In particular, overly scrupulous Christians who did not understand “Duty” 
might fail to do their part to combat “what is really Evil”: 
Now our Consciences cannot alter the nature of things: that which is our Duty 
remaineth so, and we sin by omitting it, notwithstanding we in our Consciences 
think it unlawful to be done, and what is really Evil continueth such, and is Sin in 
us, however our Consciences tell us it is our duty to do it and the fault is more or 
less compassionable and pardonable, as the causes of the Error are more or less 
voluntary and avoidable.320
In particular, one must not allow “Reasons and Exceptions” stand in one’s way: 
When I speak of a Scrupulous Conscience, I suppose the Person tolerably well 
perswaded of the lawfulness of what is to be done, but yet he doth not like or 
approve of it, he hath some Reasons and Exceptions against it, it is not the best 
and fittest, all things considered.321
This bore particularly on the case of public officials like judges:  “For all Government 
and Subjection would be very precarious and arbitrary, if every one that did not approve 
of a Law or was not fully satisfied about the reasonableness of it was thereby exempted 
from all obligations to obey it.”322
The conflict was thus framed as a battle between the moral rigorism of the “safe” 
conscience, on the one side; and the submission to “Duty” on the other.  This was a 
conflict that mattered a great deal for the administration of justice:  There was a real 
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danger that upstanding Christian jurors might resist serving, as indeed they seem to have 
done323;  yet the system needed their service.  The conflict was fought out through all the 
literature of the post-Bushel’s-case period:  The authors of the period clearly felt the need 
to reconcile conscience and duty.  Like Baxter, the authors of the period accepted the 
severity of the moral challenge facing jurors.  At the same time, like their continental 
predecessors, they worried over the consequences of this moral theology for the workable 
administration of justice.  Indeed, Baxter himself fully agreed that “scrupulosity” was a 
danger. 324  Such indeed was the basic dilemma:  After 1670 it was impossible to ignore 
the classic moral theology, in its rigorist English form.  Yet at the same time, sensible 
Englishmen, like Chief Justice Kelyng, still wished to be “strict and severe against high-
way robbers and in case of blood.”325
Thus Zachary Babington, a pamphleteer who addressed himself to grand jurors 
sitting on “cases of blood,” in 1677, invoked moral reasoning that had been familiar since 
the twelfth century.326  To Babington, as to Augustine, Gratian and Peter the Chanter long 
before him, the were as undeniable danger was that any person engaged in judging might 
“make himself a murderer.”   Grand jurors must take care “to keep themselves secure 
from the guilt of Innocent blood.”327  But Babington (like Chief Justice Kelyng328) was 
eager to insist that should not be taken too far.  Did the righteous fear of the guilt of 
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innocent blood mean that the Grand Jury was to refuse to indict, giving a no true bill?  
Not at all:  A failure of the indictment in a case of murder would leave the “innocent 
blood” of the victim unavenged, and for that reason, the safer way was to indict:  “[I]t is 
most prudent and safe for every wise and conscientious Grand Jury-man . . .rather to 
presume it probable, all other Circumstances may be true, as they are laid in the 
Indictment  . . . and so to leave it fairly to the Court to judge thereof, and themselves free 
from the imputation of Blood by concealment . . . .”329  
 Babington was not the only author to say such things.  The most important of the 
texts written along such lines was Sir John Hawles’ “The English-mans Right,” of 1680.  
Hawles’ much-reprinted pamphlet, read widely in the American colonies during the 
eighteenth century, has been described as disseminating the teachings of Bushel’s Case in 
pamphlet form.330  This is right, up to a point:  Notably, following Bushels’ case, Hawles 
insisted that juries, “being of the Neighbourhood,” might well acquit defendants on the 
basis of their independent knowledge of the case.331  Yet, read in its full context, the 
pamphlet should be seen as more than a rehash of Bushel’s Case.  It was an attempt to 
cope with the disturbing implications of Bushel’s Case.  For, as Hawles understood, the 
new order that respected juror’s “consciences” was an order that threatened to undermine 
the workings of criminal justice. 
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Indeed, like Babington, Hawles was primarily eager to persuade jurors to serve 
despite their conscientious qualms.  His pamphlet took the form of a dialogue between a 
barrister and a prospective juryman: 
Barrister.  My old Client! A good morning to you, whither so fast?  You seem 
intent upon some important affair? 
Juryman.  Worthy Sir!  I am glad to see you thus opportunely, there being scarce 
any person that I could at this time rather have wisht to meet with. 
Barr.  I shall esteem my self happy, if in any thing I can serve you. ----  The 
business I pray? 
Jurym.  I am summon’d to appear upon a Jury and was just going to try if I could 
get off.  Now I doubt not but you can put me into the best way to obtain that 
favour. 
Barr.  ‘Tis probable I could.  But first let me know the reasons why you desire to 
decline that service. 
Jurym.  You know, Sir, there is something trouble and loss of time in it; and mens 
Lives, Liberties, and Estates which depend upon a Jury’s Guilty, or Not guilty, for 
the Plaintiff or for the Defendant) are weighty things.  I would not wrong my 
Conscience for a world, nor be accessory to any mans ruin.  There other better 
skill’d in such matters.  I have ever so loved peace, that I have forborn going to 
Law (as you well know many times) though it hath been much to my loss.332
The Barrister’s response, like that of Calamy, acknowledged the claims of conscience, 
but opposed to them the claims of public duty: 
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Barr.   I commend your tenderness and modesty; yet must tell you, these are but 
general and weak excuses. As for your time and trouble, 'tis not much; and 
however, can it be better spent than in doing justice, and serving your Country? 
To withdraw your self in such cases, is a kind of Sacriledge, a robbing of the 
publick of those duties which you justly owe it; the more peaceable man you have 
been, the more fit you are. For the office of a Jury-man is, conscientiously to 
judge his neighbour; and needs no more Law than is easily learnt to direct him 
therein. I look upon you therefore as a man well qualified with estate, discretion, 
and integrity; and if all such as you, should use private means to avoid it, how 
would the King and Country be honestly served? At that rate we should have none 
but Fools or Knaves intrusted in this grand concern, on which (as you well 
observe) the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of all Englishmen depend. 
Whatever the dangers of conscience, jurors still had “public” duties that they could not 
omit.  The Barrister then offered an argument much like Babington’s before him:  
Avoiding blood guilt required more than just avoiding public service; it meant avoiding 
sins of omission: 
Your Tenderness not be accessary to any mans being wrong'd or ruin'd, is (as I 
said) much to be commended. But may you not incur it unawares, by seeking thus 
to avoid it? Pilate was not innocent because he washt his hands, and said, He 
would have nothing to do with the blood of that just one. There are faults of 
Omission as well as Commission. When you are legally call'd to try such a cause, 
if you shall shuffle out your self, and thereby persons perhaps less conscientious 
happen to be made use of, and so a Villain escapes justice, or an innocent man is 
ruined by a prepossest or negligent Verdict; can you think your self in such a case 
wholly blameless? Qui non prohibet cum potest, jubet: He abets evil, that 
prevents it not when he may.333
Thus the troubling picture of the good Christian—one who generally forbore to go to law, 
and who when faced with the task of judgment, worried that he might “wrong his 
Conscience.”  Yet this very good Christian, through his laudable qualms, threatened to do 
injustice by omission.   
The rest of Dialogue presented the Barrister’s efforts to soothe the Jury-man’s 
moral fears, and to explain the role of jurors in the common law system.  It was true that 
that role presented authentic dangers to the jurors’ souls.  In particular, they might be 
bullied by the court into finding a defendant guilty in cases of seditious libel.  Such cases 
endangered their souls.334  Yet they could not avoid service: 
Thus a Verdict, so called in Law,  quasi veritatis, because it ought to be the 
Voice or Saying of Truth it self, may become composed in its material part of 
Falshood.  Thus Twelve men ignorantly drop into a Perjury.  And will not every 
conscientious man tremble to pawn his Soul under the sacred and dreadful 
solemnity of an Oath, to attest and justifie a Lie upon Record to all Posterity;  
besides the wrong done to the Prisoner, who thereby perhaps comes to hang’d 
(and so the Jury in foro conscientiae are certainly guilty of his Murther) or at least 
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by Fine or Imprisonment) undone with all his Family, whose just Curses will fall 
heavy on such unjust Jurymen and all their Posterity, that against their Oaths and 
Duty occasion’d their causeless misery. And is all this think you nothing but a 
matter of Formality? 
Jurym.  Yes really, a matter of Vast Importance and sad Consideration; yet I think 
you charge the mischiefs done by such Proceedings a little too heavy upon the 
Jurors; Alas good men! They mean no harm, they do but follow the directions of 
the Court, if any body ever happen to be to blame in such Cases it must be the 
Judges. 335
Such were views were understandable, said the Barrister.  Yet in the end they represented 
nothing but an effort to “shuffle off the blood guilt,” putting upon the judges instead.  No 
such effort could ever succeed: 
Barr. Yes, forsooth! That's the Jury-mens common-plea, but do you think it will 
hold good in the Court of Heaven? 'Tis not enough that we mean no harm, but we 
must do none neither, especially in things of that moment, nor will Ignorance 
excuse, where 'tis affected, and where duty obliges us to Inform our selves better, 
and where the matter is so plain and easie to be understood. 
As for the Judges they have a fairer plea than you, and may quickly return the 
Burthen back upon the Jurors, for we, may they say, did nothing but our duty 
according to usual Practise, the Jury his Peers had found the Fellow Guilty upon 
their Oaths of such an Odious Crime, and attended with such vile, presumptions, 
and dangerous Circumstances. They are Judges, we took him as they presented 
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him to us, and according to our duty pronounced the Sentence, that the Law 
inflicts in such Cases, or set a Fine, or ordered Corporal punishment upon him, 
which was very moderate, Considering the Crime laid in the Indictment or 
Information, and of which they had so sworn him Guilty; if he were innocent or 
not so bad as Represented, let his Destruction lye upon the Jury &c. At this rate if 
ever we should have an unconscionable Judge, might he Argue; And thus the 
Guilt of the Blood or ruin of an Innocent man when 'tis too late shall be Bandyed 
to and fro, and shuffled off from the Jury to the Judge, and from the Judge to the 
Jury, but really sticks fast to both, but especially on the Jurors; because the very 
end of their Institution was to prevent all dangers of such oppression, and in every 
such Case, they do not only wrong their own Souls, and irreparably Injure a 
particular Person, but also basely betray the Liberties of their Countrey in 
General, for as without their ill-complyance and Act no such mischief can happen. 
. . . .336
Dismaying advice for a Christian juror, who must fear to “wrong his soul,” but who must 
nevertheless serve, inevitably coming perilously close to having “the Blood or ruin” 
“stick fast” to him.   
At the end of the seventeenth century, the basic moral tension of criminal jury 
trial was thus manifest:  Jurors were legally free to resist entering judgments, and 
effectively free to resist serving as well.  This was one of the consequences of the great 
English campaign for “liberties” of the late seventeenth century.  But in a world of 
believing Christians, informed about the teachings of moral theology by a widely 
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circulating vernacular literature, this meant grave difficulties for the administration of 
criminal justice. 
 
VIII.  The Eighteenth Century
 
 These were the same tensions that produced the “reasonable doubt” rule a century 
later.  To be sure, the eighteenth century was a period in which the great moral dilemmas 
of the Middle Ages began to dissipate.  This is primarily because of a fundamental 
change in punishment practices.  On both sides of the English Channel, blood 
punishments began to fall into disuse, in a process that would eventually culminate in the 
abolition of the death penalty at the end of the twentieth century in Europe.  On the 
continental side, various forms of forced labor were slowly displacing execution and 
mutilation as the normal punishments in the eighteenth century.337  In England too, the 
criminal justice system was reorienting itself:  During most of the eighteenth century, the 
English system made use of transportation to the American colonies as a substitute for the 
older blood punishments.338  Jurors also avoided inflicting blood punishments through the 
“pious perjury,” systematically undervaluing stolen goods in order to allow the accused 
to escape the most severe penalties of the law.339
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 To the extent blood punishments declined, all the old bets were off, as Langbein 
has recently insisted.340  In particular, the old moral theology inevitably mattered 
somewhat less.  That does not mean that the old theology entirely lost its relevance:  
Jurists still framed questions of punishment in the old theological terms.  Thus on the 
Continent, the new punishments were known as “Verdachtstrafen,” “punishments on 
suspicion.”  “Suspicion,” as we have seen, was a technical term in the moral theology of 
doubt:  It was the degree of certainty one rank higher than “doubt” but still two ranks 
lower than “moral certainty.”  Judges who had a “suspicion” of guilt had been authorized 
to order non-blood punishments since from an early stage in the development of the 
continental system.341  The new system was thus one in which judges ordered lesser 
punishments on lesser degrees of certainty.342  Because death and blood were not 
involved (at least in principle), the moral stakes in the administration of “suspicion 
punishments” were far lower. 
 In England too, to the extent transportation substituted for execution, or other 
mitigating devices were used, the moral stakes were lower.  If blood punishments had 
been completely eliminated, there would have been much less need for the “reasonable 
doubt” instruction.  Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that the “reasonable doubt” 
instruction emerged in the Old Bailey in the early 1780s, precisely the years when the 
system of transportation had collapsed in the wake of the American Revolution.   
Nevertheless, these changes in punishment practices were not enough to eliminate 
all moral concerns.  Even though punishment practices were changing in the eighteenth 
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century, there were always at least a few such cases, and the law on the books continued 
to speak of execution as the normal punishment.  As long as Christian jurors cared about 
the fates of their souls, and knew some moral theology, something would have to be done 
to coax them into serving, and into entering the guilty verdict.  And Christian jurors knew 
some moral theology.  Christianity was by no means in decline in the Anglo-American 
eighteenth century:  This may have been a century of Deism, but it was also a century of 
widespread religiosity and occasionally ecstatic revivals.  For many prospective jurors, 
indeed, these were thunderous times of Christian belief:  As the 1771 Connecticut Black 
Book of Conscience; or God’s High Court of Justice in the Soul proclaimed, “O consider 
this, all ye that forget God, and make no conscience of your ways, you undermine your 
own salvation.”343  Judges who wanted to exercise control over jurors—as judges 
certainly did344—thus faced a difficult task:  the task of controlling distinctly Christian 
jurors, whose beliefs could make them a hard herd to ride. 
Here again, to make clear what was at stake for jurors, we must begin with the 
popular literature of conscience. The traditions of the literature of conscience were by no 
means forgotten in the eighteenth century.  The texts of Ames, Perkins, Baxter and 
Taylor continued to circulate.  Moreover the old teachings were presented by a new crop 
of eighteenth century moralists and popular legal writers.  These men understood 
perfectly well what was at stake.  For example, we may look at an anonymous 1771 
Guide to the Knowledge of the Rights and Privileges of Englishmen.  The author, 
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cribbing without citation from a 1681 pamphlet,345 explained law that dated back to the 
fourteenth century: 
 
The Office and Power of these Juries [i.e. the “Petit-Jury”] is Judicial, they only 
are the Judges from whose Sentence the Indicted are to expect Life or Death; 
upon their Integrity and Understanding, the Lives of all that are brought into 
Judgment do ultimately depend; from their Verdict their [sic] lies no Appeal, by 
finding Guilty or Not Guilty; they do complicatedly resolve both Law and Fact. 
As it hath been the Law, so it hath always been the Custom, and Practice of these 
Juries, upon all general Issues, pleaded in Cases Civil as well as Criminal, to 
judge both of the Law and Fact.  So it is said in the Report of Lord Chief Justice 
Vaughan, in Bushel’s Case, that these Juries determine the Law in all Matters 
where Issue is joined and tried, in the principal Case, whether the Issue be about a 
Trespass or a Debt, or Disseizin in Assizes, of a Tort, or any such like, unless they 
should please to give a special Verdict with an implicit Faith in the Judgment of 
the Court, to which none can oblige them against their Wills.346
From the jurors only was the charged decision of “Life or Death” to be expected; and the 
common law tradition, as reaffirmed by Bushel’s Case, gave them a choice between 
entering the general verdict or the special verdict.  Other moralists also faithfully 
explained the law of jury-duty to their readers, like Thomas Gisborne, who told them of 
their obligation “in conscience” to disclose their private knowledge, and to exercise 
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“incorruptible integrity in pronouncing upon the whole evidence.”347  Informed 
Englishmen were supposed understand the challenges of jury duty. 
 Meanwhile eighteenth-century English moralists repeated all the old lessons of 
the cases of conscience literature.  In particular, they repeated the venerable “safer path” 
doctrine.  I offer two representative quotes: 
Our rule is to follow our consciences steadily and faithfully, after we have taken 
care to inform them in the best manner we can; and where we doubt, to take the 
safest side, and not to venture to do any thing, concerning which we have doubts, 
when we known there can be nothing amiss in omitting it; and on the contrary, not 
to omit any thing about which we doubt, when we know there can be no harm in 
doing it. 
Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in 
Morals (1758)348
 
How is a goodConscience to be kept, when the doubt lies only on one side?  I 
answer, by taking the other side of which there is no doubt, and which therefore is 
the more safe.  In dubiis Pars tutior est eligenda.  “In all doubtful cases choose 
the safer side,” is a maxim almost universally agreed upon.  He that acts with a 
doubting Conscience falls under the Apostolical censure [citing Rom. 14:23], and 
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needlessly hazards the breach of a divine command, which cannot be done 
without sin. 
Henry Grove, A System of Moral Philosophy (1749)349
These moralists were not ready to abjure the English rigorist tradition.  Good English 
Christians serving in positions of public trust must always obey their consciences:  There 
was to be no taking refuge in the concept of a “public conscience.”  Yet at the same time, 
they acknowledged that the great challenge remained that of squaring “conscience” with 
“duty.”  As Grove put it in 1749: 
They who set up a publick Conscience, to which all private Consciences are to 
submit, must be forced to grant, whether they will or no, that a Man ought not to 
surrender up his Judgment to the publick Conscience till his private Conscience is 
satisfied, that the doing so is his duty.  Now there are multitudes who will tell 
them, that upon the fairest Trial of the pretensions of this publick Conscience, 
their particular Conscience convinces them that they ought not to be governed by 
it; whom therefore they must excuse from acting by an implicit Faith, however 
they may esteem it their own duty to take this method.  A public Conscience, that 
is to subsist by every Man’s renouncing his private Conscience, is much like the 
public Credit in a Community, where all the Members are Knaves and 
Bankrupts.350
Serving in a public capacity was a morally dangerous business, which required every 
Christian concerned with the salvation of his soul to proceed with extreme care.  Yet 
good Christians must serve.   
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So it was that the fundamental dilemma of the late seventeenth century hung on, 
opposing the safe conscience to the claims of public duty.  In addressing this dilemma, 
the eighteenth-century moralists continued to insist on the old provisos.  Christians were 
to stay upon the safer path, which meant that they were to listen to their doubts.  But this 
was not to be taken too far.  As Benjamin Calamy had said, a doubtingconscience was not 
to be confused with a scrupulous conscience.  Doubts were legitimate and had to be 
obeyed;  scruples were foolish and should be ignored.351  In particular, the moralists held, 
the good Protestant was always to use his “reason,” wherever possible, in order to remove 
his doubts.  We may quote Grove again: 
Where the Law is doubtful, and even where there is actually no doubt, the side of 
example cannot be warrantably taken, till inquiry has been first made concerning 
what the Law directs.  To the Law and to the Testimony, not to Examples, is the 
rule of proceeding, where the knowledge of the Law is to be had.  It will by no 
means justify a Roman Catholick who without consulting his own Reason, or 
endeavouring to acquaint himself with the doctrine of Scripture, readily gives in 
to absurdities of belief and practice, that he can plead the Authority of the Church, 
and follows men of Name for Piety and Learning; neither does his own 
Conscience make any objections against the way he is in.  For no man is 
privileged from using all the means of informing his Conscience, which God hath 
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put in his power.  And much more inexcusable is the person, who swims with the 
stream when his Conscience is doubting, and he takes no pains to remove his 
Doubts.352
Doubts were, as they always had been, subject to a test of reason. 
 Doubts were subject to a test of reason:  To make this point, it is especially useful 
to quote one of the most influential of early modern English moralists, Jeremy Taylor.353  
As we have seen, Taylor presented, in a typical English way, a rigorist view on the 
judge’s conscience:  A judge was never to “do any publick act against his private 
conscience.”354  A few chapters later, Taylor went on to address the critical question of 
the nature of “the doubtful conscience.”  Here he began by citing the inevitable maxim of 
Innocent III, that in cases of “doubt” one was to choose “the safer part.”  The problem of 
“doubt,” Taylor explained, was created by the existence of “reasons on either side”: 
When the Conscience is doubtful, neither part can be chosen till the doubt be laid 
down; but to chuse the safer part is an extrinsecal means instrumental to the 
deposition of the doubt, and changing the conscience from doubtful to probable.  
The Rule therefore does properly belong to the probable conscience: for that the 
conscience is positively doubtful is but accidental to the question and appendant to 
the person.  For the reasons on either side make the conscience probable, unless 
fear, or some other accident make the man not able to rest on either side. . . . 
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If the conscience be probable, and so evenly weighed that the determination on 
either side is difficult, then the safer side is ordinarily to be chosen . . . .355
“This also happens,” Taylor informed his readers, “in the matter of Justice very often.”356   
Nevertheless, he held, “[i]t is lawful for the Conscience to proceed to action against a 
doubt that is meerly speculative.”357  And what sorts of circumstances were those?  They 
were precisely circumstances in which there were “reasons” on both sides.  In such cases, 
the doubting Christian was to employ “determination” in the effort to reach a decision: 
Every little reason is not sufficient to guide the will, or to make an honest or a 
probable Conscience . . .  but in a doubting conscience, that is, where there are 
seemingly great reasons of either side, and the conscience not able to determine 
between them, but hands like a needle between two load-stones and can go to 
neither, because it equally inclines to both; there it is, that any little dictate that 
can come on one side and turn the scale is to be admitted to counsel and to action; 
for a doubt is a disease in the conscience, like an irresolution in action, and is 
therefore to be removed at any just rate, and any excuse taken rather than have it 
permitted. . . .  For in a doubting conscience the immediate cure is not to chuse 
right, that is the remedy in an erring conscience;  but when the disease or evil, is 
doubting, or suspension, the remedy is determination;  and to effect this, 
whatsoever is sufficient may be chosen and used.358
Doubts there might be;  but one must try somehow to act.  Taylor’s picture of the 
doubting mind is indeed much like that of Prosper Farinacci a century before him:  The 
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mind wavered, and could not decide.  But at last there must be a decisive movement of 
the mind. 
Such was the eighteenth-century moral literature.  It is only if we remember it that 
we can understand the most revealing passage of all:  William Paley’s account of jury 
trial.359  In 1785,  during the very years when the “reasonable doubt” standard established 
itself in English justice, Paley, the leading moral philosopher of the day, described the 
problems of jury trial in the same terms that had been used for more than a century.  
Paley borrowed the well-established language of the conscience literature, explaining that 
the reluctance of jurors to convict grew, not out of legitimate doubt, but out of 
illegitimate scruples.  He saw particular danger in the tendency of juror’s to read too 
much into the centuries-old maxim requiring that in cases of doubt one choose the safer 
path.  Paley’s argument was little different from Calamy’s a hundred years earlier: 
I apprehend much harm to have been done to the community, by the over-strained 
scrupulousness, or weak timidity of juries, which demands often such proof of a 
prisoner’s guilt, as the nature and secrecy of his crime scarce possibly admit of; 
and which holds it the part of a safe conscience not to condemn any man, whilst 
there exists the minutest possibility of his innocence.  Any story they may happen 
to have heard or read, whether real or feigned, in which courts of justice have 
been misled by presumptions of guilt, is enough, in their minds to found an 
acquittal upon, where positive proof is wanting.  I do not mean that juries should 
indulge conjectures, should magnify suspicions into proofs, or even that they 
should weigh probabilities in gold scales;  but when the preponderation of 
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evidence is so manifest as to persuade every private understanding of the 
prisoner’s guilt; when it furnishes that degree of credibility, upon which men 
decide and act in all other doubts, and which experience has shown that they may 
decide and act upon with sufficient safety; to reject such proof, from an 
insinuation of uncertainty that belongs in all human affairs, and from a general 
dread lest the charge of innocent blood should lie at their doors, is a conduct 
which, however natural to a mind studious of its own quiet, is authorized by no 
considerations of rectitude or utility.  It counteracts the care and damps the 
activity of government:  it holds out public encouragement to villany, by 
confessing the impossibility of bringing villains to justice. . . .360
 
All of this should make it completely unsurprising to discover that the “reasonable 
doubt” standard grew out of the old “safer way” moral theology of doubt, and the old 
fears that “public” justice would be endangered by the private conscience; and so it did. 
Let us turn to the first examples of the use of the rule in the later eighteenth 
century.  To hunt for the first case to use the rule would be misguided:  As Barbara 
Shapiro has argued, the “reasonable doubt” rule was quite simply in the air in the later 
eighteenth century.361  Nevertheless, it is revealing to look closely at the earliest cases in 
which the formula does turn up.  The first examples that scholars have found are from the 
American colonies, and in particular from the closing arguments of John Adams and and 
Robert Treat Paine in the Boston Massacre cases of 1770.  Adams, a man quite familiar 
with the traditions of continental law, defending the British soldiers charged in the case, 
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argued that jurors must take the well-worn “safer path.”  Adams quoted the observations 
of Hale’s History of Pleas of the Crown: 
The rules I shall produce to you from Lord Chief Justice Hale, whose character as 
a lawyer, a man of learning and philosophy, and as a christian, will be disputed by 
nobody living; one of the greatest and best characters, the English nation ever 
produced: his words are these. 2. H.H.P.C. Tutius semper est errare, in 
acquietando, quam in puniendo, ex parte misericordiae, quam ex parte justitiae, it 
is always safer to err in acquitting, than punishing, on the part of mercy, than the 
part of justice. The next is from the same authority, 305 Tutius erratur ex parte 
mitiori, it is always safer to err on the milder side, the side of mercy, H.P.P.C. 
509, the best rule in doubtful cases, is, rather to incline to acquittal than 
conviction: and in page 300 Quod dubitas ne feceris, Where you are doubtful 
never act; that is, if you doubt of the prisoners guilt, never declare him guilty, 
though there is no express proof of the fact, to be committed by him; but then it 
must be very warily pressed, for it is better, five guilty persons should escape 
unpunished, than one innocent person should die.362
There was nothing novel about this:  We have already encountered many continental and 
English moral theologians who had spoken, almost verbatim, in the same terms during 
the same years.  “When you are doubtful, do not act!”  Hale is not simply an authority on 
the law, in this passage.  He is an expositor of wholly familiar Christian values. 
On the other side, Paine, arguing for the Crown, himself responded by alluding to 
the moral theological literature.  As we have seen, the traditions of moral theology had 
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long resisted excessive radicalism.  The continental tradition has described the dangers of 
the “benign” view since the thirteenth century.  The same was true of the English 
literature on the problems of justice that had grown up since 1670.  That literature held 
that the doubts that had to be obeyed were those that conformed to “reason.”  Indeed, the 
moralist literature had insisted for a hundred years that qualms of conscience must not be 
allowed to prevent the satisfactory workings of public justice.  It is in that context that we 
can understand the words of Paine that were cited by Anthony Morano thirty years ago: 
[A] “Law all Mercy[”] would be an [unjustice] and therefore when we talk of 
the Benignity of the (English) Law We can understand nothing more than what 
is fairly Comprehended in Coke’s Observation on Our Law in General that it is 
Ultima Ratio the last improvement of Reason which in the nature of it will not 
admit any Proposition to be true of which it has not Evidence, nor determine 
that to be certain of which there remains a doubt.363
There was certainly something of Coke in this.  But the basic tension between certainty 
and doubt had been intimately associated with moral theology for centuries, and 
continued to be intimately associated with moral theology in the British eighteenth 
century.  The same was true of reason and doubt, Paine’s next topic: 
If therefor in the examination of this Cause the Evidence is not sufficient to 
Convince you beyond reasonable Doubt of the Guilt of all or of any of the 
Prisoners by the Benignity and Reason of the Law you will acquit them, but if the 
Evidence be sufficient to convince you of the Guilt beyond reasonable Doubt the 
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Justice of the Law will require you to declare them Guilty and the Benignity of 
the Law will be satisfyed in the fairness and impartiality of the Tryal.364
The Boston Massacre trial arguments, like everything else we have seen from the period, 
were framed in the language of safer path theology. 
The same is true of the next spate of “reasonable doubt” cases identified by 
scholars.  These cases come from the Old Bailey, the criminal court of London, in the 
mid-1780s.  John Langbein has emphasized the importance of these cases in his recent, 
magisterial, work on the “lawyerization” of the common law trial.365  He has, however, 
conceded that he is “unable to say how the emergence of the beyond-reasonable-doubt 
standard was related to the growing lawyerization” that is his theme.366  The answer, I 
believe, is that the emergence of the rule is not related to lawyerization, or at least not in 
any direct way.  If anything, these Old Bailey cases show the presence, in the minds of all 
involved, of safer path moral theology, even more clearly than the Boston Massacre trial.   
Again, there should be no surprise in this:  Paley, commenting on English 
criminal justice in 1785, complained precisely that jurors hesitated to convict because 
they wished to preserve a “safe” conscience.  So they did.  Our records of what was said 
in the Old Bailey trials of the time is inevitably spotty.  But they make it obvious enough 
that the moral theology of the safer path was guiding jurors.  For example, we can look to 
a 1787 trial.  The closing declaration of the judge in that case is framed in the same 
language used two years earlier by Paley.  Paley spoke of jurors who wished to keep their 
consciences “safe,” and so did the judge in this case.  He also made it clear that he 
himself, like public officials for a century, felt the need to compensate for the reluctance 
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of jurors to convict, in order to show proper severity.  The guilt of the three accused 
persons, in the judge’s eyes, was “perfectly clear.”  Yet he acknowledged that he had to 
bow to juror “conscience”: 
Trial of John Ward, alias Spoony Jack, Alexander Bell, Thomas Porter (theft with 
violence: robbery) (1787)367:  
The Jury retired for a quarter of an hour, and returned with a verdict 
ALL THREE NOT GUILTY. 
Court. Prisoners, you have been extremely fortunate in the caution that has been 
used by the Jury in this case, which I am far from blaming: for in a case where 
any degree of doubt occurs, whatever reason there may be to suspect the guilt of 
parties, it is always safest to lean on the side of mercy; where any real and 
substantial doubt occurs: but there are such circumstances proved, that whether 
you are or are not guilty of the robbery, it is perfectly clear, that you and your 
associate, that worthless woman there, decoyed this poor man, if not for the 
purpose of robbing, clearly for that of grossly and cruelly ill-treating him; that is 
an offence punishable by law, though in a different way; therefore I shall think it 
my duty, that you should be brought to punishment for that offence; and I shall 
therefore commit you to Newgate, till you can find bail for assaulting and ill-
treating this man; in this case, for the encouragement of those who may have been 
guilty with their associates, but have shewn some compassion on the person 
whom they have robbed . . . . 
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Other judges showed the same attitude, conceding the right of jurors to take the “surest 
side” in cases of doubt, but taking at the least the occasion to admonish the accused: 
Trial of John Shepherd (Theft) (1789)368: 
 
[Verdict]:  NOT GUILTY. 
Tried by the London Jury before Mr. RECORDER. 
Court to Prisoner. You have had a very narrow escape indeed; the Jury have taken 
that which is always the surest side, if there is any degree of doubt; as they have 
spared your life, I hope it will be so conducted by you, as to make this verdict a 
benefit to yourself. 
Other judges were more willing to accept the prospect that a jury might acquit because 
the jurors found the “safest” path, in a case where there was a “balance” of doubt, the 
“most pleasant” for themselves: 
 Alexander Gregory (Theft with Violence; Robbery) (1784)369: 
[Court]:  [I]n short, if any doubt at all hangs upon your minds, if you feel the least 
suspicions, any balance at all, you know it is much the safest way, and it must be 
most pleasant to you, to lean to the merciful side and acquit him. . . . 
NOT GUILTY. 
The mind in “balance” was a familiar topos from moral theology.  So indeed were jurors 
who, like the jurors described by Hawles a century earlier, were concerned about what 
was “pleasant” for themselves as well as for the accused. 
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The search for the safer path showed up in other ways too in the Old Bailey:  In 
some cases, the court coaxed the jury to take the “safest” way by convicting of a lesser 
charge. 370  As on the Continent, moreover, the language of moral theology also colored 
the treatment of evidence.  Judge’s commenting on the evidence for the jury also spoke 
reflexively of “the safer way”: 
Trial of Henry Harvey (Deception, Perjury) (1785)371: 
[G]entlemen, when I call your attention to the circumstance of the case, I am bold 
to say that her evidence cannot be true, if much of that evidence which has 
preceded it be true; therefore, wherever there are contradictions as they cannot be 
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Court to Jury. The circumstance of privacy seems to be personal, to the person that commits the 
fact, and that of the person who is present, aiding, and assisting, is guilty of the felony, yet as it 
depends very often upon the personal dexterity, it might not be fit perhaps to punish the person 
who means to be aiding and assisting in the general offence of stealing, with the same severity 
therefore the rule has been, to confine it to the individual hand tha t commits the fact; therefore, if 
it cannot be said, that both the prisoners were guilty of the private stealing, it is the safest way to 
acquit them altogether of the criminal charge. 
MARGARET MURPHY, BRIDGET MURPHY, 
GUILTY, Of stealing but not privately. 
William Snaleham (theft: burglary) (1784). The Proceedings of the Old Bailey Ref: t17840421-8: 
 
Court. Gentlemen of the Jury, As to breaking there is a difficulty which is not explained to your 
satisfaction or mine; nobody knows how they got into the house, there are no marks of violence 
any where; there is a small circumstance that goes to make it more probable that it should be at the 
parlour window, but that I rather think falls short of satisfactory proof that they did get in that 
way; they might have got in by some way which excludes the idea of force used to obtain 
admission; as for instance, if a garret window was open, and they got in by the leads, or if they got 
in at any other open window by a ladder: it therefore seems to me upon the whole evidence, if you 
should be satisfied that the prisoner was concerned in this robbery, the safest and properest verdict 
for you to give will be, that he is guilty of stealing the things, but not guilty of breaking and 
entering the dwelling house. 
GUILTY Of stealing the goods, but NOT GUILTY of breaking and entering the dwelling house. 
 
 
371 Trial of Henry Harvey (Deception, Perjury) (1785) THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY REF: 
T17850914-187 
both true, the safer way I take it, is to reject such evidence entirely; if the evidence 
of Goodman be true, the evidence of Brookes is not true; if Brookes's is true, 
Goodman's is not true; the safer way, and that which has always been taken, as I 
conceive, by every Jury, is, to reject that testimony entirely. 
It is in the same light that we should interpret a 1783 case cited by Langbein, in which the 
judge told jury that if “considering the evidence that has been laid before you, and all the 
circumstances of the case, you should err on the innocent side of the question, I am sure 
you error will be pardonable.”372  The question, of course, was whether what the jurors 
had done would be “pardonable.”  The Old Bailey, like the rest of the Anglo-American 
world, was a world whose conversations casually assumed that wise heads sought “the 
safer way”; and judges spoke respectfully of the corresponding anxieties of jurors. 
Yet as jurists had recognized since at least the thirteenth century, delicacy of 
conscience posed inevitable threats to the management of criminal justice.  In the 
traditions of moral theology, such dangers to the “public interest” were met by insisting 
that doubts be reasonable, and that was true in the Old Bailey as well.  We can see this in 
a series of cases that begin tentatively in 1782,373 and more clearly 1783.  In one 1783 
trial we find the judge describing once again the classic conflict between private 
conscience and public duty, as it had been laid out by Calamy a century earlier: 
Trial of John Clarke (Murder) (10 Dec. 1783)374: 
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Court. Have you any reasonable doubt - I am partly sure it was the hanger; the lock of the pistol 
was found in the co next morning. 
NOT GUILTY 
374 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY REF: T17831210-4 
If from all these circumstances you are clearly satisfied that the wound was the 
cause of his death, and are also clearly satisfied with the truth of the rest of the 
evidence, and that the result of that evidence is proved clearly to your satisfaction, 
that the prisoner is the man that gave the wound, I am then obliged to tell you that 
I am of opinion there is nothing in this case that can reduce the crime below that 
aggravated crime of murder: and it will in that case be your duty to find the 
prisoner guilty of this indictment: If on the other hand you think there is any room 
to doubt the truth of the evidence, or that believing the truth of the evidence is not 
sufficient proof that the prisoner gave the wound, or that the wound was the cause 
of his death; in that case it is your duty to acquit the prisoner wholly; or if there 
appears any circumstances that would reduce the crime to manslaughter, in that 
case you may find that verdict; but there does not appear to me any sort of 
evidence to take that middle line: Therefore, give your verdict according to your 
own consciences, you must be clearly satisfied of the fact of a crime so heinous in 
its nature, and so penal in its consequences, and then it is your duty to the public 
and to justices, to find the prisoner guilty. If on the other you think there is any 
reasonable cause for doubt, either upon the fact of his warning the man, or of the 
wound being the cause of his death, you will acquit him. 
Guilty of the wilful murder. Death. 
In another, we find the judge speaking, as moral theologians had long done, in terms of 
“moral probability,” and of the public interest as well: 
Trial of John Higginson (Theft; Embezzlement) (1783).375: 
In almost every case that comes before you, there is a strict possibility where the 
positive fact itself is not proved by witnesses, who saw the fact, there is a strict 
possibility, that somebody else might have committed it: But that the nature of 
evidence requires, that Juries should not govern themselves, in questions of 
evidence, that come before them, by that strictness, is most evident, for if it were 
not so, it is not possible that offenders of any kind should be brought to Justice. 
Where there is reasonable probability, that not withstanding the appearances a 
man may be innocent, it is very fair to make use of them: But if it goes further, 
and if there is nothing but absolute possibility, where all the moral probabilities of 
evidence are against the prisoner, where nothing can save but absolute possibility 
that he may be innocent, it would be going too far to conclude him innocent from 
that, that would make it impossible that public Justice should take its course. 
Therefore, the true question for your consideration is, whether judging of this fact, 
as you judge of all other facts, that happen in the course of your dealings with 
mankind, and your correspondence with one another, it appears to you be proved 
satisfactorily, and to moral demonstration, that this prisoner must have been the 
person that secreted this letter, and took these notes out of it, if that be the fair 
result of this evidence, then the prisoner is guilty, and it will be your duty to find 
him so. If on viewing the evidence any reasonable doubt remains on your minds, 
that he is the person that secreted this letter, and took the notes out of it, he will be 
entitled to your acquital. The public justice of the country is extremely 
considered, on the one hand, if the charge is fairly brought home to the prisoner, 
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that justice should be done upon him; while on the other hand, if there remains 
any distant hope of his innocence, he should have the same justice by being found 
not guilty. 
GUILTY. (Death.) 
The “reasonable doubt” language, while hardly yet a fast rule of law, was regularly 
repeated thereafter: 
Trial of Richard Corbett (Arson) (1784).376: 
But you gentlemen will weigh all these circumstances in your minds, in 
such a case you certainly will not convict the prisoner on a mere 
suspicion; but if you think his conduct such as can by no possibility be 
accounted for consistent with his innocence, you will be obliged to find him 
guilty; I do not mean to say that you are to strain against all evidence, or 
that if you are clearly and truly convinced of his guilt in your own minds 
you ought to acquit him, but I say if there is a reasonable doubt, in that 
case that doubt ought to decide in favour of the prisoner. 
NOT GUILTY. 
Trial of Joseph Rickards (Murder) (1786)377: 
                                                 
376 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY REF: T17840707-10 
If you are satisfied, Gentlemen, upon the whole, that he is guilty, you will find 
him so; if you see any reasonable doubt, you will acquit him. 
 
Trial of George Crossley (Deception) (1796)378: 
The first point, therefore, for you to consider is, whether this is the genuine will of 
Mr. Lewis, or whether it is a forgery; which, if we should establish beyond any 
reasonable ground of doubt, for you are not to expect mathematical demonstration 
in the proceedings of the administration of justice; but you are not to pronounce 
him guilty of a forgery, if a reasonable doubt can be entertained, by conscientious 
men upon their oaths, fairly considering the circumstances of the case. 
Such was the origin of “reasonable doubt.” 
 The question remains why the standard established itself in the Old Bailey when it 
did, in the mid-1780s.  I have already hinted at what I think may be the answer:  If we can 
trust the records that we have, all of these cases—cases speaking not only of “reasonable 
doubt” but also of “the safer path,” “the surer side” and the like—date to the early 1780s, 
and most especially to the years 1783 and 1784.  It was in 1785, too, that Paley addressed 
himself to jurors who worried too much about keeping their consciences “safe.”  These 
seem to mark the critical moment.   
If those were indeed the years in which the old moral theology was definitively 
introduced into English jury instructions, it worth noting a possible link with the history 
of punishment.  As we have seen, blood punishments were primarily avoided through 
transportation to America during the eighteenth century.  Once the American Revolution 
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began, though, transportation was impossible.  During the duration of the Revolution, 
convicts were put to hard labor, in the so-called “hulks” on the Thames.  It remained 
unclear, though, what their ultimate fate would be.  Only in 1787 was transportation re-
introduced, now with Australia as its terminus.  Within this period of uncertainty, 1783 is 
an important date:  It was in September of 1783 that the Treaty of Paris was signed, 
formally recognizing American independence.  The first cases using the “reasonable 
doubt” formula in the Old Bailey thus came in the year in which it became clear for the 
first time that transportation to America was an impossibility, while it remained uncertain 
what was otherwise to be the fate of those convicted.  Perhaps—though I offer the 
suggestion only most diffidently—this raised the punishment stakes sufficiently that 
jurors needed more coaxing to convict than had been the case in previous decades.  
Seventeen-eighty-three was a year when no one could be quite sure where the future of 
punishment lay. 
 
IX.  Conclusion 
 
 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the moral anxieties I have 
traced were gradually forgotten.  They were certainly not forgotten immediately.  
We can follow the continuing importance of the old moral theology in the rise of 
the “moral certainty” formula, used alongside “reasonable doubt” for generations.  
Steve Sheppard has recently traced much of this history.379  Nor did educated 
lawyers forget the old anxieties at once.  As we have seen, the power of the 
moral drama of judging was still strongly felt by James Fitzjames Stephen in 
1883.380
 Nevertheless, the old Christian culture that produced the “reasonable 
doubt” rule underwent a slow process of decline after 1800.  Indeed, it was not 
just the old Christian culture that went into decline:  More broadly, the old world 
of pre-modern anxieties, of which Latin Christendom was just one part, began to 
vanish.  By the early or mid-twentieth century, few people still had the old vivid 
sense of the “heavy and painful” responsibilities of judging.   
Unavoidably, this altered the moral structure of jury trial.  Indeed, over the 
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the common-law world 
gradually underwent the same change that had probably already taken place in 
the culture of the judges of the sixteenth-century Continent.  As we have seen, 
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sixteenth-century continental jurists were already in a kind of modern condition:  
They betrayed little sense of any moral or spiritual anxiety in judging.  By the 
sixteenth century, continental judges had probably already come fully to inhabit 
their professional roles.  In consequence, the medieval theology of doubt, a 
theology of anxiety, gave way to something else on the Continent:  It gave way to 
a continental law of proof that was just a law of proof, not a law of moral 
comfort.381  Continental judges, fully professionalized and feeling a diminished 
need for moral comfort, could treat trial simply as a process of attaining certainty. 
The same thing has happened in our own world over the last couple of 
centuries.  Jurors have certainly not acquired a fully professionalized identity.  
But they have lost so much of the anxiety attached to judging that they feel a 
diminished need for moral comfort.382  At the same time, the old moral theology 
of doubt has lost its currency:  We no longer live in a world of Christian jurors 
experiencing fear and trembling every time they must act when “in doubt.”  We 
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no longer live in a world in which individuals feel the need to find their way to “the 
safer path.”  Correspondingly, the old moral comfort rules have come to seem to 
us like proof rules—first and foremost among them, “reasonable doubt.” 
 Yet “reasonable doubt” was never designed to be a proof rule, and it 
cannot possibly work as one.  Therein lies the heart of our current dilemma.  
When the “reasonable doubt” formula was addressed to the moral anxieties of 
Christian jurors, as it was in its original form in the 1780s, it made sense:  It was 
capable of achieving a practical goal.  After all, Christians experiencing moral 
anxiety can be comforted.  If they know the terminology and traditions of the 
moral theology of doubt, and if they are guided by judges who seem concerned 
and trustworthy, they can overcome their doubts, and vote to convict.  By 
contrast, achieving complete certainty in criminal cases is not a practical goal.  
There is no such thing as a procedure that will always produce objectively correct 
answers in a criminal trial; and there is no possible formula, in any jury 
instruction, that will meaningfully guarantee that the ends of proof have been 
reliably attained.  The formula “reasonable doubt,” in particular, is of no use in the 
pursuit of objective truth.  It is a rule addressed to the subjective state of mind of 
the anxious Christian. 
 So it is that we find ourselves in a state of communal confusion, clinging to 
the “reasonable doubt” formula, a moral comfort formula, in a world in which we 
think criminal procedure is exclusively about proof.  Indeed, we find ourselves in 
a world in which we cannot seem to figure out how to manage our criminal justice 
at all, with the Supreme Court jerking, in an unseemly and socially costly fashion, 
from upholding the Sentencing Guidelines to making them completely 
unworkable.  There are many causes of that situation, of course.  But one cause 
is that we asking the wrong question:  We are asking the unanswerable question 
of whether guilt has been “proven beyond a reasonable doubt” to juries. 
 Does that mean we should abandon the “reasonable doubt” rule?  That 
would be unthinkable.  It has become much too deeply rooted in our legal culture.  
But it does mean that we must approach “reasonable doubt” in a more historically 
informed, open-minded, and morally humane spirit. 
 How then should we approach “reasonable doubt”?  First, there is no point 
in trying to be faithful to the original intent of the phrase.  This is in part because 
there is no original drafter of the “reasonable doubt” rule:  Not only does the 
phrase not appear in the Constitution, it was never crafted by anybody in 
particular.  It emerged in a process of collective European rehashing of the 
precepts of Christian moral theology.  It was created not only by English jurists, 
but also by English moralists—and by Italian and Spanish and French moralist 
and lawyers as well.  There is thus no original intent to interpret.  All that we can 
do is try to understand the rule in its original context, which is something 
different. 
 Second, there are better and worse ways to understand the rule in its 
original context.  The worse way is to try to reformulate it in ways that somehow 
are intended to be faithful to its original purpose.   There is more than one way to 
make this mistake.  It would be a mistake, for example, to begin by observing 
that the original purpose of the rule was to make conviction easier, not harder; 
and then to draw the nasty conclusion that a modern jury instruction should tell 
the jury to get over its qualms and convict.  This would make little sense in our 
world, simply because the problems of our world are not the problems of the 
eighteenth century.  Jurors today bring relatively few Christian qualms to the 
process of judgment, and we have no need for a rule intended to coax them into 
convicting. 
It would make equally little sense to observe that the rule originally had to 
do with blood punishments, and therefore to restrict it to capital cases.  While the 
rule undoubtedly has a place in capital cases—perhaps the last cases where 
jurors still fully feel some of the old anxieties—it has a place elsewhere as well, if 
it has any place at all.  The world of punishment has changed since the early 
modern period.  Unlike our ancestors, we no longer think of non-blood 
punishments as mild punishments.  Indeed, in the current American atmosphere, 
it would be a wholly tragic error to refuse to recognize the harshness of our non-
blood punishments, and the correspondingly high moral stakes in inflicting them. 
 The right lesson to draw from the history of “reasonable doubt” is not a 
lesson about how to make sense of “reasonable doubt,” either in its original intent 
or in its original context.  Those are senseless goals.  The right lesson is a lesson 
about the consequences of the great moral changes of the last two centuries.  
The real root of our dilemmas has to do with the fact that we have forgotten how 
morally fearsome the act of judging is.  We have allowed ourselves to become 
people who condemn offenders precisely in the way Saint Augustine said 
offenders must never be condemned:  with “passion,” and most especially with 
the passion of self-righteousness.  We have lost any sense that we should doubt 
our own moral authority when judging other human beings, forgetting what 
Christian jurists knew in the fifteenth century:  [I]f the judge glories in the death of 
a man, as no small number do in our age, he is a murderer.”383  I say this not in 
order to preach, as the crazies of the 60s did, that we should honor criminals as 
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“revolutionaries,” or anything of the kind.  The old moral theologians were right:  
We must condemn criminals.  It is a part of our sober public duty.  But we must 
condemn them in a spirit of humility, of duteousness, of fear and trembling about 
our own moral standing.  That is what our ancestors understood; and they were 
right.  It is because they understood this that they spoke about “reasonable 
doubt.”   
We can never return to the moral world of our ancestors:  The theology 
that taught them the lesson of “reasonable doubt” is lost to us for good.   But the 
lesson is one that we must find some way to re-learn.   Most especially it, we 
must learn it when it comes to jury trial.  Indeed, if there is any advantage to jury 
trial, it is that jurors have not fully come to inhabit the hardened, professionalized 
attitude of the sixteenth-century continental judge.  Lay jurors can still find 
something shocking and fearful in what they do, at least in capital cases.  Even in 
capital cases, though, jurors must be reminded of what is at stake:  As 
Eisenberg, Garvey and Wells write, “it would be better to openly and routinely 
instruct jurors that the decision they are about to make is, depite its legal 
trappings, a moral one and that, in the absence of legal error, their judgment will 
be final.”384  It would indeed, and not just where death is involved.  Instructing 
jurors forcefully that their decision is “a moral one” about the fate of a fellow 
human being, is, in the last analysis, the only meaningful way to be faithful to the 
original spirit of “reasonable doubt.”   
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